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149 I.  THE  RESEARCH  PROGRAMME  0~ THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
1. Objectives of Community  research on  the development  of concentration 
In 1970,  the Commission  of the European Communities,  at the initiative of its 
Directorate-General for Competition,  put in hand  a  comprehensive research programme 
to study the development  of concentration in a  number .of  industries in the various 
member  countries of the Community.  There  were  two  reasons for  launching this 
programme: 
- business concentration is becoming  increasingly important - going beyond  the 
frontiers of individual countries. and radically changing traditional structures -
this being partly due  to the establishment of a  common  market  in which  goods, 
services,  capital and  persons move  freely; 
- the official organizations and departments responsible for statistics do  not 
possess uniform,  meaningful  information which  can be  used to .compare  the structures 
of industries and  markets  in the different. member  countries,  from  the point  of view 
of concentration and competition. 
The  Commission  research programme  is designed to meet  these requirements for 
information an,d  comparison  ~'lot.  international level,  by  establishing systematic, 
uniform methodli!<which.all research institutes in the different countries of the 
Community  wil.l  follow and  practice in their studies. 
The  'l'reaties establishing the EuropeanCommunities  specify the Commission's  aims, 
functions and activities. 
Competition;policy ~ainly Articles 85  and 86  of the  EEC  Treaty)  represent  an 
important part of t)lese activities. 
Examination  of. these clauses,  fundamental  to the creation and administration of a 
common  market,  would  be  out  of context here.  However,  it is worth recalling the 
statement made  in 1970  by Mr.  Albert Borschette, Member  of the Commission  responsible 
for competition policy,  when  presenting the research programme  on  the development  o.f 
concentration,  giving details of its objectives and  scope: 
a)  The  "sectoral" and  comparative studies on  the development  of concentration  ..  ·. 
contribute towards the monitoring of productive structures,  so :t:hat  all mealiJ'*eS
11 
and  intervention in. this field can be  based on  thoro'll8h  knowledge  of'  these  · 
structures. 
b)  In this Wl'l-Yt  facts and figures  can be  mustered  enabling a  rational competition 
policy to be  pursued,  based on  an examination and  constant review of the situation, 
with a  view to the general objective of encouraging the establishmeni;  of strong 
and efficient firms while forestalling the development  of monopoly situations. 
2.  General research criteria:  subject 
In order to measure  concentration and analyse its effects and relationships .,.. above 
all with a  view to competition and  industrial efficiency - the following m11st  be 
defined: 
- the subject of the analysis, 
- the relevant variables and data, 
- the measures  or indices to be  used. 
As  far as the subject is concerned,  the Commission  has chosen: 
- the industry and national approach, 
7 - the dynamic  or comparative statics approach, 
so as to provide as wide  a  range as possible of comparisons  and  references. 
The  same  industries were  analysed: 
a)  in.the different member  countries,  in order to produce  a  basis for  comparison 
between the structure and  development  of each one  in relation to the other 
member  countries; 
b)  over a  fairly long period  (in most  cases from  1962  to date for the older member 
countries,  and  from  1969  onwards  for the United Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland)  so 
as  t~ obtain an overall impression of the  f~cets, trends  and  significance of the 
various processes of concentration within a  suitably representative space  of time. 
Whenever  possible,  the most  important  sub-industries and  product markets within 
each industry have  been analysed from  the viewpoint  of structure and  development 
(for example,  with regard to the manufacture  of. electrical goods,  the domestic 
electrical appliance sub-industry was  examined  separately from  that covering radios 
and  TVs.  Then  again,  within each of these sub-industries the sectors covering 
refrigerators, dishwashers,  etc.  were  examined  separately). 
It is planned to update  the industrial surveys from  time to time,  in most  cases 
every four or five years,  and  to intensify the analyses,  particularly on  product 
markets,  financial links,  mergers  and acquisitions,  prices and  the manufacturers' 
and distributors' margins. 
3·  The  industries selected 
The  industries selected for investigation are listed in Table 1,  whioh  shows  the 
situation at 31st December  1975  with regard to all the studies already carried out 
or under way.  Most  of these have  already been published in full by the Commission. 
However,  the various r.esearch institutes and  groups  which  carried out the different 
surveys are entirely responsible for the  information included and t.he  opinions 
expressed. 
This year  (1976),  hawever,  and  above  all in coming years,  investigations will have 
to be  extended to new  industries and  markets  in. order to provide a  fairly 
representative picture of the situation regarding economic  structures and  their 
comparative development  within the Community. 
The  criteria used in selecting the industries are comparatively empirical in view  of 
the  Commission's  requirements. and  aims,  and  of the resources available for allocation 
to this work•  There are necessarily a  number  of prior conditions,  i.e.: 
a)  excessively concentrated industries and  those  on  which  there is sufficiently 
detailed information available were  excluded,  for in this case the measuring 
of the concentration and the analysis of its effects do  not require the complex, 
elaborate methods  devised,  neither do  they justify the cost of such research; 
b)  atomistic industries,  in which there is little or no  concentration,  were  excluded 
because  .. it was  not worth organizing research; 
c)  industries which were  too  complicated or awkward  for various reasons  were 
excluded  (for example,  in the case of many different  or specialized products,  or 
highly integrated,  diversified groups  with interests in a  very large numb.er  of 
markets and  products),  for the collection of the basic data would  have  been either 
too costly or simply not feasible. 
However,  these principles with regard to industries to be  excluded merely represent 
a  tentative guide to present work.  During the  course  of the  surveys industries which 
are now  excluded could still be  brought  in if this was  felt appropriate. 
8 TABLE  1 
List of studies  on  industries completed or under. wq at  31  december 1975 
COUNTRY 
NICE  INDUSTRIES 
D  F  I  NL  B  GB  Ei  DK 
23  Manufacture  of textiles 
232  Wool  +  +  +  +  + 
233  Cotton  +  +  +  +  + 
237  Knitted and  crocheted goods  +  +  +  +  + 
27  Paper industry and  manufac-
ture  of paper products 
271  Manufacture  of pulp paper  +  +  +  +  + 
and  paperboard 
272  Processing of paper and  +  +  +  +  + 
pa.perboard 
31  Chemical  industry 
313.1  Manufacture  of pharmaceu- +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
tical products 
313.2  Manufacture  of photographic  +  +  +  +  +  + 
products 
313.5  Manufacture  of cleaning and  +  +  + 
maintenance  products 
:c 
38  Manufacture  of transport 
equipment 
385.1  Manufacture  of motorcycles,  +  +  +  + 
cycles  and  power~assisted 
cycles 
36  i  Manufacture  of machinery 
other than electric machines 
J61  Agricultural machinery  and 
tractors  +  +  +  + 
362  Office machinery  +  +  +  + 
364.1  Textile machinery  +  +  +  + 
366.3  Equipment  for civil engi- +  +  + 
nee ring and  the  mechanical 
366.4  working of building ma-
terials 
366.5  Hoisting and  handling  +  +  +  + 
equipment 
37  Electrical engineering  +  +  +  +  + 
375  Electronic equipment,  audio 
equipment,  radio and televi-
sion receivers 
376  Electrical appliances for do  +  +  +  +  + 
mestic use 
20-B  Food  manuf.  industries  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
9 4•  Definition of the unit 
If the .results obtained are to be  sufficiently homogeneous  and  comparable,  the 
delimitation and  definition of the subject must  be  as strict and  uniform as  possibl~ 
among  all research insti.tutes. 
This  is a  twofold.problem: 
- delimitation of the industries, 
- definition of the unit. 
As  far asthe delimitation of the industries is concerned,  stati~;~tical nomenclature 
varies from country to country.  The  Nomenclature  of Industries in the EQropean 
Communities  (NICE)  established by the Community  Statistical Office in Luxembourg 
has therefore been used;  industries at the three or four digit level were  therefore 
referred to {see NICE  number  and description of industries in Table  1). 
NICE  has recently been replaced,  with modifications in the numbering rather than in 
the groupings and  delimitation of industries,  by NACE  (General Industrial Classification 
of Economic  Activities within the European Communities). 
With  regard to the definition of the unit used for the econometric analysis of each 
industry,  the· following definitions established by the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities  in Luxembourg  should be recalled; 
"  - The  enter~rise is a  legally-defined organization which  (a)  has its owri  balance 
sheet,  (b  is subject to a  directing authority (which may  be  either a  natural 
or a  legal person)  and  (c)  has  been formed  to carryon in one  or more  places 
one  or more  activities for the production of goods  or services. 
';"'  A. ;qoup of enterprises is an association of enterprises held toge.ther by  lM.al 
and or financial arrangements,  such as holding companies,  cartels,  consortia, 
etc.  The  group may  comprise more  than one  source  of decision-making -
particularly as regards policy on production,  sales, profits, etc.  It can 
bring together certain aspects of financial management  and  taxation matters. 
-The local. unit (inthe strict sense);  a  production unit  (e.g.  a  workshop, 
factory,  shop,  office,  mine  or warehouse)  which is situated in a  geographically 
separate place and  in which  one  or more  persons work  for a  single enterprise. 
The  local unit in the wider sense consists of a  local unit ·and.  satellite units 
dependent  on it and situated in its immediate  vicinity. 
~ The  kind-of-activity units  (KAU)  are those enterprises or parts thereof (whether 
spatially separated or not)  that carry on  a  single activity which is characterized 
by. the nature  of the goods  or services produced or by  the essential identity 
of the production process  employed,  this activity being defined in terms  of a 
standard classification of economic  activities. 
The  KAU  may  of course also include parts of an enterprise located in different 
places,  provided they exerci.se the same  activity,  as previously def'ined. 
The  local KAU:  part of a  local unit carryin.g on a particular production 
activity.  It is a  kind-of-activity unit at the level of the local unit." 
Generally speaking,  one  firm may  be considered either from  the  "enterpri~e" vie'Wl>oint 
or the "KA'!J''  one.  For the purposes  arid within the scope  Of the st'Wiies  on  oonoe11~ration 
sponsored by the Commission  of '\ne EUropean  Oomm"UnitieEJ1  the units considered were 
enterprises.  For eaoh indUEJtry  examined,  ~y  those firms where  at least 50%  of 
;urnover was  derived from operations in the industry were  considered as belonging to 
it ("enterprise" approach).  · 
10 In addition,  calculations were  made  in some  cases on the. basis of the definition 
of the kind-of-activity unit  (KAU)  when  one  or more  companies  deriving less than 
5o%  of total turnover from  the industry concerned nevertheless occupied an important 
position in that industry.  A good  example  is FIAT,  the bulk of whose  turnover is 
accounted for by motor  manufacturing.  However,  FIAT!3;lso  builds tractors;  indeed, 
it is by far the most  important lnanufactur.er in the tractor industry.  When  analysing 
this industry FIAT.'s  share cannot be  ignored;  it cannot  be  considered as  an ttenterprise" 
(since the bulk of its production comes  under another. industry),  but must  be  considered 
as a  kind-of-activity unit. 
In this case,  therefore,  two distinct econometric calculations must  be  carried out 
for each study: 
- one  based on  the "enterprise" and the whole activity value in the case in question 
(sales,  employment,  eto.) is taken into consideration and.  not merely the part of its 
operations falling within the industry under consideration; 
- one  based on  the kind-of-activity unit, .where  for each firm only that part of 
its operations  (expressed in terms  of the sales and  employment  variables,  etc.) 
entering into the industry under consideration is taken into account. 
The  difference is clearly fundamental~  Fortunately,  in most  of the industry 
studies it has proved feasible to confine theanalysis to the "enterprise" approach. 
5•  The  stases in the concentration survey 
There are three stages in carrying out the studies. 
Stage  I 
Collection of basic data at  industry level and at individual product markets  level, 
according to their importance and.  on  the basis of existing possibilities. 
In this first stage all available sources are used (official publications,  periodicals, 
material supplied by national statistical offices, etc.),  but direct contact.above 
all is important  and decisive for the success of the  survey - first of all,  by means 
of questionnaires and then through personal interviews - with the most  important 
firms in each industry and market,  and with the trade associations. 
The  outcome  of the survey depends  above all on the success  of this first stage. 
Stage II 
This consists in the econometric calculations of all the basic data collected so · 
as to show: 
- the development  of concentration in the industries and markets  under consideration; 
- the quantitative relationships between concentration of the structure, its 
development  and the firms'  performances. 
Stage III 
This aims to provide an overall complete picture of the industry and  markets and 
their technological and  commercial  features by using the results of the. previous 
stages,  emphasizing the relationships between concentration and competition and 
in particular, the extent and  impact  of modern  forms  of competition (international, 
substitution,  innovation),  mergers  and trade investments,  and  the strategies ~f big 
companies  (without neglecting foreign investments). 
ll In the third stage,  the  research institutes are  authorized to  add  any  information 
and  analyses  likely to contribute to fuller understanding of the  industries  and 
their development. 
Nevertheless,  the corner-stone of the survey is the  methodology  applied in the 
second stage  ;  for one  thing it determines  and guides the  w~  data are mustered 
in the first stage  and,  secondly,  it provides  the  means  and  material for carr.ying 
through,  and  adding depth to,  the third stage,  in line with the  objectives or 
operational goals  pursued in this  research, 
The  success of the studies  and  the scope  for making syntheses  and  comparisons  at 
Community  level mainly depend  on  the effectiveness of this methodology, 
12 II.  THE  MEASURES  OF  CONCENTRATION 
6. Methodology 
In order to prepare and  apply a  given methodology,  as  already seen at I.2.,  the 
subject,  the variables and  the measures  must  be  defined. 
This problem must  now  be  analysed in depth,  bearing in mind  the functional  link 
between the object, variables and  measures.  Let  us  start by  examining  the  latter, 
for they essentially represent  the research's methodological  orientation. 
In this respect,  the Commission  has assumed  a  neutral position,  espousing no 
particular dogma,  for it considers: 
1)  that no  quantitative measure  is complete  and  independent  in itself and  by  itself 
and  therefore the "synthesis in figures"  that it provides must  be  incomplete  and 
inaccurate; 
2)  that all measures  can be  useful for understanding a  given facet  of an  industry 
and  that none  should be  rejected out  of hand; 
3)  that  consequently,  all the main  measures  should be  used.  This does  not  entail 
higher costs,  for the  computer  can be  used to calculate all measures  under 
consideration at the  same  time. 
Each research institute then chooses  and interprets the  econometric results of the 
measures it has  considered most  suitable,  meaningful  and useful for achieving the 
objectives  of the research. 
The  Commission's  position with regard to econometric methodology has  therefore 
been  extremely liberal,  in order to leave all possibilities open to the research 
institutes to achieve as much  as possible,  and at the  same  time,  through"the full 
publication of the  information and  measures  in question,  to allow all scholars to 
learn of and  assess all quantitative results, without  limitations or restrictions 
of any kind. 
7•  The  measures  of concentration: n, !t CR 
n 
Point  1)  at II.6. requires a  word  of explanation:  there is, as stated,  no  single 
perfect measure  which  objectively expresses the degree  of concentration of an 
industry. 
This is because concentration has  so many  aspects  and  because  so many  definitions 
and  approaches to it can validly be  adopted. 
The  degree  of concentration of a  structure or of an interrelated set of units depends 
on  the number  of units and  their distribution - even,  uneven,  very uneven. 
a)  An  initial measure  of concentration is provided by  any change  in the number  (n) 
of the units which  go  to make  up  the industry.  If, for example,  in a  given 
industry the number  of firms  (n)  has  increased between  1962  and  1969,  it may  be 
assumed  that the degree of concentration has declined,  and  that  the  converse  is 
also true. 
b)  A second measure  of concentration is provided by the average  size of all firms 
in each industry,  which  is obtained by dividing the total employees  of the 
industry (X)  by n  (or the number  of firms).  If,  then,  in a  given year or industry, 
the average  size of firms  ~.e.X/n) is 655  employees,  concentration is lower than 
if, in the  same  year  or industry,  the average  size is 10,500 employees. 
13 c) A third measure  of concentration may  be  represented by  the "concentration ratio", 
given by  the share ~xpressed as a  percentage)  of the total (of sales or of the 
number  of employees)  accounted for by the first 4,  8,  or 10  firms  in the 
industry or structure under consideration.  Thus, if the fi:rst four firms  account 
for 75%  of sales  (CR  =  c4 =  75%  or1  usin~.another symbol  A4  =  75%)  concentration 
is greater than in the oase where  C4  (or A 4)  •  6o%. 
8.  Comments  on  the above measures 
There is a  great deal t.o  be  said about these ways  of measuring concentration,  and 
they raise a  host  of problems. As  none  of them  cover all of the problems,  they are 
incomplete and  therefore far from  perfe.ct. 
The  first measure  is based exclusively on  the number  of units and  tells us nothing 
about  the degree of unevennecss of the distribution,  although this is an essential 
aspect of the definition of concentration. 
Both the first measure  {absolute number  of firms)  and  the  second  measure  (average 
size)  are absolute measures,  though the "absolute" size of an industry or a  market 
is. bound  to be  a  relative concept•  These  measures  do  not meet  one  fundamental 
requirement:  the possibility of comparing two  or more  different industries or one 
same  induStry at two  different times,  in order to ascertain when  there is a  greater 
(or lesser) degree of concentration. 
The  third measure,  the concentration ratio, may  also prove  misleading in inter-
industry comparisons  or in comparative statics. 
Take  a  given industry or market A,  in which  the first four firms  control 75%  of the 
total {the first firm holding 12%  and the other three only  1%  each)  and an industry 
or market  B in which  the first four firms  control  ~0% of the total, all the  same 
size  (2o%  each). 
The  reading of the C4  (or A4)  by itself suggests that the industry or market A is 
less concentrated than B,  while the opposite is in fact the case. 
9· Concentration indices 
To  overcome  the.  above difficulties, numerous  concentration indices are used,  mostly 
named  after experts who  have  devised them•  Let us recall the indices with their 
formulae  as used in the industrial research on  concentration.carried out for the 
Commis.sion.  The  Linda system of indices will receive pa:rticular attention (see II.12 
et req.). 
The  formulae are given for simple statistical series.  It is assumed  therefore,  that 
the value of the variable is known  for each unit in the set. 
The  symbols  used are as follows: 
n  =  · numbe1·  of units in an  industry; 
X=x  =  total value of the variable in ari  industry; 
i  =  unit i; 
xi  •  value of the variable for unit i; 
Fx1  =  total value of the variable up  to unit i. 
14 Limits 
Lower  Upper 
V = coefficient of variation 
n  0 
V  .., -----::M'!"'"-__  _ 
G = Gini coeffioient 
1  X: 
i  - 1  a----
n  •  x 
0  .!!..=-1 
n 
H =  Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
H  =  1000  v2· + 
n 
1  1000  L 
2  =  x2  xi  n 
i  =  1 
.1QQ.Q_  1000 
n 
E= entropy index 
n 
E = 100  L 
X.  log  xi  1  -
i  =  1 
X  X 
100(- log n)  0 
10.  Comments  on the concentration indices 
The  above  indices are undoubtedly very useful,  each one  having its o;..n  peculiar 
features.  Nevertheless. one  essential point must  be made:  they. assume  t1)at data 
are available for the whole  industry,  that is the total of  a  given varial)le  conaidered. 
(turnover,  etc.) for the whole  of the industry under examination.  The  value of the 
index depends  also on the value of this total. 
In practice, this is a  very serious limitation,  as will be  seen. 
a)  In order to study an industry,  we  must  possess information on it.  This is obvious, 
as is the fact that when  we  already have  full information on it, we  may  well. no longer 
be interested in further study.  Now,  to have full information on  an entire 
industry - covering,  for example,  sales or employment  - means  that we  must ·haV,e 
individual sets of data (though these will  ofte~ be  grouped into size categories, 
a  favourite device of the statisticians)  on all the n  firms  in the industry,  .even 
the smallest  ones  employing only two  or three people.  Now.  it 18 well known  that 
statistical survejs on very small family firms  or businesses are always .in fact 
inaccurate and  incomplete.  It is therefore inadvisable to calculate concentrati.on 
indices  on bases including such firms,  if we  want  objective results which can 
provide reliable guidance. 
15 To  come  back to the obvious,  an econometric calculation is scientifically useful 
and  worthwhile when  it considerably increases the  information available on  a  given 
industry.  In other words,  when  either everything or nothing is known  about  a 
given industry,  econometric  instruments may  just as well be  filed under  lock and 
key. 
b)  When  studying an industry, it is not  sufficient to refer to one  or two  variables; 
all facets must  be  taken into consideration,  i.e. all meaningful variables 
representing the concentration in the industry.  We  must  therefore not confine 
ourselves to sales or employment,  but also measure  and  analyse wages  and salaries, 
own  capital,  investments and  above  all performance variables,  i.e. net profit and 
cash flow.  · 
Experience shows  that even in the countries where  statistical services are most 
sophisticated and  best  organized  (like the United Kingdom),  it is  impos~ible to 
gather information on all the variables in the case of small and very small firms 
- of which  even the  exact number  is unknown  - and  therefore for the whole  of the 
industry to which  they belong. 
c)  A practical example  from  the Italian food  industry will illustrate this even more 
clearly.  The  industry in question is made  up  of about  40,000  firms.  It is 
estimated that there are about  2,000 firms  with more  than twenty employees,  and 
in 1971  these accounted for about  55%  of the industry's total sales.  Yet  very 
different calculations will be  obtained according to whether the indices are 
based on  2,000 firms  or on  the total 40,000 firms. 
This is a  highly problematical situation:  the first hypothesis is perhaps too 
incomplete,  the  second  is simply "unreal", for an  econometric calculation based 
on  all 40,000 firms  (information on  the majority of which is in fact  slight)  is a 
pure mental abstraction. 
If we  then consider the measures  represented by  the concentration ratio,  i.e. the 
share of the first four  (or eight)  firms  in the industry as a  whole,  the result 
will be  almost double,  exactly 1.8 times  in the first hypothesis  (based  on  firms 
with more  than 20  employees)  with respect  to the  second hypothesis  (all firms, 
including those  with less than 20  employees). 
Which  of these two  measures  is more  reliable?  Perhaps  the  only way  out  of the 
dilemma is to leave the choice to  co~ing generations. 
11.  The  dualism of concentration· 
The  preceding remarks bring us to what  is in my  view a  fundamental  conclusion with 
regard to methods:  all systems of quantitative analysis based  on  concentration 
indices must  be  devised in such a  way  that the values  of the indices are not 
decisively influenced by  the fact that smaller firms  are taken into consideration 
(or left out,  or included With  inaccurate and unchecked  information),  for their 
influence  on  the process of concentration and  on  the play of competition is considered, 
b,y  definition, negligible. 
If the value of an index is linked to the total structure  (or industry)  under 
consideration b,y  including the fringes  represented by  very small firms,  this will 
disguise and blur the oligopolistic picture, with its changes  and  trends. 
Yet  it is this very aspect  which must  be brought  into focus  and analysed if we  are 
to discover and  quantify the relationship between concentration,  competition and 
corporate 19erformanoe,  not merely from  a  statis.tical and descriptive point  of view, 
but from  that of logic and interrelated economic  causality. 
16 Traditio~~lly, studies on  concentration are mainly based  on  statistics; their ideology 
is statio and  (perhaps)  unconsciously imbued  with the classic conception of one-
dimensional,  atomistic competition,  where  it is assumed  that the industry has a  large 
number  of units or firms  and that they can all be listed,  identified and exactly 
measured. 
We  do not wish to reject this tradition (and conception),  nor is the Commission, 
in view of its role and  function,  in a  position to. do  so,  for .its scientific 
and methodological  approach must  be absolutely neutral and  unbiased. 
But if the research on  concentration is to remain in. the domain .. of reality and to 
~  meaningful,  the dualism of concentration must  also at least be .borne  in mind: 
a)  with respect to the industry,  considered as a  whole, 
b)  with respect to the big firms  (n*),  seen in the setting formed  by .their system 
of oligopolistic interdependence. 
In this study,  the  ~mpha.sis will be .mainly on  the  second  aspect  of concentration 
- and  thus it is  correct to refer to a quantitative theory of oligopolistic 
concentration - for three reasons:  beciiuse it is a  relatiyely new  and little 
investigated aspeqt1  because it seems  topical and  because, for the first two 
reasons,  I  pers~a~'ly prefer this oligopolistic aspect.  ·  · 
The  differences between the two  aspects a). and  b)  and  the relative .a-pproaches 
are clear ~d fundamental: 
1)  In the first  cas~ (a)  the whole  industry (made  up  of n  units or fil;ms)  is 
measured  according. to existing :indices and  measures'  .while  in the  second 
ease (b) only a  samph:;  of the largest firms  ( n*)  is studied;  .  . 
2)  In the first. c<ise  (a)  the econometric an<ilysis  is typically one..dimensio.na11 
: al1d  the reference to the concept  of one-dimensional competition is not  · 
fortuitous, for  oniy one  variable  (employees)  or two  (by adding sales)  are 
taken into consideration for the calculation of the indices,  which precludes 
any real analytical penetration of the structure of the industry,  while irt 
the  second  case  (b),  since the subject is limited to a  sample  of large firms., 
a  mtiltidimensional econometric analysis can be  developed,  by taking into  · 
consideration all meaningful variables (i.e. sales,  employment,  wages  and. 
salaries, net profit,  cash flow,  gross  investments,  own  capital and,  where 
possible,  added  value,  net asset.s,  shares in other·firms,  exports,  etc.) so 
as to include all different aspects,  relationships.and trends  in the structure 
within the framework  of the oligopolistic interdependency linking these large 
firms; 
3)  In the first case  (a)  traditional methods  are used,  while in the  second  case  (b) 
the analysis is based on  a  new  system of indices and  on  a  series of.matrices 
showing oligopolistic interdependence.  · 
The  following  pages describe this new  methodology. 
17 12.  The  Linda system of indices  (1) 
The  subject  of this system of indices is oligopolistic concentration (or unevenness 
of distribution) and in view of the many  complex  aspects of the  phenomenon: 
I  did not  consider it advisable to use  one  single  index,  but prefer to develop 
a  system of indices; 
The  system is not  applied to the  entire industry under  consideration,  but only 
to a  sample  of  large firms  (n*). 
Obviously it is not  possible to apply completely rigorous theoretical criteria in 
selecting the  sample,  but an attempt is made  to  overcome  and  eliminate any 
approximation by using absolutely quantitative and  objective methods  and  criteria 
in calculating the  system's  various  indices. 
In general,  the sample  must  include all major  firms,  cover at least h:o thirds  of 
the sales or employees  in the industry studied and  exclude the units  or  firms  which 
account  for less than  1%  of the total of the  given variable,  for they could  scarcely 
be  considered oligopolistic (i.e.  in a  position to  influence the demand  curve  and 
prices).  More  generally,  n*  may  include  a  minimum  of six to eight units  or  firms 
anP.  a  maximum  of sixty to seventy,  according to the  size and "oligopolistic d.ensity" 
of the industry. 
One. factor mus.t  be  borne  in mind  in the following description:  the units  or firms 
are ranked in decreasing order of size,  starting from  the largest (i =  1)  and  going 
dovm  to the smallest in the  sample  ( i  = n*) • 
The  following are the  symbols  and  formulae  used  in the indices system: 
n  = total number  of units  (firms  or kind-of-activity units)  making  up the 
industry. 
n*  =  number  of units studied: 
- both for  each hypothesis:  2,  3,  41  8,  10,  12,  15,  20,  etc. 
- or constituting the  sample  analysed. 
(1)  The  first formulation of the L index is to be  found  in R.  Linda,  "  Le  systeme 
des  indices d'equilibre et leur application concrete a la siderurgie des Etats 
~  ", in "Rivista di politica economica",  1967.  I  later further developed 
this econometric approach in "Concurrence  oli o olisti ue  et  lanification 
concurrentielle internationale"  Part II ,  "Economie  Appliquee,  Archives de 
l'ISEA",  1972,  Nos  2  and  3),  in "Problems  of  Economic  Concentration and 
Com  etition: Methodolo  ical A  roach for Anal  sin  Relationshi s  between  Lar  e 
Enterprises"  Fondazione Agnelli,  Working  Document  No  2  - "Analisi dualistica: 
approoci metodologici"  - Turin,  November  1974)  and in "Static And.Dynamic 
Methods  for Analysing Industrial Concentration:  The  Italian Case",  in'Markets, 
Corporate  Behaviour and  the State - International Aspects  of Industrial 
Concentration"  edited by A.P.  Jacquemin and  H.VI.  de  Jong,  1976,  Stenfert Kroese, 
Leiden (Netherlands). 
Vlith  regard to non-Italian literature on  the indices system,  reference may  be 
made  in particular to the works,  in chronological order,  of Jacques de  Bandt: 
"Mesures  de la dimension des unites de production - Problem.es  de  methodes'' 
Editions Cujas,  Paris, May  1970,  pages 44 .to 46; . of Yves  Morvan  "La concentration 
de  1 1industrie en France",  Librairie Armand  Colin,  Paris,  1972,  pages  188  to 192; 
of Christian Marfels ''A  New  Look  at the Structure of Oli o  ol "  in "Zei  tschrift 
flir die Gesamte  Staatswissenschaft",  J.C.]3.  Mohr  Paul Siebeck),  Tubingen, 
April 1974,  pages 249  to 270. 
18 The  Linda  index is as  follows: 
L 
where: 
A. 
l. 
EO. 
i  n*  i  =  A  A.  i  l.  n*  l. 
n*  i 
r 
i  = 1 
n* - 1 
A. 
l. 
EO . 
.......!; 
n* 
A  -A  n*  i 
n* - i 
i 
A. 
l. 
1 - A. 
l. 
Ai  aggregate  share  of the total sample accounted for by  the top  i  firms; 
An*  100% = 1 
In other words: 
the  L or L *  index is the arithmetic mean  of the .(n*  - 1)  ratios of oligopolistic 
equilibriu}fi  (EO),  each being previously divided  by~· 
Each  EO  ratio is expressed by the average  size of the first  i  firms  and  those of 
the  (n*  - i)  remaining firms  where  i  successively assumes  values from  1  (which 
expresses  the relationship between the size of the first firm and  the average size 
of all the. other firms  in the  sample  of the industry studied) upton*- 1;  for 
this reason the number  of  EO  relationships  in question is n*  - 1. 
The  upper and  lower limits of the L index are respectively 1  andeq. 
n* 
Let: 
n* m  number  of units  corresponding to the minimum  value of the L index in the 
sample  analysed.  (1) 
n* h<  number  of units corresponding to the maximum  value  of the L index,  in 
the  interval between n*  a  2  and  n*  •  m 
The  n*  indicate the number  of firms  corresponding to the minimum  value  of the 
~  L index in the  sample  (n*)  studied,  while  L *  is the value  of the 
appropriate L index.  n m 
The  arithmetic mean  of the L index,  from  L2  up  to and  including L * , gives the Ls 
index,  which  expresses the degree  of equilJ.brium and of  n  m 
concentration among  the n*  top firms  in the industry.  m 
(1)  An  exact definition must  be  provided of the mJ.nJ.mum  of the  Linda  index  (n*  and 
L *  )  as follows:  the minimum  exactly corresponds to the "first :point"  m 
n  m  (n*)  in the  sample  which_we  meet  when  starting from  the left (i.e. n*  =  2) 
for which  the value  of the  Linda index is lower both than the value  (of this 
index)  preceding it and the one  following it= L *  ~L  *  <  L *  ~  The 
minimum  therefore signifies the "first minimum".n  rn-1  n  m  n  m+1 
19 The  formula will therefore be: 
n*  m  LLn* 
L 
n*  = 2 
s  n*  - m 
13·  The  structural curves  of the  L indices - The  concept  of the oligopolistic arena 
A number  of authors  have  analysed the structure and features  of this indices  system 
from  the strictly methodological point  of view  (J.  De  Bandt,  Yves  Morvan,  c. Marfels, 
etc.,  see note to II.12). 
I  will here briefly illustrate the various practical applications. 
The  starting point will be  the  graph of the  system. 
B.y  indicating on  the axis of the abscissas the various  hypotheses  from  2  to n* 
(i.e. the entire sample  of big firms  under  consideration),  the series of the  various 
indices  (L2,  L  ,  •••  1  *)  will be  obtained on  the  ordinates axis.  In this way,  a 
structural  {or3Linda)ncurve can be  established.  The  lowest  point n  will indicate 
the division,  in purely quantitative terms,  between the bigger firm!Jl- which  in many 
cases,  one  might  say,  form  a  kind  of "oligopolistic arena" - and all the other firms 
in the industry and  sample. 
Table  2  shows  an  example  of a  structural curve,  and  indicates: 
the  sample  n* under  consideration,  in this case  15; 
the minimum  point  (n*  ),  in this case 9;  m 
the maximum  point  (n*h<)'  in this case  3; 
the  curve  expressing the perfect equilibrium of forces  (which I.lorvan  in his 
excellent work  called "Le  l·~odele Concurrentiel"  (Me))  which for each hypothesis 
of n*  corresponds to1/n*(all the  firms under  consideration in the hypothesis are 
of the  same  size or  account for the  same  share  of the variable)  (1). 
I  feel that  so:ne  comments  on  this concept  of "oligopolistic arena"  viill be  useful. 
The  key to the definition of an  oligopoly is represented by  the  interdependence  of 
power  or even,  one  might  say,  by  "interdependent power".  The  other features  (and, 
in particular,  the  small number  of firms)  are either the presupposition or a 
corollary of this definition.  However,  it is difficult to translate this definition 
into quantitative terms.  In my  system of indices the criterion of "minimization"  (n-¥  ) 
is used,  the minimum  preceding,  by definition,  an upl'<ard.  movement  of the  follovving  m 
L index,  caused  by  the fact  that  the next  firm  is much  smaller - i.e. follows  a 
"size gap"  - in relation to the preceding firm and  indicates the  "minimum  point"  of 
the  L index. 
(1)  See:  R.  LINDA,  "Le  s  steme des  indices d'e  ilibre et  son a  lication concrete 
a la siderurgie des Etats-Unis",  in "Rivista d:i,  Politica Economica",  Rome,  19  7i 
Y.  MORVAn,  "La concentration de  l'industrie en France",  Paris,  1972,  page  190. 
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in.t)1ia.respectr  themec~ism of the  index must  be  borne  in mind,  where  perfect 
equilibrium (PLJ or .the competitive l)lodel (MC)  is represented by 1/n* (all firms 
are of eqUa.l.  si~~).:  As  a  x-esult,~:the. val~ of. t/nf nece.ssarily tends to decrease 
as  ~he numb!'r  n* of fir;ms  increases (as. is also sho\¢ by  the  PL  = MC  f.unotion 
, inQ.icated in the graph <?f'  Table 2).  ·  · 
Consequently,; if in a  speoifio given Qasei at a,  certain point. in the structural· 
ourV,e,.  th~  .L  iJld.ex,  instea,d. of continuj,ng to decrease,  enldd,enly rises, there is 
a ''size gaP''•  According to a  criterion ~:hich iS,  I  think,  an.  objective  one,  l  . 
uae  .. :tJl.e  size  ..  ga,p  to define the oligopolbtic firms. (n*m)  which ·more  ()r  less fall ··. 
under 'the above defini.tion of an.  ol:i~OP;Qly,  as. opposed to the  othE::r  f'irms (n: ~ n~m 
or nit  ..; .n*  ), .which are exol:uded  from ·the so-called "oligopolist:i.c .arena".  •  ·  ·  ..  •·.  .,  Ill  ,  ,  ..  . ·.  . ,.  .  ..  ·.· 
Using absolq,te val11es  of these indices provitles exhaustive  information on .the 
. degree of oonoentra.Uon. of the strW}ture of the large firms  (h*)  under. consideration.: 
·.·.·  ·.~~11$.'  .. if t.h?.·  val.  ue  ...  ~f. i.nd·. ex  .. ·  ..  hi*  ..  · .  (in·  .. ·  ··. th. e  ·f.reque  .. h.t  oa.se. o.f·  n*. h< =.2)  e. xceed·····s.  1·,·  t  .. hen .•  .  the. first fl.rm. must  have  ·  · h<  •.·.  c.onsiderable power,  for it's share of the 
.  v~iable wcmld  tend to be  in:  exo.ess  of twice the share of .the  following {i.e• the 
seO:ond)  .. firm.  ·  ·· ·  ·  · ·  · ·  ·  ·  · 
The  eo(morii:fo  signific;~ce of the L indices is obVious  if w~ .reeall thei.r functioning 
and·  takE!  a.~  Ou:t'  reference po:Lnt  the 1;1.ssu,mption  of'  equa.l  size (or "Modele  Concurrentiel''). , 
i'httsl  .  . 
..,.  if a  structure includes two  firlll:s  of ihe $arne  size li·e• the same.  share in the 
variable  ~e:f. consideration},  the L  i.ndex  'will be. 2  = 0~500;  . 
... .if thiS structure. includes tbt-ee firms  of. the same  size,  the L index will . 
:be  Jlr..; o  .. 33~; 
)nores-en.erl;l.ll;y,  t)'le  hypot~esis (jf  absol11te  eqilality if+  the case of'  n* firms 
.is ,  ~xpresse!l by an.  index L ·..;  1  ;  ·  ·  ...  .  ..  .  ,  ·.  ....  ..  ..  n* 
...  the· ma.Xirnum  of the L  il1dex (i.e. L *  )  , as a .result of numerous  e!llp:i.,rical 
considerations,  uaua.:j;ly  .  .  .  ·  n  h<  corrElsponds/to the  ~ypothesis of n*,  =  2 
(a structure comprising two  firms).  It  every  r~ely  cot-responds to .the hypothesis 
o:f'  n~.· 3 (appro;x:imately5% of'  cases)  and  hardlY. ever; to the hjpothes:Ls  of n*  :.;  4. 
{less than.  1%  of ca,ses);  ..  .  .  ·  ·· 
<  /  ,',  '  '  '  ~'  '  '  '  '  '  ~  ' 
.;;.  the.econ6~ic Significance of the  index.i~ comprehensible if  we  know  the  k:~¥ to 
re'a,dil'lg  the  iruiex  inqil.estioh ori  the. hypt)thesis h* =2;  '"'_.-'  -·;. '  <,  ;  ::- '  ' ··', 
.., .  ~  tJl,e  'f;l:x-st  firm b  d6ubl~. the. second,  t:qe  index  .. = 1  or .  1.~ 000; 
·,_;:;.; 
... ~  ~he firs~ one is fo~ times the second, .the  inde:X:  = 2 .ooo; 
....  '  .  ... 
;..!! the fi;rst  orie  i!il.eight,'l;i.l.lle~ the second,  the index= 4.000; 
-.!! the i'irs'l;  o~e is n*  ti~es  't~e> second,.  one{ tJ!e  index = .!l*  .. 
.  .  .•.  · .'··  .  .  ·.  . ·.  ·.....  '  ..  · ...  ··.  .  . ....  ·  2  ' 
By  definition,; the ,indeX'  t.  repr~sents value~· lower.  than~  the index Ln* ..  ,  apart, 
h011ever, .:f,rom  the  e:x:ceptiqftal  hjpothe~is in which .  .  ..  .  .  .  ···.··  h< 
Ln*  ·•·· .  .;; ..  Ln  =  L2  ;=  L81  den~ti:ng a  mon.QoOoooduopolistic  structure in whic~ all  h<  m  ·  ·  ·  · ·  · 
• apart  fr.o1n  the first two;  ~e t()o  small  to be. oonsid.ered. 
'22' The  value of the  index L  depends  not  only on  the firms'  uneven sizes,  but  also on 
the nwnber  n*  of firms  ~onstituting what  is called  the "oligopolistic arena".  In a 
case where  th~re was  absolute equality in the sizes of the firms  considered,  the 
results for  each hypothesis  of n*  (or n*  )  wou~  the following L  values:  m  ·  s 
n*  L  n*  L  n*  L  n*  L  s  s  s  s 
3  0·417  8  0·245  15  0.166  25  0·117 
4  0.361  10  0.214  16  0.159  30  0.103 
5  Oo321  11  Oo202  20  Oo137  31  0.101 
6  Oo290  12  Oo191  21  Oo132  40  0.084 
In practice,  however,  the nwnerous  empirical analyses already carried out  have  shown 
that the index L  = 0.200  shows  the existence  of a  relatively large and  balanced 
oligopolistic  ar~na in which  competition is working  satisfactorily, while  an  index 16 
greater than the value  of 0.500  shows  that there is excessive "oligopolistic density" 
which  could act as an obstacle to competition.  An  L  value of more  than 1.000 would 
point  to the existence of a  high degree  of  dominance~ 
15.  Partial monopoly  and  duopoly 
In some  cases the oligopolistic arena is so clearly defined that the "minimization 
criterion" and its application are quite  simple  and  clear.  In other cases,  the 
structures  ..  can be  so complex  that  interpretation and  application becomes  more  difficult. 
In order to better illustrate the  functioning of our  econometric mechanism,  we  will 
examine  tv:o  important  cases. 
These  are two  extreme  and  opposite  cases  and,  as often occurs,  the  extremes  come  to 
meet:  they both indicate the absence  or the "questionableness"  of the very concept 
of the "oligopolistic arena". 
Each  of these cases  could be  defined by the following equation: 
Case  I  = n*·h< =  n*  m  = 2  (the structural curve steadily rising) 
Case  II =  n·*m  n*  (the structural curve steadily falling). 
In the first  case,  the  lowest  value of all the L indices  is right at the beginning 
of the structural (or Linda)  curve.  Since the  L  index is the  inverse function of the 
number  of subjects  (units or firms)  under  consideration (n*)  and  a  direct function 
of the degree  of unevenness,  the fact  that the  index itself constantly increases as 
the n*  hypothesis increases,  signifies that the degree of unevenness proportionally 
increases more  than the increase in the nwnber  (n*)  of the subjects,  units  or firms 
under  consideration.  This can only occur when  the "difference"  OT  "size gap" 
between the first two  firms  is constantly and  considerably lower  than any  other 
"size gap"  occurring elsewhere in the distribution (for n*>2). 
Therefore,  should the problem arise,  the oligopolistic arena should in this  case  be 
made  up  of just the first two  units  or firms  in the distribution.  This  is absolutely 
exact and  objective - considered as  a  purely quantitative result - only when  L *  = 0.500 
(for the hypothesis that n*  ~ = 2),  for  on  this hypothesis the first two  n  h< 
firms are by definition of ~e same  size.  This is therefore  a  case  of "partial 
balanced duopoly",  the fringes being represented by  all the other units or firms 
(for i>2),  since it was  asswned  that n*>2•  In this case,  the  oligopolistic arena 
would  be  the "duopolistic arena". 
23 Then  in a  case where  n  =  n*  =  2;  there would  obviously be  a  "perfect duopoly" 
hypothesis, .which  could  a~so be  defined as  "balanced" if the value  of L was  0.500 
(i.e. 1  =  1 =  0.500),  since the two  oligopolists would  then be  of the  same  size. 
n*  2 
The  problem  becomes  more  delicate when  L  *  >o.soo,  (for n*  < = n*  = 2)  for then 
there is no  objective and quantitative  n  h<  criterion of 'hlfnimiza!hon"  for marking 
off the oligopolistic arena.  Is it then made  up  of one  (the first)  firm or both 
the first two  firms?  Is there therefore respectively a  "partial monopoly"  or a 
"partial duopoly",  given that,  in any case,  since L *  >o.soo,  the second  firm is 
smaller than the first one?  n  h~ 
In this respect,  there is an additional quantitative reference value  known  as  th~ 
LIRE  (Linda  index of regUlar unevenness),  which develops as  follows  (see graph 
table 3)  ( 1):  ·  ·  · 
Hypothesis of 
n* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
i 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
so.-% 
25•-% 
12-5 % 
6.25 % 
3o125% 
1·5625% 
0.78125% 
0-390625% 
L Index 
1.000 
0-944 
1.008 
1-157 
1-399 
1.766 
2-318 
.  111111  This  is the well-known  serJ.es 2•  4' "S• fb't  32,  64'  etc., the  sum  of which  tends· to 1, 
and  for n*oo:  a  *  = 0  and  the L indexoo.  We  may  therefore deduce  that there are 
two  firms  (A  andnB);  the second is half the size of the first.  The  value  of  the 
L index is exactly 1;  but it decreases slightly (to 0.944) if three firms  (A,  Band 
C)  are considered instead of two,  the third one  being exactly half the  size of the 
second one  and a  quarter of the first. 
We  may  deduce that if the minimum,  on  the other hand,  is at n*h  =  2,  the third 
firm  (c)  is still. smaller than half the size of the.second  one.~ Indeed,  if this 
was  not  so,  the L index would  be 0.944  (for n*m  = 3),  corresponding to the 
hypothesis  of a  firm  C equal to .half the firm B as  show.ri  in the above  LIRE  tabJe. 
Table  3  and  the. graph show  the development  of the L index in certain extreme 
hypotheses.  ·  · 
B.y  combining the quantitative reference points  and  criteria indicated above,  a 
series of practical and operative deductions  may  be  made: 
a) if n*h< = 2  =  n*m 
b)  if L  *  >1.000 
n  h< 
(1)  See .previously mentioned study "Concurrence oligopoliatique et planification 
concurrentielle",  page  376. 
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., 
\ 
\ 
\  ,. v 
.,.  ;t~• ..,  •  ....... _.,.. 
.. 
••  , .  ... 
.-••  IV  ..  ..  ..... 
....  ,  ...... . 
•  fl'·· 
·'  ,  . 
.  / 
....... .... ..._  . .... ____ _ 
.  .l"'  •  .. 
~·  ··'  .  ,  .  .  . 
~·  •  ..  ..  .. 
··-- ,  . 
~<----------------... __  - ____  .._..-..  ~I 
s  1  8  9  10 
BYFO~~ 
Ie (PL) :n* =  10  IIe  :  n*  •  8  IIIe:  n*  •  7  IVe .  n*  •  5  Ve  :  n* -5  Ei  . 
a•;  L  •••  L  ...  L  a*i  L  a•r  L 
1  1/10  - V2  - 1/2  - 1/2  -
1/2  -
2  1/10  O,SOO  1/4  1,000  1/4  1,000  1/8  2,000  1/16  4,000 
:s  1/10  o.:ss:s  1/8  0,944  1/16  1,~3  1/16  1,722  1/~2  3,279 
4  1/10  0,250  1/16  1,009  1/32  1,7Sl  1/32  1,.138  1/64  3,1SS 
5  1/10  0,200  1/32  1,151  1/64  2,045  1/64  1,920  1/1~  3,444 
6  1/10  0,167  V64  1,:5~  1/1::t  2,1C82 
1  1/10  0,143  V128  1,7G6  1/25(  :5,132 
8  1/10  0,125  1/256  2,318 
9  1/10  0,111 
10  1/10  0,100 
25 it follows  that  : 
c)  the first two  firms  control at  least 7%  of the structure under consideration; 
d)  the  second firm has  less than half of the  fir~t firm's  share.  We  may  therefore 
set up  a  working hypothesis,  empirical in economic  terms but  strictly defined 
and  delimited from  the quantitative and  mathematical point of view1 
e)  in the case under  examination there is a  model  of "quantitative partial monopoly" 
distinguished by  a  "quantitative dominance"  in the hands  of the first firm  (A); 
f)  proceeding by  exclusion, if, on  the other hand,  condition b)  is not satisfied, 
i.e. if L *  <  1.000,  we  may  conclude,  formulating  a  working  hypothesis,  empirical 
in terms n  ~<  but just as strict from  the quantitative and  mathematical  point  of 
view: 
g)  given that the first two  firms  certainly control more  than 75%  of the structure 
under  consideration and  the  second  firm holds at least half or more  of the  share 
held by  the first, it follows  that this second firm may  be  considered as  sharing 
in the dominance  of the first firm,  thus representing a  model  of ''quantitative 
partial duopoly". 
16.  qup.ntitative dominance  and  the working of com;eetition  (1) 
The  above  illustration clearly shows  that the  index L *  represents  an objective 
measure  of dominance  which  may  be  considered to existn h<  when  the index exceeds 
the  approximate  value of 1.000. 
This dominance  increases as the value  of the index L *  increases,  and  as  the 
value  of the point n*  decreases,  i.e. as  the lattern h<  tends  towards n*h  ,  the 
diameter of the  oligo~olistic arena decreases down  to the  extreme case anafysed in 
the previous paragraph where  n*h< =  n*  = 2.  In this  cas~ as  we  have  seen, 
dominance  may  also exist  m  where  L *  <1.000.  The  problem then is: 
n  h< 
what  is the  practical usefulness of the  index Ln*h<? 
In the first place, it allows  comparisons  to be  made  between different structures or 
between the  same  structure at different times,  by  providing a  refe~ence point,  a 
quantitative and  objective parameter which reflects the  imbalance  or unevenness  at 
the top of the distribution, i.e. among  the top firms,  where  the play of competition 
is much  fiercer and  decisive for the whole  industry. 
This  objective representation of uneven  power  at the top constitutes a.  good  working 
approach,  allowing the absolute data on  the most  important  firms  in the  industry to 
remain undisclosed. 
(1)  See  the numerous  works  by Professor Frangois  Perroux on  the problem  of dominance 
and  in particular  his most  recent "Pouvoir et ecopomie",  Etudes EcoPomiques, 
Dun~  Paris 1974, 'ana  the comprehensive bibliography it includes.  In a  certaiP 
sense' our econometric  system applied to dominance  (and,  above all, the index 
L  )  puts his basic theories iPto practice. 
~·  n* 
h< 
26 In other wo:rds;  this il)dex lllay  express the intensity of d.ominance  in quantitative 
terms withoutundermiuing the principle of statistical•secrecy, which many  industries 
and  manage~X~.ants consider should protect .tM basic  OPE!rating  data r.>f  individual firms. 
In this way,  us: of tne  ind~x Ln  !:)an  ~ontribute to the development .of specific 
~onomic analys:ts,  by rem.oyxng,  *h<  or rather avoiding,  the obstacle and bar:der 
formed  by  the need to keep certain statistics  secr~t  •  .. 
It .must  be emphasized that use  of the qW;mti  tat:i.ve dominance  index does. not  aim to 
replace economic  ~alysis, but to ·provide it with ba.sic data and  serve as  a  working 
tool.  With rega:rd to the actual working of competition in a  given structure,  the 
index must  be.  interpreted. with great care and  caution.  · 
For there fa nqt necessarily ~automatic  relationsh~~ between quantitative 
dominancf:l. and the existence <:>:fa  ;re13biction or obstacle to the working  of the 
"competition mechanisintt·•  !n practice therefo;r'e it may'ha.ppenthat;, 
'  ' 
a} the index L *  ex.Presaes  sudh~ inte!J,se  d~ee of dominance  that competition <Tould 
seemto  11h<  be. quite out of :the  questiont whereas  the  opposite is in fact the 
case  i  competition is both vigorO'IlS •and effectiVe  j  .  .  . 
. ' b)  conve1'ilfel;y:,.  th:e .in4ex ·d.oea  l'l~f.~.~~~m t() ~now.~  subs.:tariti~l  ~~iti-:rnce ,}'lhich  could 
b.e  ·a P:an.ger  to. competitien,. whe;-',elll;,S  in actlJB.l.  fact .,the PW ()f. ~omp(;ltition is 
di$torteP, or  eve~·~~ppres~ed.  ·  ·.  ·····  .  .......  · 
As·  f~  ~~~.~}  ~.s;()Q~~e~ed1  it dlay' simp~y 'be  that the .structure.~l.;R.~.eci; ,;s·,highly 
'concentr;at~d~ 'but  ne~r:theless op~n to th_eyold wind of  substitu't~,,~om~t~tiqn' 
(ao1n;ng .fr()rn  m.anufact'Urers  belonging to  otbe~ .industries .and  struct~es} or from. 
'(;i.oZ.:da.d.  :And  thE!  essimtial goal  of competition is to ensure  som~ "range of  r~al ' 
· ·  ~~O.hofc~~'  to the consumer  or us:er.  ·  ·  ·  · 
: ':~-
'  .J\s  ra;r  as b)  is concerned,  it must  be  recalled that it is assum:~d that  tb~ index 
.·•  ..  <in. q'llestion is applied on the basis of the industry, i.e. to  tbe:~ampie'n* o{th~ 
.,major· firms belonging to a  given industry,  and therefore  ..  thi!il  i'p,d.e:X:Imit  show:~ 
· I'elatively 'ba:la.rtced  structure not affected by strong  doniinano~,  whi.le.  in. PI'Gtctloe: 
- there is some  production specialization,  so that certain key ;roduqt ~~~~t~ il.:re 
under the donlinarioe  of one  or more  firms,  whereas  the 
appear to. be  so;  ·  · 
- there are interlocking directorate'S and  shareholdings and agreements  be~h;een the 
different firms,  which,  although they are quite separate  l~gal unitli; i!(  terms 
of economic  behaviour represent a  single ent.i  ty.  ·  · ·  ·  \:,  · 
In these last ·cases,  therefore,  the "range  of choice"  available to'  1;~~  con~~er or 
user,  which is a  feature  of the market  and  of 9ompet:!:tion,  d9es  ~<:it  e~i,s"li,il,l practice. 
The  L *  index of dominance  is an econometric  concept  and not .a.le,E;~f  c~cept•  .· .. 
n  h< However,  it serves to place the questions appropriate ·to'e~.onotril;c analysis 
in a  ~:~ystematic  framewor~, requiring explanations for the.  ~l!;)us  .  '';whJrs'.'  and.  '~hews'' 
of  this quantitative dominance.  In this wa;y,  the basic .8'1lide1inE3J:lf'()r. ,s:peciaHzed 
research and analysis are suggested and determined;  the was-!;f')s  q:f's:empirioismand 
arbitrary formalism are left behind.  ·  ·  ·  ···  ·  · · 
27 In my  opinion,  as regards methodology,  the  index in question has  a  decided advantage. 
It can be  read and used without  any reference to all the  other points  on  the 
structural curve,  in particular then*  (or minimum)  point,  when  they do  not  count, 
i.e. when  they have  no  role to play,  f~r the  ~sition  of the  firms  to the right  of 
n*h< is of no  relevance.  If,  on  the other hand,  the  share of the latter is not 
exactly irrelevant,  benause  together they represent  a  force  to be  reckoned with,  the 
phenomenon  might  be  expressed in two  ways: 
by a  decrease in the value  of the  index L *  ;  and/or: 
n  h< 
point n*  shifts to the right,  tending to draw closer to point n*  and  even to 
coincidemwith it. 
In this hypothesis,  we  may  usefully consider the value  of the  index L  ,  which 
expresses the  synthesis  of existing oligopolistic equilibrium.  Moreo~er, since 
the  index L  is also a  function of the point n*mr  or minimum  of the structural 
curve,  let ik  look further into the meaning  of this "minimization" and  some  of the 
problems  to which it gives rise in certain practical cases. 
17•  The  sample  (n*)  of the large firms 
When  the  size of the units  or firms  studied decreases regularly,  the relative 
structural curve  appears  more  or less parallel - though of course it expresses 
the  values  of some  higher  L  indices - to the  PL  =  MC  = I/n* curve  (even distribution 
or perfect  balance  of size).  As  seen above,  this occurs because the  L  index is a 
function,  not  only of the degree  of  unevennes~ but  also of the units  or firms  (n*)• 
In this hypothesis,  no  minimum  of the  L index can be  determined,  because it will 
alv1ays  decrease as  the number  of units or firms  increases. 
In this respect it may  be  recalled: 
1)  that  the point  n*m  brings  out  ~he existence of a  "size gap",  which  occurs 
whenever  n*m <  n*,  thus  separatJ.ng the distribution of the  sample  firms  into 
two  distinct groups: 
firms  situated on  the left-hand side of the  curve  (n*m)  and constituting the 
"oligopolistic arena"; 
firms  situated on  the right-hand side  of the  curve  (n*- n*  );  m 
2)  if hov:ever  we  have  n*m  = n*,  a  "size  gap"  or minimurn  point  does not  exist,  nor 
does  the oligopolistic arena;  therefore  we  may  consider all the  firms  in the 
sample  as  being oligopolistic units  or as all being non-oligopolistic.  This 
is merely a  matter of terminology; 
3)  though,  where  n*m  =  n*,  v<e  lose a  general abstract criterion for defining and 
delimiting the  oligopolistic arena,  I  feel that the structural curves  can still 
help to suggest  either a  more  or less conventional "point"  for marking  off the 
firms  in the  sample  or a  more  empirical  solution,  such as  including all the n* 
firms  in the  sample. 
The  solution to the  problem of the  oligopolistic arena is thus  brought  back to the 
choice  of n*,  i.e. the  sample  of big firms  to be  analysed. 
28 Though  it is of course difficult to say at what  point  oligopolistic power  and 
interdependence  end~ there is no  problem  in deciding when  it definitely and 
indisputably does not exist, at least in purely quantitative terms. 
We  may  therefore .state that,  in all cases,  and-whatever the  structure,  the firms 
accounting for less than  1%  of the total structure must  be  excluded from  the  sample 
because they can definitely not  be  considered oligopolistic and  therefore n* will never 
exceed  100.  Since it has been established that, the distribution being uneven, 
in practice n*  will never exceed sixty firms,  when  as a  general  criteriorJ. the  firms 
accounting for less than  1%  are  excluded. 
Finally, it will be  seen that in practical terms  the problem hardly ever arises, 
because  the  sample n*  is determined on  the basis of data actually available,  which 
implies that the value of n*  is generally well below 50  - 60  units. 
In cases  where  the 1  index steadily declines as  n*  increases (i.e. in the hypothesis 
in which n*m  tends towards n*),  the value of the 1s index changes little when  a 
slightly higher or lower number  of'  firms  is taken into consideration:  this  index is 
the arithmetic mean  of all the indices 12,  13, 14,  •••• 1n*  ,  which illustrate the 
degree of unevenness  up  to each point n*.= 2,  =  3,  =  n*m  inmthe distribution.  And  in 
the given hypothesis.,  the values  of the f.irst  indices  (=  12,  13,  •••  )  are the  highest 
ones  and  influence the 1s most. 
29 II!. THE  VARIABLES 
18.  The.  defirii  tion 
Use  of. the ,system of indices  ,·p~SUPP9Eies and  all.ows  the  use  of.  numerous  variables 
therefore  :  · 
- these variables  mlist  previously be .definied and accurately determined  ; 
- oomp.arisons may be  made  between the  numei'()US  aspec.ts  of -the  structUre  as  expressed 
by these variables,  both thrOugh Linda curves  or st~ctural curves  (see  1.14)  and 
the ciligop.olistic  "unevenness''  matrices; 
In t.he  industry studies  p,rogramme  s~onsored. by the  Commission  of the European  Commu-
nities~ the following va:riables  have been us'ed<; 
- 01  csales 
- 02  employment 
- 03  w?Ees  and sa.laries 
- 04  net profits 
- 05  :  oafih  flow ,(i.e.  gross  incorrie.) 
- 06  I  groli$S  :i,1;J.vestmeni;~ 
07 ;  o~  captt~. ;. • · ·  ·  · ·  .. ·  .  >  "  .. 
When  imports'-exports  flowS  'artl  r&ley~t·,. the  a~dition, of twO  new  Ji~ri13:h~M  (·''tt~rrresti:'c. 
market"  and "exports")  is ·;very  adV:~sfl,bl~.:;.  .··.  ..  ····  ·  .·.  ··.  · 
Future studies. w$11  at:i;empt  tp also use :ractded  v~lue"  (:i..E!:~  "casn  f::i·o'1·i''  plus ri\\fagei:!· 
and  salariesh),  based  on,  a  yeT,Y'  Q'iQI:p~e ;d~f'in!  tio:n~''riet  cash. f'lowll 1  •·~~t fixed assets'' 
. and  11 c~pftaL  ernployed'1,  •.••  ,Each  bf:'t'h.es¢ valiiables • w:Ul be :exainine:<l se@.rate:ly  ;  the  . 
seicti,on  c:m;  siites · inc~'Ud~s 'Some;rnsiie  g~neral cominents.  ·· 
~  (  .  .  .  '  ,,· -' './  ·.,  :,;  ,  - - '  ·.  .•  ' 
·~·  c  .J.~r  s~~e!J. ;(t~;r .tu:I't}~~~r·; :ohiifre  ... (i'arfaires' l:Jmsatz) 
· !  •+1l~s is tlj.e  monet~ry value,  relating to  a  given year,  derived from •  the sale of' pro;--;:  , 
!iulr:ts>rflaX11if~tli~'!i·o:t' so:),d:by the .rel:eyant  finn plus sales of se,rvices  i;.o  tliit>d  Pi'f't- . 
ties.  It/i;nc;l.ude:EI  expel'ls~$ charged to customers  (non-returnable  pao:K~ing,< trans:Pc:>rt;i, 
··  suppl~nienta.ey·  service~>}~· •It  d~s .not  include  :  ·  ··  ·  ~ 
~··:::~~:~;~~:s 
.~.  ln6o~e from sales  of real estate,  plant  and machinery owned by the ·firm~ 
Iri. the Commission's  original  programme,.  the duties  and taxes the  sell~:t is  -e~t~:t;l~¢;,:: 
to  J?ass  on  such  a8  the Italian l'imposta generale sull  1entrata,  the  Unite.d i{tngdow 
purchase tax,  the  French taxe sur la valeur ajoutee,  and the Gel'IJian  ME!h:rwehxsteWil~1l· 
were  to be  excluded from  the sales variable.  · · 
• This criteria was  logically  justifiable - if "pure",  comparablE!. results were' to be 
. obtainetl :...  for the  followitlg  reas'Ons  .,,  ..  -
- the tax rates vary from  country to country, 
- tax reforms  in a  number  o:f  oountrie!3  have  led to the  gradw~i int,roductio6>i;l} the 
Community  of the various value. added taxes  replaCing the  tr~dit:i<mal:  ll'nlltl,~sta€e 
purchase taxes  (the last country to go  over to VAT  was. the  Unitia'd.  I{tngdo!lf}dn 
April  1973),  but  the  implementing procedures  and.,  more  importantly the  rates of 
the new  ta:x:es  are by no  means  uniform from.  country to C.Otilltr.y.  .  .  ' 
31 In practice,  however,  the  amount  of tax eould rarely be  deducted  from the figure  for 
total sales to customers  and therefore the sales variable  has  been taken  (as,  for 
example,  in almost  all industries  in Italy and  in the  French food  industry)  including 
taxes charged to customers. 
As  far as  Italy is concerned,  in view of the  low rate of the"imposta generale sulla 
entrata"chargeable until 1972,  for the  practical results and the  purposes  of our 
studies, it is of no  great  consequence  whether it is  included or not, 
The  same  is true of the  United Kingdom,  since until April  1973  purchase  tax was  in 
force  at  low rates. 
The  determination of sales gives  rise to difficult  problems  in the  case  of big 
conglomerate-type multinational  companies  which  include  in their consolidated· accounts 
revenue  from  operations  outside the  relevant  industry. 
Generally speaking,  the principle  has  been to use  an  overall approach,  taking into 
account  comparable  values  corresponding to the variables  analysed,  i  e.  these 
variables all refer - for each given firm - to the  same  type  and  to the  same  group 
of economic  activities  ;  the variables  are  relatively "homogeneous"  and  may  there-
fore  be  used in subsequent  work. 
When  the group  of variables  relating to the  sample  of the largest  firms  in the  in-
dustry is being analysed,  "homogeneity"  in respect  of the  firm must  take  precedence 
over "homogeneity"  in respect  of the  industry.  In extreme  cases,  therefore,  the 
aggregate sales  of the  sample  of firms  may  exceed the total f.or the  industry,  when 
one  or more  of these  firms  derive  a  substantial proportion(but  alwr.!ys,  by definition, 
less than  50 '}{)  of their turnover from  other fields  of economic  activity. 
In these cases,  two  separate econometric  calculations have  had to be  carried .out 
one .based  on  the  industry as  a  whole,  comprising the  exact  sales  of the. units 
which go to make  it up,  treated .as  kind-of-activity  units,  i.e.  by deducting  from 
the sales of each  one  the  part  derived  from  other industries  and,  at  the  same  time, 
including those  units  accounting for less than  50 %  of their sales  in the  industry, 
for the  actual part entering into the  relevant  industry  (''K;A.U."  appro'lch); 
- the other,  based on the  n*  large  firms'  taking into consideration their aggregate 
. sales,  even when  partially derived from contributions to other industries  (''enter-
prise"  approach), 
20.  Employment  (addetti,  Beschaftigte,  effectifs) 
The  number of employees  is  represented by the  number of persons  working  in the  firm 
or unit  studied  (including shareholders,  owners  or partners  who  permanently work  in 
the  firm  and  unpaid  relatives). 
This  includes  : 
- persons  working outside the  firm,  but  who  belong to it ani  are  paid by it  (e:g. 
sales  representatives)  ; 
- persons  absent  owing to holidays,  illness,  special leave,  etc. 
- persons  on strike, 
32 However,  the  number of persons  employed  excludes  : 
- persons  working at  home,  not  listed on  the  firm's  p~roll 
- persons  seconded to other firms  against  compensation 
- persons  on  protracted or indefinite leave  ; 
- persons  on  militar,y service. 
In some  cases,  executives  have  been excluded. 
21.  Wages  and salaries  (masse salariale,  massa salariale,  Lohn  und  Gehaltssumme) 
This  means  gross  wages  and salaries  ;  they are  made  up  of all the  gross  remuneration 
due,  in a  given year,  to the firm's  employees  (both white  and  blue collar),  i.e. 
-basic  p~ (wage  or salar,y),  cost-of-living index,  overtime,  bonuses  for holidays, 
national  holid~s or Christmas,  13th and  14th months,  benefits  in kind; 
- social security  costs  and contributions  paid by the  firm  and  amounts  set  aside 
ever,y year in various  funds  (redundancy,  retirement  1  etc.) for the benefi't  of the 
workers. 
Remuneration  paid to persons  working at  home  has  been excluded. 
22.  Net  profit  (benefice net,  utile netto,  Nettogewinne) 
This  is the profit for the  financial year as  shown  in the balance sheet.  The  figure 
is generally for the  pre-tax profit  of the  firm or unit studied and  in most  oases  ie 
net  of interest  on  capital  loans. 
In some  cases,  however,ohiefly in Italy,  provisions for taxes  or other purposes  m~ 
not  be  included in the profit shown  in the balance sheet. 
The  net  profit is usually obtained from  the gross  profit  on  sales,  account being 
taken of the evaluation of unsold stock  (gross trading profit),  deducting amounts 
set  aside  for depreciation and  adding various  amounts  of income  derived from  other 
activities  and  investments. 
A succinct definition of net  profit,  used by  a British Research Institute is  : 
"Profit  is before tax and dividend  p~ments and  after depreciation  and  other charges". 
23.  Cash flow (or "gross  cash-flow"  or "gross  income'~ 
This is the sum  of the net  profit  as defined  above  and  the  amount  set  aside  for 
depreciations,  account being taken of variations  in unsold stock.  The  gross  cash 
flow is fundamental  to the calculations based on  the methodology used for the dif-
ferent  industr,y studies.  Net  cash flow  m~  be  obtained from  the gross  cash flow 
(also known  as  gross  income),  by deducting income  or corporation  tax,  capital 
levies  and dividends  (and sometimes,  in certain companies,  also  interest  paid  on 
capital loans,  when  this has  not  already been deducted from  the net  profit). 
24.  Gross  investment  (investissements brute,  investimenti lordi,  Bruttoinvestitionen) 
This  is fixed investment  (in real estate,  plant,  machiner,y  and  often furniture)  and 
therefore  includes  annual  amounts  for depreciation. 
33 In other words,  this heading includes  the variations - in a  given year - in the 
total immobilized capital of the firm or unit studied. 
25.  Own  capital or equity  (capitaux propres,  capitali propri,  Eigenkapital) 
This  heading is made  up of the  algebraic  sum  of the  paid up  capital  and  the total 
reserves  (extraordinary  and  ordinary),  but it  usually excludes  provisions set  aside 
to cover specific charges  and liabilities,  as  well  as  profits  (or losses) carried 
forward. 
It has  been defined  as  "issued share capital actually paid up  plus  retained profits 
and  reserves". 
A firm's"own capital" should not  be  confused with the  "total capital"  used or in-
vested by the  firm,  which includes borrowings.  This  last variable  could not be 
used,  through it would  certainly be  of interest. 
34 IV.  THE  MATRICES  OF  OLIGOPOLISTIC  INTERDEPENDENCE 
26.  Market  mechanism  and corporate  performance 
Let  us  assume  that  corporate  performance  and profitability are  a  socially useful 
and  desirable goal  of economic  policy and  necessary as  a  means  of increasing na-
tional wealth and  of feeding the  development  process, 
The  problem which  arises  is  how  we  are to measure,  examine  and  stimulate  corporate 
performance  and  profitability and  avoid waste  and  parasite  revenue  arising from  the 
phenomena  underlying Parkinson's  laws.  This  involves  determination of 
(a)  the level  at  which  performance  and profitability should be  studied 
(b)  the most  suitable technical  and methodological tools  for carrying out  the 
study. 
With  regard to  (a)  we  can distinguish 
- the  industry and  national  level,  as  in methodology already used  ; 
-the overall and  international level,  part  of an  approach  in which the  major multi-
national  groups  operating throughout  the  European  Community  - i.e.  in all the 
nine  countries - are  contrasted and  compared  in quantitative terms, 
We  will deal with the  development  of the  analysis by the first  approach only  (in-
dustr,y  and  national).  The  problems  connected with  (b)  are particularly difficult, 
In my  opinion,  there are  only two  complementar,y,  inseparable criteria for measuring 
and  examining performance  and profitability : 
- market  mechanism  ; 
- comparative  performance  of firms. 
We  have  thus  arrived at the  focus  of  tod~'s fundamental  problems,  where  the  macro-
economic  approach towards  coherent,  effective and  above  all "efficient" economic 
policy- i.e.  directed towards  more  rational utilization of all available  resources  -
associates  and units  with the  microeconomic  approach towards  a  theor,y of the  firm 
directed towards  "efficient" development,  represented by high rate of yield and 
profit  (an antidote to the gigantism of Parkinson's  laws), 
This  focus  also denotes  the  two  knotty points  of the quantitative theor,y  of concen-
tration  : 
the first  is the deficiency of the market  mechanism  and  its structural inability 
to  pl~ its proper distinctive role  in the  oligopolistic context  of the  modern 
world  ; 
the  second is the objective  and  intrinsic difficulty of comparing the  performance 
of the various  oligopolistic firms  studied in the  analysis. 
The  first of these  problems  is  linked to the  following  question  :  how  can one  ex-
plain the  high profitability of a  given firm  in a  given  industr,y in  a  given  countr,y, 
i.e.  in given practical circumstances  ? 
35 To  what  extent  does  this profitability depend  on  r 
- the firm's  high level of efficiency ; 
- the firm's  possible  dominance  - or even monopoly - on  one  or more  markets  ? 
It is well  known  that under current  circumstances,  oligopolistic structures  and 
units are exposed to the aberrant  temptation of "power",  which,  by its very nature, 
tends to impair the  market  or competition mechanism  as  soon as  certain limits are 
exceeded. 
Good  performance  in a  firm is a  measure  of its efficiency only when  the  firm,  in 
carrying on its business,  is exposed to the full force  of the market  mechanism, 
If  1  as  a  result of its power,  the  firm has  managed to transcend the  "power of 
selection" wielded by competition,  its performance  expresses  no  more  than the 
result  and the existence of this  power,  and not the firm's  efficiency. 
In this  respect,  the  measures  of concentration can  provide certain points  of refe-
rence,  particularly by virtue of the calculations made  with the matrix n* = 1 
{see  28.). 
In certain situations, it may  also be  worth extending the  quantitative analysis 
from the  industry level to the market  or subindustry so as to give  a  better picture 
or the scope  available for operation of the  mark.et  mechanism. 
27. ·The  basic data of matrix analysis 
The  second  problem concerns,  in ~  view,  the  way  in which the  accounting and legal 
institutions in the various  countries  operate,  for they work  on very different 
criteria when  determining annual profits  and boa~  are left with  a  varying but 
in  ~  view nearly always  excessive,  degree  of discretion,  even if there are country-
to-country and  industry-to-industry differences.  As  a  result,  for practical pur-
poses,  the profits of different firms  are  not  perfectly homogeneous  or comparable. 
Nevertheless,  I  do  not  feel that  we  should exaggerate this disparity in the profits 
of different  firms,  because  I  do  not think they are substantial enough,  as will 
be seen later,· to undermine  the results of the following econometric calculations, 
especially where  these  analyses  are not  confined to a  single year,  but  extend over 
a  sufficiently representative length of time. 
In any case,  the ·above  reservations  may  be  considered irrelevant to the  proposed 
methodology  and they therefore do  not  detract from the methodology's  rigorous 
logic  r  it is clear that this is only  an  initial approach  and,  being innovatory 
in nature  1  is also capable of improvement. 
We  shall consider in order three different  and connected matrices,  which may  be 
termed "the matrices  of oligopolistio interdependence",  for that is the  principle 
on which they are based. 
They are  : 
36 (1)  matrix No  1  oligopolistic inequality  ; 
(2)  matrix No  2  s  large firms'  comparative  perfomance  1· 
(3)  matrix No  3  :  large firms'  comparative  growth rates. 
The  following pages  illustrate  r 
(a) the models  of the three matrices  (Table  4)  ; 
(b)  an  outline of the symbols  and  fomulae  relating to the matrices of oligo-
polistic interdependence  (Table  5). 
28.  Matrix No  1 
This  matrix highlights the various  aspeots  of oligopolistic .unevenness  through 
a  multidimensional  approach. 
Among  other things,  it highlights 
(  i) the existence  and  quantitative value of dominance,  expressed by the  index 
L  {maximum  of L)  ; 
n*h< 
(  ii) the degree  of unevenness  of the oligopolistic  !~.rena,  expressed by .the 
index L 8  ; 
(iii) the  ranking of the several variables baSed  on  the  rartking of the  two  above 
indexes  (L  *  et L  ),  giving the SCORE  (or total number of points) 
n  h<  s 
+ 
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COUNTRY  : 
MATRIX  No  1: 
OLIGOFOLISTIC 
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(of n*  firms) 
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(of n*  firms) 
MATRIX  No  3: 
COMPARATIVE 
GROWTH  RATES 
(of n*  firms) 
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38 TABLE  5 
Symbols  and  formulae  used in the matrices  of oligopolistic 
interdependence 
Matrix  No  l 
L *  n  h<. 
L 
S 
SCORE 
Matrix  No  2 
A,  B,  C, 
= value  corresponding to the highest  point  of the  Linda index 
in the  interval from  n*  = 2 to n*  = n*  m 
= arithmetic mean  of the  L indices starting from  the hypothesis 
that  n*  = 2  up  to n* m 
ranking of a  given variable  according to the value  of the  index 
L *  n  h< 
ranking of a  given variable  according to the value  of the  index 
L s 
unit  or firm studied 
= designation of a  given firm  ;  the letters of the  alphabet  are 
attributed according to  a  decreasing ranking of sales  in a  given 
year t 
ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  a,  etc.) in terms  of performance 
calculated on  sales  ( 1 r) 
ranking of a  given firm  (A,  Bt  c,  etc.} in terms  of performance 
calculated on  own  capital  (2rJ 
ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  0 1  etc.) in the  terms  of sales 
(lx) 
39 1[ 
l.  J1 
lr = lri 
2r = 2ri 
lx  lxi 
7x = 7xi 
SCORE 
rei 
re. 
1 
n** 
Matrix No  3 
t 
A,  B,  C, 
1[  ]' 
ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  etc.) in terms  of own  capital 
(  X) 
7 
ratio  net  profit  (in %)  of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.) 
sales 
=  ratio  net  profit  (in %)  of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  eto.) 
own  capital 
- absolute value of the sales of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.) in 
thousand millions/millions/thousands of ••• 
= absolute value  of the  own  capital of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  etc.) 
in thousand millions/millions/thousands of ••• 
li  +  2i 
r  r 
=quantitative index of firm's  performance  i  (A,  B,  c,  etc.) expres-
sed by  the  following formulae  -
rl  i 
+ 
r2i 
1[ Ji  7[  ]i 
2 
number  of firms  where  re  ~1. 
=year 
=  designation of a  given firm in the ;rear t,  remaining constant 
in subsequent years  (t+l,  t+2,  etc.) even when  its sales ranking 
changes. 
=ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  eto.) in terms  of growth rates 
·  calculated on  sales. (  1  o) 
= ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  eto.) in terms  of growth rates 
calculated on  net  profits  (4o) 
=  ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  etc.) in terms  of sales establis-
hed in year t 
40 c  t+l  c 
1  =  1  i,t 
SCORE 
ranking of a  given firm  (A,  B,  c,  etc.) in terms  of net  profit 
established in year t 
t  *  1 a  i,t 
= percentage share  of the sales variable  relative to the  n*  firms 
or units  in the  sample,  of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.)  in year 
t+l 
percentage  share  of the sales variable relative to the  n*  firms 
or units  in the  sample,  of  a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.)  in year t 
percentage  share  of the net  profit variable  relative to the  n* 
firms  or units  in the  sample,  of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.) 
in year t+l 
percentage  share  of the  net  profit variable relative to the  n* 
firms  or units  in the  sample  of a  given firm  (A,B,  C,  etc.) 
in year t 
absolute value  of the sales  of a  given firm  (A  B,  C,  etc.)  in 
thousand millions/millions/thousandsof  in year t 
absolute value  of the  net  profit of a  given firm  (A,  B,  C,  etc.) 
in thousand millions/millions/thousandsof •••  in year t 
Interpretation of  matrix  No  1  presents  no  difficulties if the structure and 
development  of the  L indices  used are  known. 
If the value  of an  index L *  exceeds l,the dominance  of the first  firm  (or the 
first two  firms)  in the  n  h<  oligopolistic arena is clearly very extensive. 
For example,  in this  case,  the first firm's  share  in the variable will undoubtedly 
account  for double  (or more)  that  of the second firm. 
In contrast,  if the  index L * 
n  h< 
corresponds  to 0. 500,  bearing in mind  tha,t  when 
n* = 2,  I  = 0.500,  we  m~  deduce  that  the first  firm in now~  dominates  the  other 
n*  unit  in the  sample. 
41 With  regard to the  index L  ,  which  expresses  a  quantitative synthesis of the 
structure of the whole  oli~opolistio arena,  reference can always  be  made  to an 
empirical or conventional scale of values  or basic points of reference.  We  may 
thus  assume  that when  L  <  0.100  (approximately), the structure seems  relatively 
balanced,  with many  cen¥res 9f decision  ;  it is based on  a  reasonably large number 
of oligopolistic firms  9r units,  whose  degrees  of dominance  appear,  in quantitative 
terms,  to be broadly similar. 
The  value  L  = 0.100 can be  considered  as- a  reference  point  of definite practical 
interest ana  corresponding to the outline hypothesis of an  oligopolistic arena 
made  up  of about thirty oligopolistic units of uniform size. 
As  the value of the  index L  rises,  the number of oligopolistic units decreases 
and/or the extent  of  uneve~ess between them  increases.  We  may  consider. that up 
to the value  L  =  0.200,  the olisopolistic structure is satisfactorily broad and 
balanced and  ~mains so up to Ls  '"'  0. 300. 
Beyond  L  = 0.300,  the concentration in the oligopoly  ~~d/or the unevenness  can 
graduaUJ create obstacles to the  functioning of the market  mechanism.  When 
however the values  of L  exceed O. 500,  a  qualitative  and  far-reaching survey of 
the market  and  struotu~s can often prove  promising and  revealing. 
29.  The  ranking of the variables 
We  will study two  indices  (Ln*  and.  Ls), for each variable.  In mat:rix No  1,  all 
the variables  are  indicated  inh~ecreasing order of their respective values 
(L  *  across  and.  Ls  down). 
n  h< 
Using the symbols  and  formulae  in Table  5,  the  SCORE  = 
the  ranking of each variable. 
provides 
A practical example  :  if the  index Ln*h<  is higher for net  profit  (for example, 
2.500)  than for any  other variable  (for example,  cash flow= 1.800;  employment= 
0. 900  ;  sales = o. 500  and  so on,  in decreasing order) the net  profit variable will 
be v1i  =  1  (while,  for example,  cash flow will be  v1i  •  2; emplqyment  will be vli • 
3  and sales will be vli ...  4). · 
If the  index L  is higher for the cash flow variable  (for example  0.850)  than for 
any other vari~b1e (for example,  net profit ..  0.800  ;  employment  = 0. 250  ;  sales  ... 
0.150),  the  following will be  obtaine_d: 
2i 
=  1  for cash flow  v 
2i 
2 tor net profit  v 
2i 
3 for employment  v 
2i 
4  for sales  v  = 
42 The  ranking of each variable will be  provided by the score  (3 for profit  and  cash 
flow,  6  for employment  and  8  for sales).  Therefore,  the  following will be  ob-
tained  : 
1)  Net  profit  1  +  2  3 
2)  Cash  flow  2  +  1  3 
3)  Employment  3  +  3  6 
4)  Sales  4  +  4 = 8 
In our example,  therefore,  net  profit and  cash flow will  rank equal first, 
followed by employment  and  sales. 
What  does  this "ranking of the variables"  mean  ?  It has  : 
(a)  a  general  meaning,  which holds  true for all cases  and  applications 
(b)  a  special meaning,  which holds  true  only when  certain conditions  are  met. 
As  far as  (a)  is concerned,  it is  particularly important  that  we  should know  for 
which variables the  degree  of concentration is higher or lower.  Though  there 
are  many  different  facets  of modern  oligopolistic competition,  modern  oligopolistic 
concentration also has  many  different facets,  which must  therefore be  analysed. 
From  an  empirical survey on  twelve  manufacturing industries  in Italy, it was  found 
- that it is not  true that  the  absolute  level of concentration changes  little 
from  one  variable to another 
- rather,  that there  is  a  kind of "size gap",  applying to the  level of concentration 
between two  types  of variables  (the financial  ones  and/or the  others)  ; 
- more  accurately,  the  financial variables - i.e.  net profit,  cash flow,  own  capital 
and  gross  investments  - show,  in nine cases  out  of ten,  a  much  higher level of 
concentration than the  three traditional variables  of sales,  employment  and  wages 
and salaries  ; 
- generally speaking,  despite the fact  that the  concentration values  for the last 
threevariables  are  relatively similar,  the sales variable - the  one  most  commonly 
used in traditional research on  concentration - almost  alw~s ranks  last. 
Obviously,  therefore,  traditional methods  of quantitative  concentration analysis, 
generally based  on  sales and/or employment,  tend,  because  of their basic  principles, 
to underestimate concentration levels. 
43 30.  Comments  on  the  res~lts of an  empirical survey 
The  survey carried out  on-~welve manufacturing industries in Italy has  already been 
mentioned.  We  shall now  briefly examine  some  of the aspects  and  results of this 
survey. 
It extended over an  eight-year period  (from  1962  to 1970)  and  covered twelve  indus-
tries, thus  providing ninety-six cases or structures  (8  x  12) which form  a  suffi-
ciently wide  and  representative basis.  The  industries are listed below,  with the 
number  n*  of firms  making  up the sample  analysed,  in the years  1962  and 1969 
respectively,  indicated in brackets  : 
pharmaceuticals  (n*  =  47  ;  =  45) 
wool  (n*  = 30  ;  =  30) 
cotton  (n*  =  40  ;  =  40) 
knitwear arid  hosiery  (n*  = 25  = 25) 
paper  (n*  =  29  ;  =  37) 
cycles  and  motorcycles  (n*  = 12  ;  =  13) 
electrical engineering  (domestic electrical appliances,  radio  and  TV,  etc.) 
(n*. =  30  ;  =  30) 
office machinery  (n*  = 8  ;  = 8) 
tractors  and  agricultural machinery  (n*  =  19  22) 
textile machinery  (n*  =  17  ;  =  24) 
lifts  (n~ = 5  ;  =  5) 
hoisting and  handling equipment,  excluding lifts  (n*  = 14  = 19). 
The  ninety-six matrices  were  then calculated - one  for each industry and for each 
year - taking into consideration all the seven variables  used in the Commission 
methodology  (sales,  employment,  wages  and  salaries, net profit,  cash flow,  gross 
investments,  own  capital). 
The  following  results were  obtained  : 
- in forty-three  of the ninety-six industries studied,  the net  profit variable 
ranks first  among  the seven variables  used,  while  the sales variable  ranks first 
in only two  industries  (or cases) 
- in twenty-three  of the ninety-six industries studied,  the net  profit variable 
ranks  second,  while sales  ranks  second in only six ; 
- as  a  result,  out  of the ninety-six structures considered the net  profit variablA 
ranks first or second in sixty-six industries  (or oases),  while  the sales 
variable does  so in only eight. 
44 The  following table  shows  the distribution of the different variables  in the 
ninety-six cases  in question  : 
VARIABLE  RANKING  OF  THE  VARIABLES  TOTAL 
I  II  III  IV  v  VI  VII 
01  - Sales  2  6  12  15  13  26  22  96 
02  - Employment  9  11  15  14  17  16  14  96 
03  - Wages  & salaries  14  13  14  16  19  15  5  96 
04 - Net  profit  43  23  10  9  4  6  1  96 
05- Cash-flow  12  29  21  13  9  6  6  -- 96 
06- Growth  Investment  27  14  14  13  6  10  12  96 
07  - Own  capital  7  13  13  20  16  16  11  96 
The  results speak for themselves  :  the fact  that concentration of profits  (followed 
by cash flow)  is higher than that  of the  other variables  is in itself an  indication 
that concentration is increasing regardless  of the  absolute values  of the  concen-
tration indices  used  in working out  the  matrices.  In the first place,  the  firm 
making  the  most  profit  probably has greater power  on  the  market  ;  in the  second 
place,  it can  use this  profit  in order to  increase its market  power.  This  is  a 
classic process  of capitalist accumulation,  highlighted by the  approach used in 
matrix No  1  and  the  ranking of the variables  (1). 
31.  A ~ypothesis of profit maximization by the  largest  firms 
Nevertheless,  the  foregoing conclusions  require certain additional clarifications, 
reservations  and  comments on  8,  general theoretical  plane  (ignoring  then,  the 
specific  situations  in the empirical survey already described). 
The  question is this  :  do  the different  n*  firms  in the sample  all occupy the  same 
position in the seven  rankings  of absolute values  of the seven variables or not  ? 
(1)  See  R.  LINDA,  _Statio  and Dynamic  Methods  for Analysinf Industrial Concentration: 
the Italian Case,  in"Mark~ts,Corporate Behaviour and  he State- I:l}ternation;;tl 
Aspects  of Industrial Concentration, ·~y A.P.  Jacquemin  and  tl.W.  ne  Jong,  1976, 
Leiden  (Netherlands''- )pages  i43 et -seq. 
45 We  must  be  clear on this  :  we  are  not  talking about  the  ranking of'  the variables 
bas$d on the  two  concentration indices  (L  *n<  and  L  ),  described in the previous 
paragraph.  Here,we  are  referring to the  ~aiikings baJed on absolute size.  For 
example,  is the top firm  alw~s the same  f'or·all the seven variables  (i.e.  the  one 
with the  highest sales,  the highest  profit,  the highest  employment,  the greatest 
capital, etc.)  ?  Is the  second firm the same  for all the variables  and.  so  on,  or, 
for example,  is a  firm first in the  ranking for prof'i  ts, but  second for sales, 
third for employment  and then second again for cash f'low  and so  on  ? 
We  can hypothesize  two types  of'  answer,  ·corresponding to two  extreme  oases  of' 
structure  : 
(a) the  rankings  of' the  firms  vary from one  variable to another ; 
(b) the  rankings  of'  the  firms  match exactly for all seven variables. 
The  former situation undoubtedly ooours  most  frequently. 
consider the various  n* firms  in the sample  individually, 
the functioning  and  dynamism  of'  each industry structure. 
means  of'  matrices  Nos  2  and  3,  outlined later. 
We  therefore need to 
in order to understand 
This will be  done. by 
The  second situation  (b)  sometimes  ooours,  but mainly when  only certain large firms 
are considered and  only certain significant variables.  Moreover,  even when  the 
rankings  of certain large firms,  based on  absolute size,  do not exactly match for 
all the variables,  some  general conclusions can still be  made. 
Thus,  according to the  hypothesis  of'  a  structure approximately resembling type ·(b), 
we  m~  deduce  that  : 
(1)  greater unevenness  ~or concentration) of profits than of' sales signifies that 
the  prof'i  t  share  (a i) of the larger firms  (or the largest  of'  all the firms) 
in the sample  n*  is greater than their share  of' sales  ; .  the. largest firms 
therefore make  more  profit than sales when  compared with the smaller firms 
included in the sample  n*  : 
(2)  If' the largest firms  in question  make  more  profit than the smaller ones  on 
their sales, it is reasonable to assume  ~t  their performance  is better than 
that of the smaller firms  in the sample  n*  : 
(3)  Consequently,  the  largest firms  do  not  tend to maximize  sales - more,  at  any 
rate,  than the  smaller firms included in the sample  n* - but they possibly tend 
to maximize  profit  (since their performance is better than that of the smaller 
firms),  as  a  result of the numerous  factors  connected with their large size, 
sucll as  economies  of scale and enhanced market  power. 
When  the  industry approach is used,  there is what  seem  a  virtually automatic 
corollary  :  insofar as  the  largest firms  perform better,  and this is connected 
with their market  power,  this  power is attained through their large size which, 
among  other advantages,allows  them to choose  (in order to dominate)  the product 
marke1s  which· seem to offer the  most  promising and profitable prospects for the 
future. 
46 In spite of their market  power,  ver,y  large diversified firms  often have  lower levels 
of performance  than medium-sized firms  (1).  This  paradox will  have  to be  explained 
and  analysed. 
As  far as  methodology is concerned,  since hypothesis  (b)  is relatively infrequent, 
analysis  of the relations between firms'  size  and  profitability entails use  of the 
"individualizing approach"  of matrix No  2.  See  Part  V. 
(1)  See  R.  LINDA,  Un  modele  de  develo 
Mondes  en  developpement,  Paris,  No  11  1975 
International Nouveau),  pages  413-459. 
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es,  in 
ou Ordre V.  MATRIX No  2  CONCERNING  THE  LARGE  FIRMS'  COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE 
32.  The  question of performance 
The  structural matrix  No  2  is a  typical tool of oligopolistic analysis  ;  its main  hypo-
thesis is based  on  the  interdependence  and  unevenness  (of power)  between the various 
oligopolists. 
This matrix  is designed to provide "a quantitative  picture" of unevenness  of per-
formance  (and,  implicitly,  of efficiency and capital intensity)  among  the various 
oligopolists. 
It can be called  :  "the matrix of large firms'  comparative  performances".  It can be 
used to establish a  ranking of firms  by performance  and  to assign  a  complex  index 
(re.),  whose  meaning will be  explained later1to eaoh of them. 
J. 
In order to draw up  matrix No  2,  accurate  concepts,  hypotheses  and  formulae  must  be 
defined. 
A firm's  performance  may  be  measured  in various  ways,  but  no  measure  can be  considered 
satisfactor,y and complete  in itself. 
The  matrix  approach has  the  advantage  of allowing two  measures,  instead of  just  one, 
to be  taken  into consideration for the  econometric calculation.  In this  case  we  will 
consider the  two  following measures,  applicable to each firm  i  of the  n*  large 
firms  constituting the  sample 
net  I!rofit 
l ri  sales 
net  I!rofit 
,r. 
- J.  own  capital 
X  100 
X  100 
or 
or 
cash flow 
sales 
cash flow 
own  capital 
(l) 
(2) 
The  two  measures  are,  in a  certain sense,  complementar,y,  though they must  be  used 
with caution and  reservations. 
Since  the  objective  of this econometric  system is to determine the. "comparative" 
performance  of the various  firms  in the  sample,  we  must  take net  profit  as  a  basis 
for reference.  It depends,  of course,  on  the criteria used to evaluate unsold 
stock and to determine  annual  amounts  set  aside for depreciation of immobilized 
capital. 
In other words,  the criteria used to determine  net  profit var.y,  within certain limits, 
from  one  firm to another ;  the type  of firm  and  policies  on  balance-sheets  also var,y 
considerably from  one  to another. 
In these  times  of inflation,  different criteria used in evaluating and  drawing up the 
balance-sheet can lead to differing net  economic  results. 
Comparison of the net profits of different  firms  therefore  implies  a  certain degree 
of approximation and inaccuracy,  but it appears  unlikely that this would  be suffi-
ciently extensive to invalidate the  results  of the  analysis,  especially when  it 
covers  a  fair number of consecutive years. 
To  overoome  these  inaccurracies  gross  cash flow  (the  sum  of the  net  profit  and 
annual  amounts  set  aside for depreciation)  may  be  used instead of net  profit  (see 
22  and  23). 
49 Performance  based on  sales  (formula 1)  is clearly a  function of a  given  firm's  pro-
duction structure, i.e., the industry and  markets  on  which it operates  and  its degree 
of vertical integration and  capital intensity, 
Moreover,  sales are  such an objective  and  comparable  factor  (apart  from  certain small 
firms  with a  propensity for tax evasion) that it would be  unreasonable to  reject  it, 
all the  more  so  since matrix No  2 is usually based on  an  industry  (or subindustry), 
which therefore  increases  comparability between the  units  (or firms)  studied. 
'In terms  of pure economic  logic,  performance based on  own  capital  (formula No  2) 
is certainly the  most  meaningful  and  accurate  measure,  since the  most  important  fac-
tor in analysing the  economic  efficiency of a  given firm  is the  rate  of return 
on  capital.  In practical terms,  however,  own  capital is obviously affected by the 
criteria on  which balance-sheet  policy is based  ;  this should not  be  overlooked, 
above  all in present  times  of inflation, 
Performance based on  total fixed  invested capital would  also be  a  significant measure, 
but  the  date  gathered were  not  suitable for this type  of calculation, 
33,  The  ranking of firms  by performance 
The  firms  of the sample  are classified in decreasing order of  performance  1ri across 
the matrix and  the  performance  2ri down  the matrix. 
In addition,  the value  of ~ ~  is also indicated across the  matrix  ;  this is the 
ranking of each firm  i  in  terms  of absolute  sales [these are  the values  1xi, 
indicated for  referen~e purposed),  while the value  of  7 ·  J  i  is indicated 
down  the matrix,  i.e., the  ranking of each firm  i  in 
terms  of absolute values  of  own  capital  (these  are the values 7xi,  also indicated 
for reference  "purposes").  (*) 
Matrix No  2 has  a  dual  purpose  ;  it can be  used for two  series  of calculations 
(a)  the  ranking of firms  by  performance  ; 
(b)  the  evaluation of "dimensional  performonce". 
For  (a)  the  procedure  is the same  as  for matrix No  l  :  calcul'ltion of the score. 
However,  in this case,  it is not  applied to the variables but to the  firms.  There-
fore,  if a  given firm E.  ranks  first  (rli)  in the lri list and  fourth  (r2i) in the 
2r.  list, its score wilt be  obto.ined from  1  +  4  =  5,  while if a  firm E.  ranks  tenth 
1  '  1 
(ri)  in the  1ri list and fourth  (r21 )  in the  2ri list, its score will be  10  +  4  = 14. 
If we  then place the different  firms  in order of their scores,  we  will obtain the 
ranking of the  firms  by  performance, 
(*)  3ri  would  be  used  (instead of lr)  and  4ri  (instead of  2r)  if cash flow  were 
used  instead of net  profit, 
50 With  regard to the  designation of the  individual  firms,  letters of the  alphabet 
(A,  B,  0 1  •••  Z,  then A',  B',  0 1 1  Z',  and  then A",  B",  0",  ••• )can be  used, 
linking the  alphabetical order to the  absolute size of a  given firm E.  in a  given 
year t  (for example,  sales of the  firm  in 1970),  so that  the letter 1designating 
one  s~e firm through  a  number of subsequent  years  remains  the  same,  even though 
the  firm  m~  change  its ranking in terms  of the  absolute values  of the  relevant 
variable. 
According to this  method,  firm  A is the  one  with the highest  sales  in 1970,  while 
firm A'  ranks  27th  by sales for the same  yea.T', 
Finally,  it should be noted that,  for the purpose  of establishing matrix No  2.  and 
the  related rankings,  all the  n*  firms  in the  sample  of the  large  firms  analysed 
for each  industr.y should be  taken into account,  but  no  other. 
34.  The  evaluation of "size  performance" 
Here,  we  assign to each firm  E.  in the  sample  n*  a  certain index re.  which  can 
have  at  least  two  different  naffles  :  --1 
- index "of size  performance" 
- "size  reducer"  of performance. 
This  re.  is of purely technical significance and  must  be  analysed and  interpreted 
with gr~at care,  to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding. 
The  starting point for the calculation of re.  is still matrix  No  2  and it is obtained, 
for each  firm i,  from the  following  fcrmula1 : 
rli  r2i  rli  +  r3i 
+  +  or 
1 [  J 
i  7 [  J 
i  1 [  li  (3) 
rei  J 
2  4 
where  1i  is the  ranking of firm  i  in terms  of performance based  on 
is ther ranking of the  same  firm  i  in terms  of performance based on 
and  as  regards  formula ( 3 bis) accouni;  is als  0  taken of ratios based 
instead of net  profit. 
r2i  +  r4i 
7 
T"' 
li  l  J  (3 bis) 
i  sales  and  7 
own  capi  til 
on  cash flow 
Interpretation of the  index re.  is based  on  a  convention corresponding to an  abstract 
structure  :  if each firm has-1  a  comp~rative performance  proportional to its ranking 
in terms  of absolute values  of the variable  (sales and/or own  capital),  we  will 
obtain re.  2  1.  In this case,  the  performance  is a  function  of the  ranking in abso-
lute  size~ 
The  first firm  for sales  (and/or own  capital)  is the  one  with the highest  rate  of 
performance based  on  sales  (and/or own  capital),  the  firm  ranking second  i.n  terms 
of absolute sizes will also rank second in terms  of performance  and  so  on  up to the 
last firm  (or n*th firm)  of the  sample,  which,  since it is the smallest  in the sample, 
will also be  the  one  ranking lowest  in terms  of performance  among  all the  firms  in 
the sample. 
51 In this respect  1  it must  be  pointed out  that the  rankings  are  indispensable  quanti-
tative terms,  which summarize  the position- in an oligopolistic view of multidimen-
sional competition  (or lack of competition)  - of each firm based on its absolute 
size and  performance,  distinguished from  all the other firms  in the sample. 
This  approach involves  the  formal  division of each firm's  performance  into two  sepa-
rate parts  : 
- size performance  ; 
- efficiency performance, 
As  we  have  seen,  the  performance of a  firm depends  primarily on its ~  (effect on 
production facilites  ;  capital intensity,  sophisticated technology,  economies  of 
soale; effect  on the market  :  dominance  over demand  curves  and prices)  and efficiency 
(economical,  efficient organization and management,  thanks  to quality of management 
and employees). 
The  index rei is designed to show,  by means  of the  matrix  No  2  approach,  the  portion 
of a  given f1.rm 's performance  which must  be  attributed to the "siZe"  factor. 
Clearly,  the greater the portion of performance attributed to the "size" factor,  the 
lower the  remaining portion,  represented by "efficiency" will be,  and vice versa. 
What  are  the  practical grounds  for using the  rei index ? 
Many  economists,  industrialists and politicians insist on the  need to promote  ' 
increases in firms'  sizes,  through mergers,  acquisitions and  joint ventures,  in oraer 
to increase firms'  competitivity.  It is particularly important  that  we  should have 
the quantitative tools to verify the validity of these  objectives  and the extent to 
which they are being achieved. 
The  various calculations based on matrix No  2  can help in this,  above  all the  index 
re1,  whose  value must  not  exceed l,  If it should exceed 1, it m~  be  argued that 
in firm E.  "s;i.ze  performance"  prevails  over "efficiency performance"  and  is achieved 
at its  ex~nse.  In other words,  too great  a  share of this firm's  performance  is 
derived from  its size  and too small  a  share  from  its efficiency. 
The  mechanism of the rei index shows  the "size performance"  as  a  negative  concept, 
because this size yield obscures  and climinishes  the scope  and value  of the  performance. 
It is  just as if we  said to the  firm,  "you have earned t.  100.  All well  and good. 
But your re.  index is, for example  3.083,  which is far above  l,  The~ 100 you made 
have  been  a~hie.ved not. through good management  but  only through your largs size. 
Your performance  is therefore  a  "size performance"  and your firm  is"inefficient~· 
. This  is why  the  rei index can also be called a  "size  reducer"  of performance. 
Can this approach be  justified in terms  of theory  and general  economic  policy ? 
We  will  look at this  again after analysis of the concept  of the "size performance 
curve". 
52 35.  Ranking of firms  based on "size performance" 
In  my  opinion,  the  abstract hypothesis  re.  =  1  is particularly useful for analysing 
l.  . 
the unevenness  of performance  among  oligopolists,  for it indicates  the demarcation 
1!a! between the two  categories of firms  : 
- those in which "efficiency performance"  prevails over "size performance" 
~ those  in which the opposite  occurs. 
First categor;y  :  rei < 1 
The  minimum  limit of the  index rei is 1/a* and corresponds to the A1pothesis  that 
firm  i  is last in the  ranking of  absolute values  of the variables  (sales,  own 
capit";l)  and first in the  performance  ranking. 
According to the definition taken here,  this firm in which rei  =  ~  is that firm 
which has  no  "size performance",  in contrast with all the other  * 
n*  firms  in the sample,  so that its performance  is due  entirely to management 
efficiency. 
If the sample  is made  up of fifty firms,  the  lower limit of the  index rei will 
therefore be  0.020. 
But,  more  generally,  in all the  firms  in which re.  is less than 1  "efficiency per-
formance"  will prevail over "size performance",  far their performance  ranking is 
better than their ranking in terms  of absolute values  (of sales,  own  capital, etc.). 
In an extreme  case,  where  all the  firms  in the sample  really do  give the  same 
performance  result,  they will all have  a  different re.  index,  but this will still 
be  less than 1,  for all  but  the largest  firm,  for whicft  we  will have  re.  = 1. 
l. 
Second category  :  rei > 1 
The  upper limit of the  index re.  is n*  and  corresponds  to the  hypothesis  that  firm  i 
is the !!!!! in the  ranking of !bsolute values of the variables  (sales,  own  capital} 
and last in the  performance  ranking.  Consequently,  all its performance is attribu- . 
table-To size  and none  to "efficiency". 
Generally,  all firms  with the  index re.  higher than 1  have  "size performance"  higher 
than their "efficiency performance".  1Their position in the  performance  ranking is 
lower than their position in the  ranking of absolute values. 
Third categor;y  :  re  =  1 
There is a  third category of firms,  represented by those situated on the  "demarcation 
line".  For example,  the fourth firm in the  performance  ranking is also fourth in 
that  of absolute size  (ratio 4  = 1). 
36.  The  concept  of the "anti-size arena" 
Let  us  now  use  n** for the  number of firms  in the first category  (re < 1), i.e. 
those  whose  performance  is not size-based,for their performance  ranking is higher 
than their ranking in ter!fiS  of absolute size.  This  arena may  be called the "anti-
size arena". · 
53 Thus,  for example  : 
- if a  firm is eighth in the  ranking of absolute size  (sales  and  own  capital)  and 
seventh in the  performance  ranking,  it falls within the  anti-size arena  (ratio 
i < l) ; 
if however a  firm is thi~ in the ranking of absolute size, but  fourth in the 
performance  ranking,  it falls  outside the anti-size arena (ration .4;  /  1). 
3 
n**  may  be used to indicate the ratio between the number of firms  in the  anti-size 
n*  arena. and the total number of firms  in the  sample. 
Where  all the  n*  firms  in the sample  have  the  same  rates of performance,  this  ratio 
will be  n*  - l  for only the first  firm will fall outside the  arena. 
n* 
The  minimum  of the  ratio ~  is 0  and this  occurs  when  all the  firms  fall  into the 
third categocy  n* 
(re.  = 1) 1  i.e.  they are all situated on the  "demarcation line". 
~ 
37.  The  size performance  curves 
The  re.  index may  be  used for a  number of interesting applications  and  developments. 
All  the~ re.  values relating to the  n*  firms  in the sample  form  a  curve·  displaying 
the  unevenfiess  of the structure · when  performance  is linked to size.  · 
Let  us  therefore call it the "size  performance  curve".  The  various  firms  i  will .be 
indicated on the  axis  of the  abscissae in decreasing order of the  rei valuis 
appearing on the ordinates axis. 
Let  us  now  suppose that this curve  is a  line  (r') parallel to the  axis  o:f  the 
abscissae,  which occurs  in the  cypothesis  where  all firms  in the sample  have  an 
index re.  =  1.  A parallel line (r') does  not  however indicate that all firms  in 
the sample  have the  same  rates  of performance,  but that  performance  is linked to 
the position of each firm in the ranking of absolute values  and therefore. decreases 
with the size of the  firm  (measured,  in this case,  by these absolute values). 
However,  where  all the  firlils  in the  sample  have  the  same  rate of performance,  the 
curve  (r'') will increase, taking the values  l  ,  1  ,  1  ,  l.  The  first  i 
- - r 
on the  axis of the abscissae will be  the  las¥*onR*in the  ~ample (based on the 
ranki"'"' of absolute values)  and re.  will be  l  ,  the second  i  will be  the  penul ti- .  ...,  ~  - r 
mate  one  in the  sample  and  rei will be  1*  n~ up to the last ri' which will corres-
pond to the top one  tn the sample  (baseR on he ranking of absolute values)  and the 
rei of this firms  will be 1. 
I 
In the given hypothesis  all the  i  numerators  are the  same  for all the firms  and 
are therefore all equal to 1,  whfle the cl,enominators[  J  i  change  according to 
position and therefore rise from [  n*]  to  [  1 J  (l) 
(1)  Even  though all the n*  firms  in the example  occupy different  positions  in the 
ranking of absolute values,  they. all occu:py the  same  position,  i.e, the first 
position,  in the  performance  ranking (r1i). 
54 TABLE  6 
THE  SIZE  PERFORMANCE  CURVES 
1.000  First hypothesis  Perfeot correlation between ranking and  performances  (r') 
r 
0.900 
o.aoo 
0.700 
r" 
0.600 
r'  0. 500 
0.400 
-· ---- -·--- ----------- --- - -
0.300 
0.200 
0.100 
Second  hypothesis  :  Equality of performance  (r") 
i  =  1  rei =  ~  =  0.1250 
1 
i  =  5  ;  rei = 4 =  0.2500 
1 
i  = 2  re1 = 7 = 0.1429  1 
i  =  6  rei  = 3 =  0.3333 
i  =  3  1  re1  = b =  0.1667  i  =  7 
1 
re1 =2=0.5000 
i  =  4  ;  1 
re1  = 5 =  0.2000  i  =  8  re1  "'  1  =  1.0000 
55 The  graph shows  two  curves r' and  r"  ,  and  assumes  a  sample  of n*  =  8. 
In building the r' curve the  axis  of ~he abscissae  m~  be  interpreted in two  con-
trasting w~, since the value  of re.  is the same  for all firms  : 
l. 
(a)  the  largest  firms  in absolute  terms  (on  the basis of sales and/or own  capital)are 
on  the left and their size decreases  as  we  move  towards  the  right,  or 
(b)  conversely,  the smallest  firm is  on  the left and  as  we  gradually move  towards 
the  right the  larger firms  come  to the fore,  the final  one  on  the  right being 
the largest  in the sample. 
Only  the second interpretation  (b)  is 
for the value of rei is lower for the 
for the  largest firm  (index value 1). 
I 
needed for building the  r"  curve  however, 
smallest  firm  (index value 1)  and greater  .  8 
38; Size and  performance  in a  market  economy 
The"economic  philosophy"  at the basis of this mathematical  construction can be 
explained in logical terms.  In the  casP  of the  r"  curve,  size has  no  effect  on 
performance,  in other words  size is no  w~ a  source of profitabilitY7 
The  smallest  firm  (i = n  )  operating in the  oligopolistic  arena can be  defined  as 
primus  inter pares  and  m the  largest firm (i =  1)  m~  be  defined as  ultimus  inter 
pares. 
In fact 
(a)  the  increase  in firms'  absolute size,  and  therefore  in oligopolistic concen-
tration,  tends,  ceteris paribus,  to change  a  decentralized economy  into  a 
centralized economy!  reducing the extent  of freedom  and  economic  enterprise 
and  therefore the  intensity of competition.  This  increase  in concentration 
can even damage  the  market  mechanism,  which is  one  of the main  tools of econo.-
mic  and  productive efficiency ; 
(b) this efficiency is also endangered in the  long term,  for increasing size  and 
concentration lead to  increased rigidity in supply and  production capacity. 
Only  if certain welfare  losses are tolerated,  notably in terms  of employment, 
will  it be  possible  in  su.ch  a  situation to strike a  balance between 
over-rigid supply and erratic and  decli.nin_s  demand  ; 
(c)  in the light of all these negative aspects,  and  consider the general  interest, 
there is a  factor- only one,  but  a  fundamental  one  - which militates  in 
favour of concentration  :  its necessity.  Increased size is the  precondition 
for the existence,  implementation and  general  dissemination of technological 
innovation  ; 
(d)  since large,size and  concentration are  linked to capital intensity,  they must 
inevitably - throu.gh economies  of scale - lead to a  high level of performance 
(on sales  and  own  capital)  ; 
(e) similarly,  large size being the source of market  dominance  (and therefore of 
power over prices  and  the demand  curve),  the practical result must  be  an 
increase  in the  level of performance, 
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profitable than small  firms. 
If profitability is not higher,  the following factors  must  be  present 
- the greater  capital intensity is not  paying off ; 
- theconsiderable  accumulation of resources  (to finance  large-scale technical 
investment)  is not  paying off ; 
- economies  of scale are either no-t  being made  or are offset by "diseconomies  of 
scale"  (a polite way  of saying that management  cannot  cope  and  that  Parlcinson 's 
laws  are  applicable)  ; 
- extra profits  are  not being generated by the  enhanced degree  of market  power  and 
dominance  conferred by the  features,  conduct  and effects  induced by size. 
To  conclude then,  all this signifies that - in the hypothesis  in question - the 
large firm is less efficient than the smaller firm,  despite the "natural"  advantages 
gained from  its position and  size. 
This  is clearly expressed in the  hypothesis by the  r"  curve,  where  all the  n*  firms 
in the oligopolistic arena have  the same  level of performance  :  the  most  m 
efficient firm is the smallest  (primus  inter pares),  the least efficient is the 
largest  (ultimus inter pares), 
39.  Concentration and  proof of efficiency 
The  conclusion is  obvious  :  large size and  industrial concentration must  still 
establish their claim. to legitimacy in the eyes  of public opinion and  the social 
system.  This  claim can only be  advanced on  the grounds  that they are "absolutely 
necessary"  from  the technical  and  economic  point  of view  and  this must  be manifest 
through greater performance,  In the  absence  of such proof of ''efficiency"  and 
profitability,  large size  and  concentration are harmful  ;  they cause waste,  abuses 
and  imbalance  and  are generally linked with all forms  of dominance. 
The  alternative is clear : 
- either the economies  of scale really exist in a  given instance,  in which case 
they must  then be expressed,  if the unit is efficient,  through performance  ; 
or the economies of scale do  not exist,  in which  the large firm,  its size  and 
concentration are  not  justified in the  eyes  of the general public. 
Consequently,  when  the situation in an  industry and  an  oligopolistic arena is similar 
the hypothesis  and  the r"  curve  (i.e.  equality of performance),  the structure and 
concentration process  can be  considered undesirable,  particularly if major firms 
are  involved  (i.e.  those which are  not  more  efficient than the smaller firms). 
57 Let  us  now  assume  that  in a  given industry,  the  top firm,  i.e.  the largest,  is also 
the  most  efficient,  i.e.  the  one  with the  highest  level  of performance  as  compared 
with all the  other firms  in the  sample.  Let  us  suppose that  in this  case  the  in-
dustry is tending towards  the r' curve,  i.e. that in general the  performance  ranking 
of all the  firms  in the distribution is linked to their ranking in terms  of absolute 
values. 
This  is  a  natural hypothesis,  inherent  in the  modern,  progressive  and  tenhnologi-
cally sophisticated oligopoly,  where  the greater profitability of the  major firms 
in fact  represents  one  of the  main  features  and  motive  forces  of the system of 
oligopoly  and  the concentration of capital,  production facilites  and  markets. 
The  approach based on  analysis  of rankings  - i.e,  assembling  and  appraising them  -
starts by  combining the  performance  and  absolute size  renkings,  and  then formulates 
the  hypothesis  and the r' curve  (where  performance  is  a  function  of absolute size). 
This r' curve  is the  expression of a  model  reflecting the  demands  and  implication 
of an  oligopolistic,  technological  and  modern  industry. 
For the  purposes  of operating a  structural economic  policy,  working  from  this hypothesis 
under which the  firm which  ranks  first  in terms  of size  also  ranks  first  on 
performance,  the efforts of the smaller firms  to  increase their size  must  not  be 
hindered.  The  tendency of smaller firms  to grow  larger - and  thus to rise in the 
size  ranking - expresses their attempt  to raise their performance  and  thus  to 
attain a  higher position in the  performance  ranking  (re1  indexes).  This  tendency 
and effort contribute  towards  the  process  of competition and its dynamism  ;  it will 
be  recalled that either the  oligopoly is dynamic  and hence  competitive  or else it 
tends  to  produce  the effects  of monopolistic  rigidity. 
40.  Balance  of forces  and  conduct 
However,  in practice,  the  following  are  fundamental  in relation to the r' hypothesis: 
- the  position and strategy of the top firm  ; 
- the  components  and  causes  of its greater profitability. 
As  far as  the  £Osition of the  top firm  (or top two)  is concerned,  the  L *  index 
- and,  in addition,  the  L  index - may  be  used,  both shown  in matrix  n  h< 
No  1  (concerning the  rank~ng of the variables). 
In this  respect,  one  of the basic concepts  of oligopolistic comEetition must  be 
stressed  :  the balance  of forces  between the various  firms  operating in the  oligo-
polistic arena.  If the  L *h  index exceeds  1  for some  significant variables 
(net  profit,  sales,  own  c~p~fal, etc.), the top firm's  dominance  may  appear so 
great  that  the smaller firms  simply cannot  compete  effectively.  In other words, 
beyond  a  certain limit - registered by the value  of the  L  index  .~.  competition and 
dominance  become  incompatible,  for the latter prevents  the  former from  developing 
and  gaining ground. 
58 The  conduct  of the top firm  m~  be  regarded as  the  product  of at least two  components, 
and  a  distinction can be  made  between  : 
(a) various  formlf  of conduct  on the  market  1  i.e.  on all the markets  on which the 
firm operates 
(b)  conduct  outside the market. 
The  strategy and "competitive  armoury"  of a  large firm are expressed and operate 
both through the  market  and  through the structures constituting the  overall sur-
rounding environment  ("environnement  globalise"),  and modify  and  influence both the 
market  and  the  environment. 
The  "competitive  armoury"  chiefly consists of  :  prices,  advertising,  quality of 
products,  sales organization  (or "implantation commerciale11 ) 1  production facilities, 
welfare  and  wages  policies  and, finally· that  residual area which is known as  conduct 
"outside the  market". 
All these "competitive weapons"  can act  as barriere· to entz;y,  keeping other firms 
out  of the  industry and  the  market  ;  this,  indeed,  is precisely what  the large firm 
aims  at when  it develops  its dominance  in the  oligopolistic arena  (1). 
The  degree  and intensity of this dominance  are manifested in practice by .a high 
proportion  eith~r of the  industry's total sales or of its total profit.  Here,then1 
are the operational  and practical factors  which support  the econometric analyses 
contained in the three Linda matrices  of "structural oligopolistic unevenness". 
Though greater profitability logically seems  to point to dominance  by the top firm, 
we  must  develop still further the analysis  of two crucial factors  : 
- the practical aspects  of conduct  ; 
- the practical aspects of "economies  of scale"  and "diseconomies  of scale". 
41.  Abuse  of dominance 
In the first place,  we  must  make  sure that the top - i.e.  the  largest - firm in the 
oligopolistic arena does  not  use its dominance  to break the "rules of the game"  of 
competition. 
It can do  eo  in many  different ways 1  as  numerous  and varied as technocrats'  and 
businessmen's creative imagination.  The  following are but  a  few  examples  : 
- the top firm  m~ feel  the need to force  its  own  competitors to accept  price-fixing 
agreements,  agreements  on trade  practices  or market-sharing agrements  (possibly 
fixing quotas  on the various national,  regional or local markets)  ; 
(1)  See  R.  LINDA,  Concurrence  oligopolistique ••• ,  pages  352-369. 
59 - the top firm  m~ feel the  need to  impose  on  its own  purchasers,  distributors 
and  wholesalers  oppressive  conditions,  resale prices  and  sales  quotas  on  various 
markets  (national,  regional or local)  1  export bans  or other barriers  and  ob-
stacles to the free  movement  of goods  ; 
- the top firm  m~  even consider it should require its own  subcontractors  and 
suppliers to accept  restrictions  on  production and supplies to competitors, 
obligations,  limits or exclusive  rights connectedwith the granting of licences 
(patents,  know-how) 
- the top firm can use  its own  financial strength and  its own  industrial,  commercial 
and technical structures 
(1)  to create surplus  production capacity so as to saturate the  market  and  drive 
its weaker competitors  out  ; 
(2)  to operate  intensive advertising campaigns  coupled with predatory pricing 
(3) to act  on  public  authorities,  administrations,  associations  and  political 
parties in order to obtain - through devious,  illicit and  fraudulent  means  -
decisions  on  the  award  of public contr8.cts  which work  to their own  advantage 
and  to the detriment  of weaker competitors. 
~he foregoing brief examples  alone  provide  good  reasons  for-continuous,  far-reaching 
investigation of all the various  forms  of conduct  of a  large firm which  dominates 
a  given industry or a  given market.  The  conduct  of this firm must  be  analysed, 
continually and  without  respite  1  by the  public bodies  and  authorities  responsible 
for economic  policy in general  and  competition policy in particular. 
This  analysis  of conduct  must  be  even deeper  and  even more  detailed when  the top 
firm is the  most  profitable  (on the basis of matrix No  2)  or the  most  dyn~ic from 
the point  of view of growth rate  (on the basis  of matrix No  3,  to be  considered in 
the  following pages). 
42.  Diseconomies  of scale 
However,  the  foregoing  assumptions  do  not  meen  that  an  investigation of the. largest 
firm in the  industry  (or the  firm dominating one  or more  markets)  should be  excluded 
~  this firm  is less profitable  (on the basis  of matrix No  2). 
For this firm  m~  well  have  abused its dominant  position but  at the  same  time  be 
burdened by "diseconomies  of scale"  and  take  advantage  of accounting and  administra.-
tive stratagems to underestimate or transfer profits to its own  executives or subsi-
diaries  (however covertly}. 
\ 
According to this hypothesis  - i.e.  lower profitability of the  largest firm - dif-
ferent  aspects  of its conduct  must  also be  analysed,  but  not  conduct  alone  :  the 
structure of this large  firm must  also be  analysed. 
60 More  generally,  the largest firm may  therefore be  s 
- more  prof'itable,  because it is more  efficient and/or because it abuses  its own 
dominance  ; 
- less profitable, because it does  not  abuse its dominance  or because it does abuse 
it but the  firm is inefficient. 
The  problem is therefore  obvious.  The  conclusive  hypothesis  will result  from  a 
combined  analysis  of 
- economies  of scale 
- diseconomies  of scale. 
In operative terms,  what  we  must  do  is  t 
(a) draw  up  an  inventory of the various  indicia so  as to indicate the separate  and 
distinct existence not  only of economies  of scale but  also of diseconomies  of 
scale  ; 
{b)  establish methods  for collecting and  analysing these indicia. 
This  analysis  impli~s that the  following must  first be  taken into consideration  : 
- the  firm's ~  capital  ; 
the ~  capital it actually uses,  i.e., total capital employed 
- external financing  i 
- the  comparative  performance  for each of those three factors  (own  capital, 
invested capital, external financing). 
The  analysis  must  then cover personnel expenditure,  distinguishing executive  and 
managerial salaries  from wages  and salaries proper (blue-collar wages  and  white-
collar salaries). 
Executive  and  managerial "inflation" may  be  an aspect  of the  diseconomies  of scale 
connected,  for reasons  of political nepotism,  with absenteeism and  low  worker pro• 
ductivity,  since the latter is really an  aspect  of these  diseconomies. 
At  any rate,  it appears  that the fraction of turnover or added value  accounted for 
by  remuneration of staff and  executives  may  provide  an indication which  though 
complex  and  multiple,  is not  without  its value. 
The  question becomes  much  more  complex when  we go  on to actually use  and  relate 
these  indicia for the  purposes  of reliable calculabion and  in order to track down 
and  attack possible  "white elephants"  or "colossi  with feet  of clay". 
61 43.  Method  of comparison- selecting firms  - corollaries of economic  policy 
The  comparative  method  is based on  the  logic of oligopolisti.c  interdependence  and 
therefore detennines that  of matrix No  2  (and of the other matrices).  All  the 
finns  constituting a  given "oligopolistic structure" must  be  analysed together in 
order to  determine  1  through objective  and  quantitative criteria and  tools  : 
- which are the  most  profitable firms 
which are the  most  efficient firms,  i.e.,more profitable without  actually 
being dominant. 
Once  matrix No  2 has  been set up,  I  believe it is the sine  qua non  of any  attempt 
at  solving problems  of efficiency and  dominance.  we  must  say yes to efficiency, 
and  yes  - but  subject  to reservations and to checks  by public opinion and  public 
authorities - to efficient dominance,  but  no,  absdutely no  to inefficient  dominance. 
The  problems  have  perhaps been somewhat  simplified for the  sake  of qUantification, 
but  the  main thing is to make  public  opinion  aware  of the  issues. 
Through the  approach based on  the structural matrix,  on  comparative  profitability 
and  on  the "anti-size arena"  1  rankings  can be  analysed  and  discussed.  This  implies 
singling out  the units or finns  to be  studied in the  sample  E.*,  which  represents 
the starting point  of the  analysts 
The  method  of comparison is based on  selecting the firms,  each being examined  under 
the  microscope  of quantitative analysis,  with its rankings  and  other features. 
This is  a  fundamental  step in economic  and  competition policy,  highlighting the 
various  aspects  of the  unevenness  in a  given oligopolistic structure,  distinguishin~ 
the individual oligopolistic  units meaning the firms  which determine,  represent  and 
create this structure. 
However,  this  argument  may  be  developed at  an operative  and  more  general  level, 
where  public authorities  have  a  twofold task before  them 
(a)  formulating their own  structural polio¥ on  the basis of the quantitative data 
obtained by the  methodology  already described  ; 
(b)  informing public  opinion,  the trade  unions  and  consumers'  associations  on  the 
develoRment  of the various  structures studied and  the  large firms  forming them, 
with reference particularly to  : 
(  i) the  level of inequality (or concentration) 
(  ii) conduct,  i.e.  economic  and business strategies 
(iii) comparative  performance  levels. 
62 The  information  (b)  is  of course  preparatory to  and a  functional 
the structural policy  (a).  Each oligopolistic unit  of the  sample 
industry  (and country)  has  an  objective  position in matrix  No  2. 
requirement  of 
n* for each 
The  fact  that each of these units  is designated by  a  letter of the  alphabet  (A,  B, 
C,  etc,,  A',  B',  C',  etc,) underlines the  objectiveness of the  approach and metho-
dology  and  allows  the  confidential nature of certain date  to be  protected where 
necessary,  The  fact  that  individual units or firms  are taken does not  mean  that 
they are being singled out  for praise or for blame,  but  only that  a  basic functional 
requirement  of the  objective quantitative  investigation is being met, 
Matrix No  2  therefore  provides  precise  quantitative  information on  individual firms 
(anonymous  insofar as  letters of the  alphabet  are  used to denote  the  firms)  as 
regards  the  two  main  points 
(1)  the  level of inequality  (or concentration) 
(2)  comparative  performance  levels. 
Matrix No  2  therefore  requires that  a  link be  estab~ished between  (1)  and  (2)  and 
this link is  provided by the  detailed study of conduct  (point  2).  This  analysis 
of conduct  must  explain how  and why  a  given firm  in a  given uneven  industry obtains 
a  given comparative  performance  level  and  a  given performance  ranking.  The  analysis 
of conduct  covers  many  fields of investigation, 
The  choice  of industries  and  above  all of the markets  - both product  and geographic 
markets  - in which  a  given. firm  operates  is the  primary aspect  of economic  rationa-
lity.  This  aspect is li:nked with economic  and business strategy (in particular, 
policy on production capacities,  product diversification and  pricing which the firm 
intends  to follow,  The  practical result  of the choices will be  a  definite perfor-
mance  level and  a. definite  performance  ranking.  In actual fact,  the  oligopolistic 
system simplifies  and clarifies the role  of public authorities..  There  are  a  few 
hundred oligopolistic units in each country  and there is therefore  no difficulty 
in placing ear,h of them  in a  given industrial matrix  No  2.  At  the  same  time,  the 
public  authorities  have  the duty  and  responsability of being aware  of oligopolistic 
reality,  logic  and  development  in order to carry out  theirown polit'ica.l  function 
consciously  and  objectively.  If,  for example,  it becomes  clear that  a  given 
;firm is  abusing its dominant  position- i.e. breaking the "rules of the  game'', 
laid down  by law or agreed on  as  a  policy - public authorities  must  respond with 
suitable action, 
The  objective pursuit of economic  policy,  of which the matrix approach represents 
merely  one  aspect  and tool,  requires  the existence of clear,  unambiguous  "rules 
of the  game",  well-defined objectives and efficient means  of intervention. 
Here,  however,  what  we  are tying to do  is to emphasize  that there is no  contra-
diction between the objective pursuit of economic  policy (structural and competition) 
and selecting the  oligopolistic units  or firms.  Indeed,  the latter .is  fundamental  to 
attainment  of the  former. 
63 44.  Seeking-hypotheses to explain indust;y-to-indust;y differences  in performance 
Industry-to-industry and/or country-to-country differences  in performance  m~  be 
caused mainly by  a  number  of differences  in  : 
- technology,  in the broadest sense  ; 
-legal forms,institutions  and  accounting and  management  standards 
- the efficiency of management. 
Identifying the relative importance  of each of these  factors  is  a  difficult task 
involving detailed,  far-reaching and  accurate analysis. 
Let  us  now  consider a  basic structural factor,  namely  technology,  working from  the 
difference in performance  noted between different industries in one country on  the 
basis of numerous  empirical analyses. 
Technology,  in the broad sense  of the term,covers  all the economic  and  hence  all 
the technical industrial and  technical commercial  aspects  of a  given industry. 
We  will distinguish three  fundamental  factors  : 
(a) capital intensity ; 
(b)  the extent  of purchases  from  third parties 
(c)  the duration of the firm's  (or its various divisions')  economic  and  production 
cycle. 
(a)  Capital intensity 
This  is closely connected with  : 
- the  degree  of industrialization 
- the  degree  of technical  production and  commercial diversification 
- the degree  of vertical integration. 
Clearly,  greater capital intensity will lead to higher performance. 
Therefore,  a  key  industry,highly capital-intensive and using sophisticated techno-
logy  (office machines,  pharmaceuticals),  must,  managerial efficiency being equal, 
be  more  profitable than other industries  (such as  the  food  industry).  _ 
Greater capital intensity and  more  sophisticated technology entail in practical terms, 
substantial intangible property,  such as  ownership of patents,  know-how,  etc. 
- connected with extensive activity in the field of general  and  applied research -
which in turn entails very high launching costs,  which,  under the  rules in force  in 
various  European countries,  cannot be  recorded in the books  as  own  capital and  thus 
represent  a  reserve which is at the same  time  covert yet  legitimate.  Since these 
launching costs  do  not  appear as  such in the  accounts,  the  own  capital of the  firms 
belonging to key,  advanced technology industries is,  in practice,  undervalued in the 
balance-sheets.  · 
64 Consequently,  the  fact  that the  2r ratios  (performance  based on  own  capital) are 
generally considerably higher for key  industries  (office machines  and  pharmaceu-
ticals) than for the  food  industry does  not in itself imply that  the latter is 
less efficient than the  former, 
Substantial intangible  property in a  given  industry inevitably raises  a  barrier to 
entry,  which gives  the  firms  in the  relevant  industry  and  market  a  certain degree 
of dominance  over demand  and  prices which tends  in its turn to  produce  higher prices 
and profits  (and therefore higher earnings)  than in industries  where  there  is no  such 
barrier. 
The  degree  of industrialization varies  not  only from  industry to  industry but  also 
from  firm to firm  and is connected with the  degree  of diversification and vertical 
integration.  There  is  a  fundamental  difference between  a  pharmaceutical  firm 
which  devel~ps and  launches  new  products  (whether they do  more  harm  than good  is 
another matter)  and  a  firm which  just fills  and labels  phials  and bottles. 
More  generally,  greater capital intensity affects the  cash flow  and  added value 
variables,  which also take  provisions for depreciation into consideration,  apart 
from  the  above  reserves  concerning intangible property. 
(b)  The  extent  of purchases  from  third parties 
This  mainly effects the 1r ratio which,  of course,  will be  much  lower in a  distri-
bution firm,  which simply sells a  product  which is already manufactured  and  packaged, 
than in a  firm  whose  operations  extend through all stages  of processing a  given 
product.  The  value  added by  the  first firm will necessarily and  invariably be  lower 
than that  added by the  second one. 
More  generally,  for example,  a  food  industry which  purchases  agricultural,  semi-
agricultural  or semi-processed raw materials,  generally,accounting for a  large 
proportion of the  final  price of the processed product,  tends  to have  a  1r ratio 
(performance  based  on  sales)  lower than that  of more  integrated industries with 
greater added value,  managerial efficiency being equal. 
(c)  The  duration of the  firm's  (or its various divisions')  economic  and  production 
cycle 
The  longer the  duration of this  cycle - the  period during which the  ctrticle  remains 
in the  firm,  with consequent  immobilization  and  utilization of production facilities-
the greater the  added value  will inevitably be,  other conditions being equal. 
The  duration  of the  production cycle for a  chocolate  or for a  can of peeled to-
matoes  is  much  shorter than for a  computer,  whatever the  components  and  parts 
needed in the latter's production process.  A firm  has  the  time to manufacture 
thirty or fifty or a  hundred successive  runs  of chocolates  or canned goods  in 
the  time  needed to manufacture  one  single  run  of computers  and,  because  of compe-
titive pressures,  this necessarily affects the selling price  and  ratio of net 
profit to sales. 
All the  foregoing considerations therefore  aim to demonstrate  that 
65 - comparisons based  on  different  levels  of performance  are  dangerous  and  misleading 
when  made  between industries,  chiefly because  of structural differences  inherent 
in different technologies 
- results based on  a  sample  n*  of firms  may  also be,  at least  in certain cases,  re-
latively misleading,  when  there are  important  structural differences between the 
different  technologies  applied by  firms  in one  single  industry. 
It follows  that 
(1)  comparisons  based on  the  1r  and  2r  ratios  should be  limited to the same  indust;x, 
possibly considered at dii'ferent  times  and  in different  countries  ; 
(2)  comparisons  should not be based on  a  sample  of firms  whose  technological struc-
ture  is often different,  but  on  the matrix No  2  approach,  which  implies selecting 
the various  firms  in the  sample  and  therefore the  relevant  aspects  of inequality 
of performance  and  size  ; 
(3)  quantitative points  of reference should be  examined,  for they may  provide  a  basis 
for a  reliable  and  meaningful  comparison between industries. 
45.  Differences  in performance established in count;r-to-count;x comparisons 
The  considerations in the  previous  paragraph help to  put  into perspective the  problem 
of the difference in performance  of the  same  industry in different countries. 
I  believe that all three  of the  previously-mentioned factors  (technology,  legal forms 
and  accounting standards,  and  managerial  efficiency) have their role to play,  though 
the  importance  attached to them varies  in cases  of country-to;.. country comparison  • 
• 
As  far as  technology is concerned,  the  food  industry,  to take  an  obvious  example, 
clearly has  a  different structure in Italy from  that in the United Kingdom.  Never-
theless,  it cannot  be  denied that many  (though not  all) the  firms  in the  sample 
manufacture  a  relatively comparable  range  of products.  In other words,  they are not 
completely different  industries  1 from  the  technological point  of view, as  would  be  the 
case if I  compared  food  processing firms  with office machinery  or pharmaceutical firms. 
To  take the same  example,  the  same  multinational groups  operate - often on  the same 
product markets- both in Italy and  the  United Kingdom  and_also  in other countries 
of the  European  Community  (such as,  for example,  Unilever,  Union  International 
Limited-Weddel,  Cadbury-Schweppes,  Brook Bond  Liebig,  J.  Lyons,  Nestle,  Kraftco, 
Swift,  Campbell,  Nabisco,  etc.). (1) 
All things considered,  the technology facton does  not  seem to  represent  an  insur-
mountable  obstacle to drawing up and  interpreting international comparisons of a 
specific  industry,  even if it is as  complicated and diversified as  our example  of 
the  food  industry. 
(1)  See  :  I  processi di concentrazione industriale  :  Metodologia e  applicazione 
all'industria alimentare,  by SORIS  and  R.  LINDA,  published by  Franco  Angeli 
Editore,  Milan,  1976. 
66 The  factors  connected with the legal  forms  and  institutions  and  accounting  and 
management  standards  in different  firms  and  different  countries  may,  however, 
bear more  weight.  Analysis  of these  factors  necessarily implies  making  a  distinc-
tion between the various  firms  in order to understand the significance of perfor-
mance  levels  (1r  and  2r)  or  (3r  and ,4r). 
From  this  point  of view also,  the effectiveness  and  in my  view,  the  need  for the 
matrix No  2  approach seem  to be  confirmed. 
We  must  now  say go on  to the third source  of differences  in  performance-management 
efficiency.  This  is  a  residual  factor,  in the  sense that,  after consideration and 
analysis  of the first  two  factors  (technology,  and legal  forms  and  accounting 
standards),  the  remaining difference between thevarious levels  of performance  in 
the  industries  under consideration can be  due  only to management  efficiency.  This 
seems  fairly obvious,  as  does  the  need to base this type  of analysis  on  the selec-
tion and  description of the  individual firms,  their structure,  power  and  conduct. 
46.  An  extension of matrix No  2 
The  foregoing analysis  has  shown,  amongst  other things,  ways  and  means  of singling 
out  and  determining differences  causes by  technology  and their consequent  effect 
on  firms'  performance. 
Three  particularly interesting variables  have  not  been  included in the  Commission's 
studies  on  concentration trends because  of certain technical difficulties in some 
industries  and countries.  They  are  : 
- added value  ; 
- capital  employed 
- net  fixed assets.  • 
Since value  added tax has  now  been  introduced in all the  countries  of the  European 
Community,  investigation of the  first variable  is considerably easier.  For this 
case,  a  second matrix  No  2  could be  constructed,  based,  not  on  1r  and  2r,but  on 
two  other ratios  resulting from  the  net  profit  related to  added  value 
(instead of sales)  and capital employed  (instead of own  capital). 
The  comparison between the  two  matrixes  No  2  and the  relative  ranking of the  firms 
could provide  useful  quantitative  points  of reference,  particularly if the  survey 
can be  extended to  a  fair number  of industries  and years. 
It will be  recalled that  the  objective  of studies being carried out  for the 
Cpmmission's  Market  Structure Division is to determine  each of the  four ratios 
mentioned  at  32  for the  major firms  in a  number of indUStries  : 
net  profit  over sales,  i.e. 
net  profit  over own  capital, 
04  or 
i.e. 
3r  h  fl  1  ·  '  Q2  cas  ow  over sa es,  1,e.  01 
cash flow  over  own  capital,  i.e. 
2.1 
07 
Q2 
07 
67 VI.  MATRIX  No  3  CONCERNING  LARGE  FIRMS'  COMPARATIVE  RATES  OF  GROWTH 
47.  Matrix No  3 
Like  the  two  previous  ones,  matrix No  3 is based on  the  principle of oligopolistic 
interdependence  and,  like matrix No  21  is intended to provide  a  ranking of firms. 
The  ranking of each of these  firms  is  a  function of the  ranking of all the  other 
firms  in the sample. 
The  main  differences between matrices  No  3  and.  No  2 are  the  following  : 
(a)  the starting point for constructing the  matrix is not  firms'  performance but  : 
- the  fraction  (in% terms)  of the sales of each firm in relation to the  aggre-
gate sales  of the sample  of n*  fi;ms--
the fraction  (in 1u  terms)  of the net  profit of each firm in relation to the 
total net  profit  obtained by the sample 
(b)  then,  the variations of these  percentages  from  one  year (t) to the  next  (t +  1) 
are calculated and  the  individual firms  are  placed in order of the  degree  of 
variation  : 
in the  percentage  of the  aggregate sales of the sample  n*,  across the matrix 
- in the  percentage of the  aggregate  profit of the sample  n*,  down  the matrix. 
The  resulting ranking of firms  may  be  defined as  a  ranking based on  the "rate of 
growth". 
Since  the  percentage share  of an  individual firm  i  (i.e.  A,  B,  c,  etc.) in a  given 
variable  in a  given year is expressed by t  *·  t' the variation relating to this 
firm with regard to the variable in questi8n1 '  will be  provided by the  following 
formula  : 
c. 
1 
t+l * 
a  i,t  t  *  a  i,t 
Therefore, £  (i.e.  rate of growth)  is used to denote the difference between one  year 
and  another in the  percentage  of a  given variable  accounted for by  a  given firm. 
The  advantage  of the matrix approach is that it permits  measurement  of the  rate of 
growth  on  two  variables  (and not  just  one). 
Of  course the variables  have  to be  distinguished and  chosen.  MY  view is that all 
the variables - apart  from  gross  investments,  because  of their generally cyclical 
nature - are suitable for representing the rate of growth. 
Here,  1c  (sales)  and  4c  (net  profits) have  been chosen and  used  as  a  basis for 
constructing matrix  No  3.  (1) 
(1) It must  be  pointed out  that  the  figures  relating to the  measures  o  coin-
cide with the figures  assigned to the same  variables in the  computer programme 
used in the  industry studies  on  concentration.  The  following code  was  used for 
these last-mentioned figures :  01  :  sales  ;  02  :  employment  ;  03  :  wages  and 
salaries  ;  04  :  net  profit  ;  05  :  cash flow  ..  ;  06  :  gross  investments  ;  07  : 
own· capital. 
69 48.  The  ranking of firms  based on  rate of growth 
The  sample  of n*  firms  considered for matrix No  3 is the  same  as that  used for 
matrices  No  1  and  No  2.  However,  in this case it is not the series of size or 
power relationships between the various  firms  in a  given year which is  shown, 
but  the series of differences  or variations  appearing in the structure,  by defi-
nition oligopolistic,. which they  form. 
These  differences  or variations  m~  be  positive  (when  a  firm increases its per-
centage share  of the variable considered)  or negative  (when  the  opposite is the 
case). 
When  constructing matrix No  3  and the subsequent  ranking,  one  of two  criteria may 
be selected  : 
(a) either all the  firms  in the  sample  n*  producing sales and  a  profit  in the  two 
years  t  and  t  +  1  are considered,  whichever w~  ·they vary from  one year to the 
next  (Increas;o;:: decrease  of a* i)  ; 
(b)  or only those  firms  in the sample ~  are  considered which register either a 
positive or no variatiop.  (not  negative)  in their share  (a*.)  in the  case of 
both the variables considered  (sales  and net  profit)  betwe~n the year t  and 
the year i...±...l·  -
Both criteria are sound,  but the  former can provide  a  more  complete  and more  ex-
tensive  ranking of firms  based on rates of growth,even .though it will not  neces-
sarily differ from  the  ranking of firms  when the second criterion is used. 
However,  for practical reasons  (and for the  printer's convenience,  the  aim being 
to keep the matrices within manageable  proportions )and etymological  reasons, 
for we  are  concerned with the rate of "growth"  (and not  the rate  of "  decline "), 
it is possible  to. choose  the second criterion and  therefore to disregard firms 
that  register a  negative difference or variation between year t  and year t  + 1, 
even for one  variable  only  (either sales  or net  profit).  - ---
What  is the significance and  practical  purpose  of the  ranking  of firms  ba.sed  on 
rate of growth ? 
In the first place,  the firms  registering the  highest  rate of growth may  be  deter-
mined. 
In the second place,  two sets  of meaningful  comparisons  may  be established by 
taking 
- the firms  with the  highest  performance,  resulting  from  the  ranking produced by 
matrix No  2. 
- the  firms  with the greatest  absolute size,  measured by sales and/or own 
capital. 
Since  a  certain letter of the  alphabet  alw~s denotes  the  same  firm whatever the 
matrix and approach  (No  2  or  No  3)  and whatever the  time  (t,  t  + 1,  t·  +  2, 
etc.), this type  of comparison can  lead to conclusions  and deductions  of consi-
derable  interest. 
70 49.  Lack  of synchronization in growth rates 
Let  us  now  imagine  a  practical example  in which the  rate of growth will be  measured 
by the sales  and net  profit variables, 
We  must  therefore proceed  as  follows  ; 
The ~  variable will be  considered from  various  aspects  : 
-an increase of the share  in the variable held by a  given firm  (1c.), the  measure 
of which determines  the  ranking of the  firms  based on  the  rate  1 
of growth  in sales  (in national currency)  ; 
absolute size of each given firm in the  reference year,  expressed in terms  of 
sales  ; 
- finally,  ranking of each individual firm in terms  of absolute values  of sales. 
The  same  elements·  are considered down  the matrix,  but  refer to the net  profit 
variable,  the  absolute values  being expressed in national currency. 
Various  practical applications  of matrix No  3  allow us to arrive at  two  immediate 
conclusions. 
The 11!!1 is that the rates of growth of the  individual firms  are not. synchronous 
in the sense that there is no  quantitative correspondence between the  variations 
(or differences)  in the  two  variables considered  ;  sales and net  profits, 
In fact  1  if the  rates  of growth were  synchronous,  the  rankings  of all the  n*  firms 
in the sample  would all be  exactly situated across the diagonal  of matrix No  31  for 
the  firm  ranking first  in rate of growth of sales should also  rank first  in respect 
qf net profits,  the  second would  alwa.YS  rank second with respect to rate of growth 
of both sales  and  profits,  and  so  on. 
However,  in reality,  each firm grows  and/or declines  in a  different manner with 
respect to each variable,  thus  modifying its structure  and  ranking in relation to 
the  other firms  in the  sample  n*.  Indeed,  a  firm m~  have  a  positive  rate  of 
growth 1c.  (for sales)  and  in contrast,  a  negative  one  4c.  (for net  profit),  or 
.  .  1  1  v1ce-versa. 
Empirical  investigations  have  shown  that this divergent  development  in rates of 
growth between the two  variables is a  relatively freguent  occurrence  and that 
two  explanations  are  possible 
(a)  When  a  firm  increases  its share  of sales but  declines  in terms  of net  profits 
(or increases them  much  less  we  cannot  exclude the  possibility of a  cumulative 
effect linked with a  growth or sales maximization strategy,  as where,  during 
the  period studied  (for example  1970  to 1971),  this firm  preferred to lose  on 
prices  and profits in order to increase its sales. 
This  increase in sales  m~  be  accompanied by massive  and costly advertising 
campaigns.  There  is  also the possibility that,  when  a  firm is considerably 
increasing its sales,  the reaction of the trade unions  (and consequent  wage 
rises)  may  push net  profits  down  somewhat.  Again,firms  considerably increa-
sing their sales tend to understate their profit to the extent that the  law 
and practical considerations allow. 
71 (b)  In contrast,  where  the share  of sales decreases  and  the  share  of profit in-
creases, it m~  be  that the  firm is pricing for hig?er profits  and better returns, 
even at the cost  of losing some  of its customers.  Such contraction of sales  m~ 
follow  a  phase  of vast  expansion,  for once  a  certain market  has  been won  and 
the  price  paid  (in terms  of advertising,  special launching prices,  etc.) greater 
attention m~  be  given to the profit  margin  and  less attention to the  actual 
quantities sold. 
At  any rate,  only  a  detailed analysis  of the structure  and  competitive strategies 
of the  main  firms  in the  sample  n*  will provide the answers  to the various  ques-
tions arising from  the lack of synchronization in growth rates. 
Hence,  for purposes of methodology,  it can be particularly interesting to consi-
der the c.  values  (expressing the rates of growth of each firm)  for the greatest 
possible ftumber  of variables  and  not  just sales  and net profit. 
The  second conclusion ensuing from  the examination of many  matrices  No  3  (and their 
rankings  of firms)  is that the variations  (or differen6'es )"  are  much  wider for the 
net  profit variable than for the sales variable. 
This  is a  distinguishing feature  of different  industries studied in various countries 
and  is demonstrated in particular by Italian manufacturing industr,y.  The  net profit 
variable tends  to be  a  dynamic  variable,  while  the sales variable tends  to  remain 
static, 
50.  In search of an  index of competition 
The  range  of matrix No  3  may  be  extended in order to obtain an  index of competition, 
so that explanations  are  required on  : 
(a)  the  alterations to be  made  to matrix No  3 
(b)  the  meaning  of an  index of competition. 
In the extended matrix No  3  account  is taken of all the n*  firms  in the  sample,  even 
though some  of them  register a  negative share  (a*i)' in respect  of the total of the 
variable,  and  not  just  a  negative difference  or variation  (c.).  Of  course this can-
not be  done  for the sales variable  (for there  are no  firms  ~with negative sales), 
but it can be  done  in the case  of the net  profit variable  (there  are  always  firms 
returning losses  and  not  profits). 
How  are we  to calculate the difference c  when  a  firm records  a  loss  instead of a 
profit in one  of the  two  years  (t and  t  +  1)  considered ? 
Let  us  now  suppose that,  in a  given sample  n*  of large firms,  firm  A has  recorded 
a  net  prOfit equal to 13% of the total profits obtained by the sample  of n* 
firms  in 1970.  Let  us  now  suppose  that  in 1971  firm A records  considerable losses, 
amounting to about  7 %  of the total net profit  obtained in 1971  by all the  other 
firms  in the  sample. 
In this case the difference .£i  1  relating to firm A,  will be - 13 %,  between the 
years  1970  and  1971  (and not  - 20% = 13% +  7 %).  In other words,  the negative 
values  are made  equal to nil,  in order to quantify the  "dynamism"  of the structure 
cons ide  red. 
72 This  procedure  is in line with the basic principles of the  econometric  and  computer 
systems  used,  for it takes into account  - even for calculating the system of indices 
(as  in matrix No  1) - only the  positive net  profit variable  (and  not  the  financial 
year's losses),  thus  disregarding negative figures. 
As  far as  (b)  is concerned,  it is demonstrated that the  index d  or D (index of 
dynamis~ is obtained by adding the absolute values  of the differences  (positive 
and negative) between year t  and year t  +  1,  for each of the  n*  firms  in the  sample 
and then dividing the sum  by  2. 
The  formula will therefore be  : 
n* 
L 
d 
i  1 
2 
If we  use  the  algebraic sum  of the differences c., since the total of the sample 
n*  to which the  percentages  refer is by definitian equal to 100 %,  the  result  w?uld 
necessarily be nil,  for the negative differences  would  be  offset by  the  positive 
ones. 
Since  however,  the  index d  is derived from  the  sum  of the abc;olute  values,  the upper 
limit  of the  index will-be equal to 200% divided by 21  i.e.  1, while  the  lower 
limit will be  0.  If d  is multiplied by n*  the  index F will be  obtained  (1),  but this 
is not  examined  in this  paper. 
51.  Competition' as  ~ynamism and variations of market  shares 
We  still have  to define the  relationship between the development  of a  given struc-
ture  and  an  index d  which is supposed to express this structure's degree  of dynamism 
or even  represent ~  index of competition. 
Let  us  therefore  suppose that we  are calculating d  on  the sales variable which 
- assuming the effect  of  imports  and exports to be nil or negligible - generally 
reflects the structure and  development  of the  market. 
Let  us  suppose that this market  is made  up  of~*  firms  and  m~  be  defined as either 
(a) statio, or (b)  dynamic  or competitive. 
(1)  See  previously-mentioned work  by  R.  LINDA,  Concurrence  oligopolistigue et plani-
fioation ooncurrentielle interna.tionale  innEoonomie  Appliquee'!  1972,  pages  388 
et seq.  The  applications of the "indices of dynamism"  are to be  found  in the 
following reports  published by the Commission of the European Commqnities  : 
(I) L'evolution de  la concentration dans  l'industrie de  la brasse~  en France, 
Chapter V,  (Cat.  No  8705,  IAM  and  INRA  research team,  Montpellier,  by  D.  Boulet 
and  J.P.  La  Porte,  under the  responsibility of J.L.  Rastoin), Brussels- Luxein-
bourg,  October 1975;  (II) Etude sur l'evolution de.la concentration dans 
l'.nd  trie des  s  iritueux en France  Second  Part  and  Annex  3  (by the  above 
research team  Brussels-Luxembourg,  1976. 
73 (a)  Static market 
This  is  a  market  in which all  fiJ:.ms  keep the  same  share  (a*.)  against  the  others 
from  one  year (t) to  the  next  (t + 1).  1 
There  is no  competition in this market,  for even if there were  competition,  it 
would be  ineffective,  in that it would  produce  no  change  in the  market  shares 
(a*.)  of the  individual firms.  In this case  the  index dis nil. 
l 
(b)  Dynamic  or competitive  market 
This  is a  market  in which  the  shares  (a*.)  of the  individual firms  var,y  consi-
derably from  one  year (t) to the next  (t1+ 1).  Consequently,  some  firms  record 
an  increase  and  others  a  decline  in their shares,  presumably as  a  result  of the 
pressure  exerted by competition. 
Maximum  competitive dynamism  will give  d  100%  1. 
The  above  classification and quantitative definitions  ~re inherent  in the present-
day  concept  of competition. 
It must  be  emphasized that  : 
(1)  "The  necessar,y condition for modern.  competition is the  existence of an unequal 
and  flexible  power  • • •  giving rise to numerous  changes  • • •  while the  process 
of competition puts the  changes  into effect". 
(2)  The  natural setting of modem competition is the oligopoly,  represented - in the 
various structures - by the sample  of n*  firms. 
(3)  When  an  oligopoly is in motion  (or dynamic)  it thereby becomes  a  competitive 
structure,  whereas,  in contrast,  an  oligopoly becomes  a  monopolistic structure 
(as  rega~its practical effects  and  results) if it stagnates,· static and 
immutable  for all time.  In this respect,  there  is no  better index of monopolis-
tic rigidigy- whatever the numberof units  present  with legal  personality on  the 
given market  - than the  immutability of marlcet  schares.  · 
52.  Results  of an empirical survey  on  dynamism 
The  index ~ may  be  considered a  general  index of  dynami~;~m "capable  of interpreting 
the many  aspects  of this dynamism".  It may  therefore be  useful to  apply this  index 
to all the variables studied,  for the comparative  deductions  should prove very 
interesting.  Moreover,  this  aspect  of the  research has  not  yet been fully  inves-
tigated and  we  may  therefore mention here  an empirical survey which has  been 
carried out,  where  the  index~ was  applied only to sales  and  net  profit. 
The  starting point  ~as provided by the  same.  sample  of the Italian manufacturing· 
industry mentioned at  30,  but  reduced for technical  and  practical  reasons  to only 
eight  industries  instead of the original twelve. 
74 DYNAMIC  OF  PROFITS  AND  SALES  (index d)  (in %) 
1968/1967  1969/1968 
INDUSTRY 
Profit  Turnover  Profit  Turnover 
PHARMACEUTICALS  9.9  2.9  13.4  2.6 
COTTON  12.8  6.1  8.7  6.6 
PAPER  38.8  3. 5  41.3  7.9 
CYCLES  AND  MOTOR  CYCLES  20.9  5.0  - -
ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING  11.6  7.6  36.2  3.0 
OFFICE  MACHINERY  1.6  0,8  56.7  3.8 
TEXTILE  MACHINERY  34.5  6.2  31.0  11.1 
LIFTS  34.3  1.3  17.9  6.3 
The  following indications  are  suggested for interpretation of the table 
- hyperridigidy  d  t...  2% 
- rigidity  2% <  d  ~3% 
- qualified rigidity  3% < d  ~  5% 
- qualified dynamism  5% < d  ~  10  cs;. 
- h:j.:gh  dynamiSm  10 %  < d  ~  20% 
- ver,y  high dynamism  20  ""  ~ 
d  ~50% 
- hyperdynamism  d  >50'){. 
A number of comments  may  be  made  on this table 
(1)  The  dynamism  of profits is constantly much  higher than that  of sales  ; 
{2)  The  net  profit variable is therefore  a  dynamic variable,  while  the sales variable 
is static, 
With  regard to the  rigidity of sales, it must  be  emphasized that it tends  to express 
the "rigidity of market  shares",  for the total value  of. a  firm's sales  is derived 
from the aggregate  of its sales  on  the  various  product  markets  on which the firm 
operates, 
We  may  therefore suppose that the "rigidity of market  shares"  represents  one  aspect 
of that rigidity which is  a  general feature  of oligopolistic structures,  for it is 
connected with  : 
(a)  the  possible existence of dominant  positions in certain product  markets  ; 
(b) the practice of administered prices  which,  at least in non-inflationary times, 
tend to maintain a  certain degree  of price rigidity, 
75 Rigid or administeredprices express  oligopolists'  tendencies  to  avoid  price compe-
tition ;  they make  changes  in market  shares difficult or even  imposcible  over periods 
of time,  on  markets  where  there  are  dominant  positions  or barriers to entry.  We 
obviously  do  not  wish to say that certain forms  and strategies of competition cannot 
operate  in static markets.  But  the  fact  remains  that this rigidity always  gives 
cause  for concern. 
53.  The  dynamism  of net  profits in oligopolistic structures 
With  regard to the  ~ynamism of net  profit,  the  explanation is  complicated.  This  is 
a  highly  anomalous occurrence whose  roots  are  the be  found  in the  abnormal  development 
of certain Italian manufacturing industries,  from  1967  to  l969,,the  most  obvious 
demonstration being the  profit squeeze  (1). 
However,  the greater dynamism  of profit  than·  of sales  seems  to be  a  normal  occurrence 
in oligopolistic structures  (even though it very  rarely  reaches  the very high values 
we  have  already seen in the  case  of certain Italian industries). 
In  a  certain sense,  the  rigidity of the  oligopolistic market  tends to cause  greater 
1ynamism in firms'  internal  structures- affecting the  profit variables  (chiefly 
net  profit)  - since the  reaction of prices  and  quantities  produced  (and supplied)  -
and  above  all production capacities- to variations  and  trends  in demand,is  not 
automatic  and  does not  re-establish balance.  These  variations  in quantities  deman-
ded therefore directly affect  firms 1  profitability, but  have  virtually no effect  on 
either market  shares  or price levels,  which  remain unscathed by the  complex  rebalan-
cing process(col\1-ti\lp.lous  and  unstable)to  which all markets  are  subject, as  a  result 
of the cyclical and structural fluctuations  induced by  demand  situations  and 
variations. 
We  could carry on  much  further with this  argument.  Suffice it here to say th2.t  the 
principles  and  analysis  of structures  can be verified qymeans  of objective  econome-
tric tools,  linked with the general  index of dynamism  (or index_£). 
(l)  For further developments  see  :  R.  LINDA,  Static  and  Docnamic  Methods  for 
Analyzing Industrial Concentration  :  The  Italian Case  in 11  Markets,  Corporate 
Behaviour and the  State ''by  A. P.  Jaoquemin:  and  H. W.  de  Jong,  Leiden, 
Netherlands,  1976,  pages  156  et seq, 
76 VII.  CONCENTRATION  ON  PRODUCT  lYIART<ETS  .i\Jm  1JI;HRIBUTION 
54.  Industry approach  "lnd  product  merket  am1ysis 
All  concentration rese'lrch is  faced  in pr'l_ctice  with the  dichotomy between the  in-
dustry approach  c>nd  the  product  market  approach.  Since  modern  firms  c>re  more  :md 
more  tending to  produce  several different  products  for sale  on different  product 
markets  (multi-product  firms),  the  study of concentration  and  competition is obliged 
to take  account  of this reality by beginning with the  industry  approach.  As  was 
recently stated,  "the structure of  an  industry is defined by  reference to the  number 
of units  or firms  manufa.cturing certain products,  the  industry link being established 
either on technological  lines  (production aspect)  or on  commercial  lines  (market  as-
pect).  Analysis  of an  industry inevitably leads  to analysis  of the  main  product 
markets  and  firms  doing business  on  them  "  (1). 
Thanks  to the  industry  approach,  based chiefly on  comparative  analysis  of the  struc-
ture  and  performance  of  a  sa.mple  of n*  large  firms  in business  in the  relevant  indus-
try, it is possible to highlight  not  only the  most  significant  products  into which 
the  industry can be broken down,  but  also  : 
(a)  what  firms  should be  selected  ; 
(b)  what  interlocking shareholdings  and  directorates exist  between  them  ; 
(c)  what  effect,  if any,  is exerted by  international competition,  substitute  compe-
tition and  endogenous  competition(2). 
(d)  what  flexibility there  is in production facilities  (meaning their ability either 
to  produce  different  products  at  the  sa.me  time  or to  change  over from  one  type 
to another without  difficulty)  ; 
(e)  what  forms  of cooper"l,tion exist between firms  in the  sample  and  other firms, 
through  joint ventures,  subcontracting,  or whatever  ; 
(f)  what  mr.>rketing  methods  and strategies  are  applied and  what  concrete  form distri-
bution takes. 
Awareness  of all these  factors  is the sine  qua  non  for defining  inter-m·,_rket  reL'ltions 
and  hence  for defining,  delineating  ~d selecting the  most  significant  product  markets 
for concentration and  competition study. 
55.  Characteristics  of product  markets 
For the  analysis  of product  markets  the  Commission  haB  developed  its  own  methodology 
which falls  in line with that  described  above  (3). 
(1)  Commission  of the  European  Communities,  Fifth Report  on  Competition Policy, 
Brussels - Luxembourg,  April  1976,  point  180. 
(2)  See  under heading  58. 
(3)  The  practical application of this methodology  can also be  seen from  Appendix  1, 
which  considers  a  number of subindustries  and  product  markets  :  "Concentration  on 
certain markets  in certain Community  countries  :  1973/74" 
77 The  methodology  derives  £rom  six conclusions  o£  £act 
i) since most  of the  £irms  are multi-product  firms  it is  impossible to establish 
the  financial or social variables  for ea9h product  market,  so that the  metho-
dology  can consider no  more  than the domestic  sales variable  ; 
(  ii) in general,  there are ve;y few  firms  in business  on  each product  market 
is usually a  ver,y  dense  or ver,y  narrow oligopoly 
there 
(iii) it is  frequently difficult to establish the  individual share of each of the 
oligopoly- or even dominant  - firms;  and this entails  using brackets,  with 
the market  share lying between the  two  limits  ; 
iv)  most  firms  do  not  wish their individual market  shares  or the way  they are deve-
loping to be  made  public  ; 
v)  frequently financial  links  are  found to exist between the companies  concerned, 
while it is also £ound that  £irms  operating on  a  given product  market  are 
subsidiaries  or parent  companies  of other firms  1  operating on  the  same  or on 
other product  markets  ; 
(  vi) it is also fairly frequent  for a  major share of a  given  product  market  to be 
taken by  a  foreign exporting firm or,  though,  this means  much  the  same  thing, 
by local subsidiaires acting primarily as  distributors  and  importers. 
56.  The  methodology of product  market  analysis 
It follows  almost  automatically from  the  foregoing that the  methodology·has  to be 
worked  out  along the following lines 
I)  All  that  can be  analysed is the share of thd  domestic  product  market,  expressed 
in terms  of sales,  held by both domestic  producers  and  importers. 
II) The  degree  of concentration is measured by  a  pair of linked indices  (no  others 
are likely to  meet  our ver,y strict requirements)  : 
- the  concentration ratio  (c~),  representing the  aggregate  percentage share  of 
the  relevant  product  market. accounted for by the four largest  firms  (or impor-
ters);  ·  . 
-the coefficient  of disparity  (4L  or 4L4),  which is no  more  than the Linda index 
calculated on  the first  four firms  (n*  =  4)  and multiplied uniformly by  4. 
The  lowest  possible value  of 4L  will consequently be  1 1  or 100 %,  since,  assuming 
absolute equality of size  (and working on  four firms),  L~ =  0.250 and  it is fairly 
evident that 0. 250  x  4  =  100 %.  In other words,  4L  expresses the  relationship 
between the  L index calculated in a  specific case  and the  L index or CM  correspon-
ding to the  hypothesis  of absolute equality  :  i.e.  CM  =  _l_  l  0.250  (1). 
Consequently, it is evident that  where  14 = 0.250,  0.250 
0.250 
n*  4 
1  100 %. 
(1)  See  Y.  MORVAN,  La  Concentration de  l'industrie en France,  Collection U,  Libr. 
A.  Colin,  Paris  1972,  page  190. 
78 The  lower limit of the coefficient  of disparity (or 4L  index)  thus  corresponds 
exactly to the  upper limit of the concentration ratio  (c~).  This occurs  when  the 
four firms  control  100 %  of the market.  If these four firms  are  also of the same 
size  1  we  have  the extreme hypothesis  that  C  4  =  41  =  100 'f,.  Presentation in these 
terms,  already followed by the Fifth Report  on  Competition Policy  (1),  makes  it 
possible to give the  main  quantitative data on  the structure of the  relevant 
product  market  without  divulging specific market  data for the  four largest firms. 
57.  The  firms  in business  on  the  product  markets 
Side by side with theCA and  41  indices the same  table will give  the  names  of the 
firms  (in some  cases designated by  a  letter of the alphabet)  and  their respective 
rankings.  The  effect  of this will be twofold 
- one  and  the same  table will highlight  those  firms  which  occupy strong positions  on 
the various  product  markets  analysed  ; 
- the bottom of the same  table will also indicate the  interlocking shareholdings  and 
directorates between these  firms,  whether or not  they do  business on  the  same  pro-
duct  market  (2). 
In  my  view,  adequate  attention will never be  given to the  operational and strategic 
importance  of the methodological  innovation consisting of the  individual analysis, 
explicit designation  and  comparative study of the  individual  firms  in the  sample  ·· 
- referred to by  a  code  letter - which is what  both the second  and  the third ,matrices 
of oligopolistic interdependence  and  the  table  on  product  market  concentration do. 
58.  Endogenous  competition and  company-to-comp~y links 
It is clear from  the  foregoing that, if a  concentration table  covering different 
product  markets  is to be  worked  out,  prior consideration must  be  given,  not  only to 
international  and substitute com  etition (for the sake  of  a.  clear definition of the 
product  market  to be selected  1  but  also to endogenous  competition which may  exist 
between  firms  belonging to the same  group  (especially if the group  is  a  multinational 
conglomerate)  (3). 
(1)  See  Tables  8  - 15 in points  183  - 194 of the Fifth Report  on  Competition Policy, 
April  1976.  See  also  Appendix  1  to this methodology  :  "Concentration on  product 
markets  in  some  Community  countries". 
(2)  An  interesting example  is given by Table  9,  at  points  183  and  184 of the Fifth 
Report  on  Competition Policy,  referring to concentration on .the  markets  for 
textile products  in the United Kingdom.  It will be  seen that  on  certain of these 
markets  strong positions are  held by Courtaulds,  Tootal  and  Carrington-Viyella. 
But  the footnote  to Table  9  records  that Tootal  is linked financially both to 
Courtaulds  and to  ICI  and that  ICI  controls the Carrington-Viyella Group. 
(3)  See  :  R.  LINDA,  L'evoluzione della societa industriale e  la concorrenza endogena, 
in"Il Politico': 'Ed.  Giuffre,  Milan 1965,  pp.  218  - 239. 
79 If there  is qualitative  information to suggest  that there  is  such competition,  then 
consideration will be  given to those  of the group's  individual subsidiaries which 
are  in business  on  the  relevant  markets,  though a  footnote will specify the  parent 
group.  Otherwise,  the group  will be taken  as  a  whole. 
59.  Duopoly  and triopoly - criteria for analysis 
In the specific case  of a  highly concentrated product  market,  consideration will be 
given not  to the first four firms  but  only to the first two  or three,  giving concen-
tration ratios c2  or c3,  whereas  the  12  and  13  indices will still be  multiplied 
by  4. 
The  following  is an objective point  of reference of general validity for all such 
cases  : 
- In general terms,  the  market  share  of the first  four firms  will be  studied  (giving 
a  Cd  ratio),  provided that the smallest  firm considered must  have  a  market  share 
of at least  one  tenth of that held by the largest firm.  If, exceptionally,  the 
second firm  has  a  market  share of less than one-tenth of that of the first  firm, 
the c2  ratio will also be  calculated (together with the  412  index). 
In any  case,  if the  product  market  concentration  table  is based  on  c2  and c3 
rather than C  hypotheses,  we  ma;y  treat this very fact  as  a  warning SJ.gnal 
(for there  is4probably serious danger to effective competition). 
60.  Ranking  of product  markets  by degree  of concentration 
The  foregoing considerations  raise the  question whether it is  possible to set \lP 
concentration tables  in which  product  markets  are  ranked by degree  of concentration. 
Two  solutions  are  possible  : 
First solution 
Markets  are  ranked  in decreasing order of the  C  ratio and  again by the  1  coefficient. 
Then,  by the same  procedure  as  was  applied to tie three matrices  of the oiigopolistic 
interdependence,  we  calculate the score for each market  and  determine  the  ranking of 
each of these markets  in relation to the aggregate of the markets  studied. 
It is a  simple,  almost  mechanical  operation to work  out  rankings  on  the  41  coeffi~ 
cient.  Problems  may,  however,  arise in the  use  o.f  the C  d  ratio, since in some 
cases there will be  no  C  but  only a  C  or c2  •  Hence  the  need for recourse to a 
"convention"'  enabling  c~ncentration ratios worked  out  on different bases to be 
used for the  purposes  of the same  ranking; 
- Where  a  c2  ratio is concerned, ~  its value will be  added  (so that, if c2 = 
100 %,  we  write *C4  150% to make  that c2  ratio comparable with the c4  ratios); 
- Where  a  c3 is concerned,  one ~  of its value will be  added  (so that if c3 
100  %,  we  write  *C 4  133,33 %). 
80 The  convention is thus  based on  the  assumption that the  missing firm or two  firms 
would  have  had exactly the  same  size  as  the  average  of the  three  firms  ( C  3)  or 
the  two  firms  (c2)  for which  aggregate data are available, 
Hence  product  markets  can be  ranked  on  the  combined basis  of the c4  (or *C4)  and 
4L  indices. 
Second solution 
This  solution consists  of working out  an  index combining the  C  concentration ratio 
and  the  4L  coefficient  and  then  ranking the  individual  product4markets  in decreasing 
order of value  of this combined index,  But  this  raises serious  methodological diffi-
culties,  which cannot  be  analysed in this  paper. 
61.  pynamism  of product  markets 
As  a  source  of deep  and detailed knowledge  of the  evolution of market  shares tiken 
by  a  given  product  over a  sufficiently long period - at  least eight or ten years  -
an  index of dynamism  "d"  could be  calcultated for each  reference year.  Comparisons 
could then be  made  between different  industries  and  markets  in different  Community 
countries. 
The  calculation and  analysis  of indices  of dynamism  could provide  information of 
considerable  interest to the  analyst  of competition. 
6 2..  Competition and prices 
This brings  us  straight to the ve;z complicated problem of the  role  and  working of 
modern  competition,  While  it is unfortunately only too true that simple  statements 
in this field tend  (generally)  to be  (relatively)  false,  it is not  true to  s~ that 
whatever is complex  is by definition useless.  So  we  shall now  go  on  to attempt  to 
sketch out  a  series of methodological criteria with the  aim  of showing that  the 
empirical,  practical study of competition in different  industries  and  markets  is 
not  only possible but  also  ~ighly fruitful. 
It goes  without  saying that  analysis  of the  degree  of competition  on  different 
product  markets  would  have  virtually no  practical value  if it were  not  accompanied 
by analysis  of competition,  A number of factors  influence competition,  its  imper-
fections  and  any  restrictions  on  it, and the  degree  of concentration- and  the 
related market  power - is but  one  of these  factors. 
The  organizations  studying the  evolution of concentration for the  Commission  are 
constantly endeavouring to gather and analyse all information  and  all factors 
(even what  are called "qualitative" factors)  so that they can establish and  assess 
aotlJ,al  situations of fact  in terms  of structures,  evolution and  trends. 
In brief,  there  are  at  least  two  fundamental  aspects  of each product  market  which 
must  be  analysed  : 
- concentration 
- prices, 
81 This. papeJ:'  has  already said virtU.ciU;y  all,, there is to be.  ea:id on  how  to  apprOa()h1 
del'J.qribe  and  highlight the  major pll,enollllilnc>n  of concentJ;"ation  •.  A'b.riet' ide13.  of.  ~he 
degree of conoe:ntration on  a  nuniber of selected product. market£:;> can also be  foUnd 
in Appeniii:.x; 1.  ·  ·  · 
~  Pfices, ·ho~ev~r,  a  good deal  of w'?~ :remains  to pe· don~ :- both 
.a  rne"J;hod~logy  ... and .. in the field of diJ:'9ct  empirical  rese;arch  (lh. 
Incon~estabiyi the. pe,riodic  fU!d  sy~ternat  ic surve;y · and analysis ofpri6es  enapl~s . 
significant •p9il1ters. to the e;x:istence  and ope.:r;-ation  of competition on aifferent. 
ma,rkets  to emerge.  In general.terms,  s.'tlbJect  to a  number of' highly specUi0.ex..-
ceptions,  a  findi:ng that  price~ tend :to be,static may  seem to go hand in hand wtth. 
a  ;finding that market shares. for the same  products also :'!;end  to be st.:atio•  The  . ·  •.··  . 
oombined.e;x:istence. of static market  sha.res ·and. 'static pri~s  ·would. s~l\!est.tha:~ ;the< 
existence  of cQmp!!tition.on the  releva:nii  p;r<>d11ct  m(l;X'ket~  is open i;o  cons~~,rabl,~ 
doubt,  and what  cdmpetition .there is is likely ,to be  highly· imperfect· and  J;~ill:lstan;:; ·  . · 
tially restricted.  ·  ·  ·.·  '  ·  · ·  ···•··  · 
'  . 
Firstly~  we  are not living .ill times: arid'• in a.  13yst.em  of'  pric~· stability l,)utin  .··.·  •.  an  inflatio~ry situation a.o  that  1  eVen  if prioesi ch~e; a:nd  change  f~~ntiy·~ 
theycannot be  assumed  tC)  do.  so.  under the pressure  of' competition .13ild  .market  ' 
fu~···  .  >  •.  .  . 
..,.  Secondly,  in  ourec~nom:lc system b(3.$ed,on  11:!'ioe  freedom  (with the  obvious  .....  . 
t.ion •of ce:rt.aln s.:peoifio a,:reas  ..  where ,~ficesars  .regul~ted} a:nd  ol'l  p~oduct  .... differen-- · 
tlation,.  there> exist vej;>;lta:ble. price m;ala.:lties  .··  - millions  and .~itliGlnf3: of'  j>r~ges ~  .. · 
which Jt would,. he. :t>bYsically veey  difficl.l.~t  and  in,  .any  case  eMeedingly  ·expensive.: 
to  SU~!13:•  .  .  ..  .  . 
'  ··:  ' 
(a) tinitly ,... . and  obviously - th~re :is a  pr:i,oe  for ea.ch  product. ;  .  .  -.  . 
(b) prices .va:ey  acqoroing' to the. mo~ttt in time  .. (t) 
(C')  prioes 
. (d) finally, 'al1d  this more  parti.cularly concerns consumer prices' 
. the .  form  and t;n>e  of business  and tdth  ~he ,;;;1-.o ...  ca:::;;.t,..J.;;..;'  o;.;;n;....;;.=....=;;.;;.:;...,....:.== 
.  .  . . . '  .  .  . 
(1)  For a  ~~ne~a,l review. of  .. the  pro'Qle,ms  arising from the st'9:d.y.of 
..,.R •. LJ:NuA;  .. ·Me:t}lodolo~:i.e .de···la .rechei'9he  .. ··sur la  .c6ncehtratidn appligqee. alf.;•('lotnlifne•·· 
d~ la distribwtion de ){roduits >alimentaires '· in Options  Med;i.t:erraneenri:es,.•NoJ4,..  . 
. ·pp.2S et seq,, Gentre Inte:ma:tionaldes Hautes Etudes  agron01ill.ques  ~editerran.eennes, · 
;·~l.-\rue  NeWt_9n·,  7.51.~6:·  :P~ria.  :·  ··  ·  -·  ·  ·  ' 
,-Ap:Pendix  2 tot.his methodology  :. Sul,'\'~Y of retail prices  and mark.,.,llps:pi'Ov;isiona} 
6ut;ine rne;thodolo~. 
82 64.  The  breakdown of product  markets  and  the  sample  method 
Each  industry taken as  a  whole  consists  of a  set of subindustries,  each covering a 
number of products  which,  in their turn,  can frequently be  broken down  into diffe-
rent  qualities,  packings,  volumes,  and  even brands. 
To  take  one  example,  the  food  industry covers  a  large  number  of subindustries,  the 
technological  and commercial  links between  them being frequently extremely tenuous 
examples  are  preserved foods,  milk  and  derived products,  cereal products,  animal 
feed,  baby foods,  sugar and the  like,  oils  and  fats,  chocolates  and  confectionery, 
frozen  foods,  condiments  and spices  and  broths  and soups. 
A subindustry can then be  broken down  into,  for instance,  preserved meat  products, 
preserved vegetables  and  preserved fish.  Preserved fish cllll  then be broken  down 
into sardines,  anchovies,  tuna,  salmon,  mackerel,  prawns  and  shrimps,  crabs,  fish-
paste  and,  thereafter,  for all the  individual brands  of each of these sub-divisions 
The  price  of each product  under each brand then varies  according to  the  packing 
and the size.  Small  packs  usually tend to cost  more  per unit  than large  packs. 
Moving  on  to brands,  it will be  clear that,  in the  food  industry alone,  there  are 
thousands  and  thousands  of different  products  under different brands,  each having 
its own  price. 
Ultimately,  then,  any  analysis  of prices will have  to be  centred on  consideration 
of the brand of any given product,  together with each types  and sizes of packaging 
from  wh~he  consumer may  choose. 
Bearing in mind,  however,  the  nee.d  for at  least  some  figures  on  the structure  and 
evolution of retail prices  in certain manufacturing subindustries,  and more  .par.,. 
ti(}ularly in food subindustries,  the  Commission  has  been  obliged to use  the sample 
method,  already.applied to research  on  concentration in manufacturing industries, 
A number  (y*)  of products  and brands  were  selected so  as  to  constitute  a  produc.t 
sample  for the  food industry,  having certain specific features  (industrial products 
manufactured by multinational firms with well-defined comparable brands  distributed 
widely in several  Community  countries  and in several sales points).  The  price of 
the sample  produr,ts  were  surveyed at the  same  time  at  the different sales  points 
covered by the survey. 
Research is currently going on  in France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  United Kingdom  and 
Denmark  and  an extension to other Community  countries is  planned. 
The  list of the  products  constituting the  sample varies slightly from  country to 
country in view  of specific situations which on  occasion make  it necessaryto 
consider different brands.  Basically,  however,  the  following  products  are  covered 
preserved meat 
preserved fish  (salmon,  tuna,  sardines)  ; 
preserved vegetables  (peas,  beans,  etc.) 
baby  foods  (Heinz,  Gerber,  etc.)  ; 
prepared soups  (Heinz,  Kubor,  etc.) 
83 margarine,  butter,  different  types  of branded oils 
instant coffee,  tea,  cocoa  ; 
a  few  brands  of mineral water 
fruit  juices 
Coca-Cola,  Fanta,  Schweppes,  Tonic,  various  quality beers 
tomato ketchup 
certain brands  of chocolate 
certain frozen  foods  (Iglo,  Findus,  Birds E,ye,  etc.) 
various  types  and brands  of  jams  and  marmalades  ; 
powdered milk,  evaporated milk,  (Carnation),  condensed milk  (Gloria,  Nestle) 
milk creams  ; 
various  types  and brands  of cheese  (Camembert,  Boursin,  etc.)  ; 
sugar  ; 
rice  and  pasta  (Buitoni,  Panzani,  etc.)  ; 
biscuits,  crackers  and  the  like  (l'Alsacienne,  Ritz,  Lu,  McVities,  Bahlsen, 
de  Beukelaar,  etc.)  ; 
prepared potato  puree  (Pfanni,  Maggi,  Mousseline). 
As  in the  past,  the  Commission  will be  publishing reports  on  the distribution and 
prices  of food  PPOducts  in the individual  countries, 
This  research will be  pursued since its interest lies not  so much  in the  survey 
of prices at  a  given moment  in time  as  in analysis  of the comparative  evolution 
of prices for the different  products  at different sales  points  in different  Commu-
nity countries  (1). 
In general,  prices  are to be  surveyed either quarterly or six-monthly. 
65.  The  sample  of sales points  :  the analysis  of distribution circuits 
The  price  of each product  varies  not  only with brand and  packing but  also with the 
time  and  with the location of sales  points  (1).  Clearly,  it is  impossible to 
visit ever,y  sales point,  so that here,  too,  the sample  method  has  been found 
necessary. 
For each Community  country,  therefore,  we  have  taken  : 
(a)  only  one  area or city (Montpellier for France,  Munich  for Germany,  Turin for 
Italy,  Greater London  for the United Kingdom  and  the  Aarhus/Odensee'area for 
Denmark)  ; 
(b)  in the  sample area or city,  a  sample  of roughly  30  or 40  sales  points  represen-
ting different types  of business,  account  also being taken of their location. 
(1)  See  Appendix  2, 
84 The  sample  of different groups  and types  of business for instance,  included 
A  :  hypermarket  - out  of town 
B  hypennarket  - suburban  ; 
c  supennarket  - out  of town 
D  small  independent self-service 
E  small  independent self-service 
store - out  of town 
store - suburban 
F  :  small  self~service stores - town centre  ; 
and so  on. 
; 
Initial results of these surveys  showed  not  only that the  prices for several pro-
ducts varied sharply from  one  sales point to another,  depending  on  the  location 
and/or type  of shop,  but  also that prices  developed in very different  ways,  again 
depending on the sales  point. 
Let  us  give  a  few typical examples 
- at Montpel:tier,  on  16/17  April  1976 
(a) L'  Alsacienne biscui  ta cost fl 1  1.  07  in one  shop and FF  2. 50  in another shop in 
tlle  same  town  ; 
(b)  Amora  mustard cost FF.  1. 15 in. one  shop  and FF  2. 20  in another 
(c) Buitoni pasta cost  FF'  3.65 in one  shop and FF  6.85 in another. 
in London,  in January 1976 1 chocolate homewheat  were  selling for ll pence  in one 
shop and  20 pence In another,  while  Marie Elisabeth canned sardines sold for 
. }5 pence  in one  !shop  and  24 t  pence  in another. 
- in Turin,in January 1976,one kilogram of Barilla branded flour cost Lit.  390  in 
one  shop and Lit.  210  in  another in the same  town  ;  the  same  brand and  quantity 
of butter (Optimus,  made  by Polenghi-Lombardo)  cost Lit.  800 in one  shop and 
Lit.  550  in another  ;  Certosino cheese  (made  by Galban:i)  cost Lit.  2700  per 
kilogram in one  shop and Lit.  1800 in  another ;  the  same  bottle of Schweppes 
Tonic  (Acqua  Tonica) cost Lit.  200  in one  shop but half that in another. 
These  are  just a  few  examples. 
As  regards  price changes,  surveys carried out  by the Institut  IFO  in Gennany,  cove-
ring the city of Munich,  revealed ma,jor differences  in changes  in prices from 
15 January to 15 April  1976.  For example,  Nescafe Gold  (instant coffee,  200  gram 
jar) went  up by 10.3 %  to DM  13.97  in one  shop,  by by only 1. 9 %  to DM.t2. 30 in 
another.  But  other products,  such as Sal  at Mayonnaise  Kraft  ( 500 grams),  rose 
during the relevant  quarter by  20. 2 %  to  DM  2. 98  in one  type or shop but fell by 
nearly 1 %  to only  DM  2. 33  in another shop.  -
There  are  a  number of points to be  made  on  this divergent  evolution of. prices. 
85 Firs~ly,  ~inc~ this evolution is the  result  of fJ.  la~  number  of specific oo..,facrtor!! 1 
any<con~lusion of general validity implieS not  only that there must  be· a  substanHa). 
.. ·,enlargement  Of  the .sample  (both of' products  and  Of. areas  and Sales points) but  alSO' 
that these  perioQ:lc .surveysmus.t be  continued so as to give the greatest :possible 
n:)lllihe,r  of factual data  .. (in this case the mul  tiJ>:lEi  price galaxies) enabling each of 
these  'co;...factor~r to l;)e  identified 'and h:i:ghlighted, 
·.seconJily,  the:t'act.thei.t  t>riceleve.a.s  var:rshar:(lly  and developin diverg~nt ways 
·· .. wliu~d>seem tO  SUggeSt  that :eompei;iti:on.is  not ;working perfectly,  thOugh·thiS is not;. 
necessaril;r in i1;selfa bad thing since, if  competition  i~. working  ilr1.perf~c!JtY,  .~e ..  · 
can  conc.h.de· that it is at least }V'Orking,  .which is. a  good sign.  .~odel:'ll competiti?n 
is not perfect competition and. do&s  not  have  a  sil!file £rice as  one  of its feat:ures1 
perf:e!:)t  information not being. available. on. the state of' the ma,rket  (1).  On  tJle  .· 
contrary, .]miform prices•shoul,d be  re.garded  as'  giv.~ng d.efinite  oaus~ ,for oonce~; 
eipqe tM  •. ~.P,a:rices  a::re )hat t.hey  are the  res.ult or  tacit or overt .o0iluai.on ~etWeen 
the relevant Jmanufaotu,ring ·ahd·.  dif!!t.,ribution) firms.  In  other words, at  f;i.~t,  .··· 
sig}lt  ... and sliojeot to f'urther qMoidngr  analysis· and.  surveY's,  it seems  that  .~  .  .. 
- dif;ferenc'es  fn  co~pl3.rative levels  and  4eveloJ>Ilitmts  of prices  g~nerally ~flept 
imperfections  ~f Mmpetition,  whe~as ·uniformity in the levels and  d~velo~m&rits. 
of these prices  are  lil.cely to  refl~c'l;  restrS,.ctions  of comE!:'tition  ;  ·  · · · · 
r'  '  '  ,,  •, 
- the consni!ter is bEitte:r se#ed by  im~rfect qon'lJ>etHion th<¢ b;y 
ti'tiol\. 
- .  .  .  . 
. As  ~··  h~Ve seen! the  find:i.n~. that  th~re a.re  major Pffoe  d.ifferenoes for a  nunib~r 
9f products in seyera:l Community  count:des  prompts  us to seek .:the  cause~ 
~  '  .  '  '  '  ,  . '  '  - ,.  ;  .  .  :  .  '  ' '  .  ~· 
The  Qomml~Jsion  's  Pl'Q€ramm~. of research. on distclbui;ion. ( 2)  ~iwi~ages 
· >analy.\'>is  of the .distribution chain for each pl':Qduot,  highlighting two 
· detini  te .interest  :  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
·.I :analysed  t~e pherioinena.  of compe.t&t:ion  and..· pJ:'io$s . in my'  wofk  concu~nce  . 
olW>eolistigue et .p:tanifioation concurrentielle. intenilitionB.l.ei  :in.''Eoo11omi.e 
Applique,  ArchiVes  de  l'ISEA,'! Lfbrarie  l)ro~  .. ,  Geneva, .1972,  N'o  2.:.3,  pp. · 325-' 
·  3Ei9•·:  Arnqng  other tn;ri'gs  T  sa:id that llperfeot (or pure  and perfect)  oompe..:. 
..  tl.tiori is>,.  0  :a.  shadow effect" whereas.  "m()de,fu  competition ;is  dynamism 
it provokes  and. crystallizes innpvation,  eipansion1  grolrol'eh  •• ;  · ..  · 
Modern  competition is alJ:IO stra',li:egy,  aggrei"f3Sio:n,  defence.'  negotiation  {~  0  "· 
{op.  cit., page  367)  ~d  inde'ild  it>may \\tell be .that divergent price  .:t.~nO.s 
are  ac~uB.lly  •tbe  ·  effect of competitive. strategi~s and  aggressive' l'<>,ticies 
op~:rated by  oerta:in groups {oi' cha:.insJ of  major  (and even minor)  ret~:ilei'B. 
',  ··~:::::.:>:.··.  ·.  <  ,·'  ,.  •  ,·,  .  ',,  :,  '  .  ',',  '•.·  :<  •  .  _:  ,.., 
(2). See.··· .;;a. •  LINDA,  ·· Metnodolop.:ie  de 1a ~cherohe sur la concEmi;ration appltctEee 
au. domaine  de •la d1striput:J;:on  P,e  PrQ(iu;i. ts aliment aires,  ;i.n  ·noptiQn~  •.•.  ··  '· · · 
Medit.era.ile~nnes~"l9'76,  NQ, 34,  PMe  2~,  and AJ>pendix  ·~·to this pape:i:v• 
'' .  ''  '  .  ''  '  '  .  ''  .  :~  '  - '  '  . .  -- '  ·,.  '  ·'· theJincii price  p~able by the ultimate  ..  conswner,  in other words 
price  1.  whose  characteristics have  already been outlined  ; 
the inii;ial price - j.n other ~ordf3 the 'Qgxing  :grice  (or producer price). 
<  '  ,- •  •  •  ' 
From  ?- cornparison ol'  these' two  prices  we  can determine  the  mark-up,  or gros 
prof'it ,ffi(l;rgin attained by each reta.iler on  a  given. product.  If the ret  aile  pays 
100  (the buying· or producer price) f.or  a;  given p:Mdu.ct  and s.ells it to the  ti-
mate  consumer at 120,  he  has applied, a mark.;;;;up  of  2.0  'fo.  But  the  ..  PrRblem is highly 
complex since we  ax-e  again conf'ronted, with buying pric.e galaxies, varying  : 
,,"  ',, 
(a}  acaording to the sales  poil1t,  s,i.'il'tie•1ihe .Produoez>  Pr~oe differs with the 
tanoe  and siZe "of the .retailer ; 
(b)  according to the  g:qantity purohaied,  since  bulk.·llisoount~  ·rnaJf  ;ge  giv:en 
(c) according to .  the time .  at which t,he  J,)~oduct  is PUI'chi;);Sed. 
As  is made  ~dmi:iiably clear by the' ~por1; 'of~; the So tis  Inst~  tut~. in.  Tl.lr'i~' qti  the 
distribution of food products  irr.Jtaly (now  ~±th.the'" printer), major diffe 
.'if~~  recorded ill. ~he. buying :gtioe  f.or  .~·IJ.e'•. same  ,l?ro~~ct, at,  p~:~. same.  sq,l~~  ~0 
The.pressu~. cif•ilitl,.a,ti?n. in .r;tal.Y'hatfb:a;d .the $:ffect'\1:hat  a;; oa.p  ofrpJ:<$ser'll; 
food.  will  ha~  bo~'!{,~h:e  x-etailer pao  at  i  giVE)rimomeni in  time  a.pd  209  a,UIQ 
l:a~;~r.;,',t'!l~~.,i,t  ~~(~vi:dent that· retailers who.  are clever etlough.or lucky  ~n 
.  to. ):Ju;r.:il1  I~~~~ <!1¥~titieB' be.fore. a  larg~ pri'Qe .;rise  hav~ had,:  the  goo~ fc:r( . 
. to  eilj:()~  pa,rt;i~tJ.}a1;'ly,·~rnpreSE;JiVe  ma.r1c7tt~  wh~m re.;..selli~:  .  . 
·)  ,,  ',_:'  ."  -.;  ..:  _,~,,;.",),_  ..  , ...  :  :"  "  :  .; ':·  '  :.  _,  '_  '  '-
,'Jlhe·p~:tl~~.rn .,~mae~~,'  nowevel'~  of d~te:lmiriJp.g what Is  .~he real  m~rk-up :t a 
> ;s~:l:ea  P?l;~'f,,,.?~. i:~f·~ gj;ven  x-e~aile~ when .. t.he  reta:ile:~<:has bolight.  sey~l,'~t:ba 
·  •  .  t:.9f>~·~}t~:;Pi:~d;uct ~~ different times  and  at .very sharplY dif'ferenl pri.ces 
-· · ,  ".::_.. ~~;~~~~/  the·::_-.:~lit~rk.~~-~-~  fr~  -~-qO_pe:~~ti:on~_ o~ certain  w.~ail'e_~ ."~·(~  ~-h  tJ:l:~:·'·,~.~~ 
"·r~:t:ft1lftet, ~~ioh  ·~its. carr,yintout·these eurteys in. Italy for the Cpmmisfli9n 
va:tn,·y~;cy cow.plex  theo~tiqal <,Uld  practical problems still have  to be sett.l 
;,"•(,c•1£t. aW rate,. the' following points  shouHr be noted  • 
.  .  '  ,··~;;.,  .·  _.- -:  ·,; ,_.  -
. 'Tht~ ,complex  of problems  and data pro'J.ides  the. Commission •wi th £  f~c.tuai :Q 
anti;: a set of. reference Points of inestimable value  as  a  .faqt()r J)arrhit:tirlg s 
6f  t~e real and specific working of compet.ition in  several p~<>d1l¢t rtlatkets. 
Whenp:i'ices  are stable, it is particula.r:ly difficult to e:tplaiil ~·  their 1  vel 
is •whcit  it is, why  it is uniform  ~d  w:hy it is statio  ;  is  tn~ eff.E!!;9'fo( p  .~oes , 
neutralized by oompetiUve  px-essure  or is thex-e,  on. the contrary,  nca''  o~mpet tive 
pressure .whatsoever but  only collusion of one  fqzm·  or another :?:,  · 
To  put it another w~, when  prices. are stable, they  ddns~i,tUte 'a ~~s{  am~:i. 
item of infozmation for the  economic analyst. 
In times  of inflatio;n,  on the other hand;  despite al].. the  method~lqg~¢al ~· 
praotioCJ.l,  difficulties enta:i,led in. gat!lering and a.n<:lli:f!ing  .f'ig~il'es:, it. is 
possible to grasp the logic. and  pb,ysicloe;r of these. p~ioes., 'to acgui!-e)an· 
'IUlderstanding of the  laws  governing their divergent  evolution,  i;,q  detect  fl, 
points,  pa!'allel developments,  the  speed and the  extension, of  pt.ip~•.an.'g.nine 
and,  mo:re  generally,  a  whole  f!eries  of sy!!!ptoms  of the  operati;qh,o;f  t~a~e c: 
cuits, .and thence  :  ·  · 
87 the main inflationary co-factors 
certain monopoly rents  (1). 
Ultimately the existence  of inflation provides  competition economists with  a  unique 
opportunity for getting to grips  with the  dynamic,  deep-seated realities of modern 
markets. 
67.  New  distribution structures -causes and salient features 
We  have  so .far discussed the  final !?rice  1  in 9ther words  the price which the ul-
timate  consumer has  to pay,  but  we  cannot  ignore the  fundamental  problem of the 
formation:  of the. initial price.  This  obviously depends  on the  coml?arative  nego-
tiating strength of supply  (generally meaning t11e  producers)  and demand  (generally 
meaning traders,  purchasing cooperatives  and large-scale retailers). 
The  relations  of force  between sellers - notably manufacturers  of branded goods 
enjoying. qualified monopoly  power (of the type  described by Mr  Chamberlin's  theory 
of monopolistic  competition)  - and bu,yers  - meaning the major distribution chains 
and organizations  controlling the.  :retail supermarkets  and so  on - are  undergoing 
radical  chgnge  in several  Member  States.  The  change  is taking place  in a.  context' 
of oligopolistic competition which for the  m.oment  is working to the benefit  of ·the 
ultimate consumer,  although this does  not  mean  that  we  should not  analy$e the 
longer-term trend which may  change  the  picture completely.  This  is  a  highly complex 
subject  and  we  shall consider only the distribution of food  I?roducts.  All  we  shall 
do  is outline,  very briefly, the  main .causes  and:  trends  of the current structural 
transformations. 
The  factors  governing these structural changes  are,  in the  following order 
firstly,  t.he  ever expanding ownership of private means  of treXtsport  (and parti-
cularly motor cars)  ; 
- secondly,  the  resulting constant  proliferation of sul?ermarkets,  ;ypermarkets  and 
all the  other different sales points  designed primarily for customers with their 
own  means  of transport  ; 
- the  extension of the territorial or geographical area in which c'ompetition works, 
since it is no  longer shops  of the  same'  13,rea .or street which  alone  compete  with 
each other  (as it was  in the  model  analysed by  Piero Sraffa forty years or so 
ago).  . 
The  broadening and  intensification of competition in the retail business,  notably 
as  regards  food  products  and other intensive  consumption goods  1  are likely to 
produce  three types  of actions  and  reactions 
(a)  the emergence  of negotiating strength in the  hands  of the  major retailers  and 
supermarkets  which,  taking advantage  of the large  quantities  of each prOduct which 
they can sell  and  therefore buy,  can exert considerable  pressure  on producers 
and manufacturers  so  as  to obtain supplies  at particularly favourable  prices 
and terms  ; 
(1)  R.  LINDA  :  Methodologie  de la recherche sur 1a concentration appliquee  au 
domaine  de  la distribution de  produits  alimentaires  1  op.  cit.  p.  29. 
88 (b)  the formation by small retailers of purchasing cooperatives and large 
distribution chains with the  aim of enjoying similar negotiating strength 
vie-a..-vis producers and manufacturers and thereby surviving the competitive 
onslaught of the  supermarkets; 
(c)  a  process of concentration between large retailers,  supermarkets, 
purchasing cooperatives and distribution chains,  with a  threefold objective: 
I) relaxing or, in the case of some  products or items,  doing away 
completely with the over-keen competition which in certain countries 
is still raging between individual retailers and between different types 
of retailer (supermarkets,  small  independent retailers,  small retailers 
grouped together, etc.):  the reduction in the number  of brands marketed 
by supermarkets and chain-stores is another means  of restricting the play 
of competition; 
II) achieving economies  of scale in marketing,  by reducing the range  of brands 
and articles sold,  economizing on  the packing and  presentation of these 
articles and  imposing their own  label for a  few  or even several articles, 
to which  they have  the exclusive or monopoly right; 
III) giving a  further.booster to their negotiating strength vi~vis 
manufacturers and producers by reducing or gradually even eliminating 
the power  over demand  which  each manufacturer of a  branded product  can 
exercise over his product  through advertizing. 
It is deduced that as the degree  of concentration of demand  (represented by the 
supermarkets,  major  purchasing cooperatives and distribution chains) rises, it 
boosts the power  of this demand  over manufacturers and producers while reducing 
the probability that gains made  at the expense  of these manufacturers or 
producers will actually be passed on to the ultimate  consumer  in the form  of 
retail price outs. 
68.  Concentration in distribution- effects and trends 
A process of concentration in distribution presents very serious risks for the 
functioning of competition.  Even if the degree of concentration is in itself 
not high,  there is a  fundamental  need for in-depth analysis of the  scope  and 
trends of the concentration process. 
Here  certain main aspects of the structure of demand  should be clarified, with 
a  distinction between: 
(a)  consumer  demand  (generally households);  and 
(b) retailer demand  (e.g.  demand  by supermarkets,  purchasing cooperatives, 
distribution chains and  small independent retailers). 
Consumer  demand  is increasingly concentrated since, in order to gain time rather 
than money,  consumers generally now  prefer to group their shopping and  go  out 
once  or perhaps twice per week.  In other words  they 50  to a  sales point to 
buy a  whole  set of goods  and not  just one  item or OLd  specific brand.  Hence 
large-scale retailers exert considerable real power  over consumers by imposing 
a  basket  of articles or goods in which the various components - the actual 
articles and brands- are not determined by the consumerbut exolusivel,;y: by 
the seller. 
89 In othe!'  ~OX'~ the  .. l!£t?"!6e.J.e  .. retaiier  ..  has: f.iW!Ci:fip montipglt power  over "the 
.  oo~~ti!Rer in·. r.e~peot of  ..• e~  bi:"and  or artioh displi;i.yed  ..  on his shelves,  tak:el'l 
..  l.nd.i'V'idualli or'  separately.  ·  <  ·  · 
Jill tb.&t  the consumer  c~  d~ is,.  consequ~ntl;;yt t9 decide to b~  £rom  the :baske"l:  ··· 
of articles and goods offere\'1 fo:J;'  !ii!ale  in. onEi  sales point  ot:  frQlll t}le baske'f: . 
•  offered for Ba.le. in anPtlier.  Th~.  hOUfi!elQ:.fe •i-arely has .time. to shop around  f~l' · 
.h$7'  faYOltrifte  \)rand of ~heese .  or  tinned food.  Thus  She ·gradually l()Seli  t}).e  .  ; 
h!l.bit· of h~Ying a  .·f~voll!'ite brand and aoqu4res th• habit  .. of ~'e;hoo.~xtg''  th~.·br.ana 
displ~d  QJJ.  tpe  supe~a.rket. fllhelf.  ·  ·  ·  ··. 
:rtliilly, i!l ;View  of .the  time  els111ent~  th~ consumer is not.  reai~t.in•.a·  poSi;t'ion 
.to  vit:~it> a  ~'$.rge n1Jinber,  o.f  sales  _.poin~s to ·gompare  the  qW:tJ..iti;~.s· ~  Pl,':ioes · · 
. 'of the y&ri()US  a;rtiole$. Offered •for ;sa;l.e. •.  · We  u;y indeed speak of tlie• exi~tence 
··.·. of  ..  l.~seal· Olig2Jablistitf'£enaB. since,. i~  getiel'a~ .  terDUilt  a•oorUiiWJler :li\l:ing  in~ a 
given town  or ll.'r'e .. has  a  rell!ttivel1,lill1i  ted. nulliber  of• sales J)oints• :to  chot:>~ • 
betweer1.  The•l.lmnber .. is f11rther  limite<i. b;r. the fa.eot  _that .oel!tain in,lpernrarkets 
. Ol'.hypEil'lnarltet·s  bEalong  ~o· th~ same'g011p :or  oh~~'t;: ltt ;the  moBt·highl;y·_·  ...•. •  .:···"t 
competitive areasi:tllel1..t  t:tte  consumer ,Will 'pe  able 'to•  ~.hoose between a. d~t;en 
o~ fio  indepen<ie!lt  SaleiJ  poi~i;s Wei!EilitB  i:n  le~s d.~n!Siel;y populated areas there  ~;r 
be oril;r  t~o or t~e~ (in .o,ne  area of ~cet  f.or  inflltance;  ·t:asino  G~ant, 
Leclerc Distrib:Q.tion .. an<l  a  fElw  Sjllal;.l  indepe:ndantli!)~  ·  .  .  ··  · . .  ·.  · 
The  ge~1iine dominance w.telded by the SUpe#n&llltetS  '~d;  01Ia.J.nst();~S.  OV~  tft~·~:retail  rnar:-
ket  rel~tive to spe(\Uic 1:1r0duct~  :t~en  :separately,ha.~S< suosti,Ultial ~~erouasl;ons/_(a.ri(i · 
.  ~WerEt is>  a,·rnliltfplier·eff'll.ot  .. which·_ha.lil  s~ill to ()e  ll)eil$u:l'Eid)oh the pu.:roha.lile  marl:tet ......  .. 
.  froJII·  ..  m8riaf!I.Ot~e~s  •. ·o:r~·produoers of·. theee  ·•  SliUII6·: products  .•. ·  •..  ·.'!'he~. large :retailers 
control  sever8J: IeoaloliiOROJ,istie wenas and the'ir detiia.nd,. being the result 
o:f'  the  juxtaposition of demand  from  numerous  sales points within numero'il.S 
. r8gt0Jl.St  is···SO  intenliJe  aS  to beoligopi!Oni~'bio  'G!r. f!Wn  ln0Il0p30l)~:fi.lti:Clt  . :Bt8.ndiiJ .. ··.• 
'and  g(()o(l.~  ~ioh fail .  to. :reaol1  the  ifU.~rmar~t. shelf IIl~.  e~d/\l.p b&il:lg. wi  thclrawp  i 
.~OIIJ..  ~ci,~:u.otion  altogether~ £ii1lq.e,Jilanln'aotll!'el's  can  l).~  ..  lo~er  beri~fit f'rODi>t,b.e  .· 
·· technical• economies· of scal.e·. linked:  to:. maslil  prod.uct;on.  ··  .l'or ·.mass. production..ts··, 
.o~:r possi\)'+e  where mass  sales· are  poitsible,~arui t,hi~m~ans Jiavi~  ..  ~ooe.ss•'bo, 
..  sul)el'l!la.tkets  and ohaj;n-st()res.; •...• 'J.'h•  reSW.t  is thM m8.1'lufactlll'ers  and producers 
· ta.re  vert¥. highly .dependent 9n ;the  .. superlnarket:s a.nli  Qbai~stores,alid be(;om~c tnoz>&· 
and··:rnore ·s  as the·_sbe  ~d. :the  ...  eoneel'itrationo~ sal'es::  oints. inoreases.(:tl).e  · 
ul  ti lier effeat •  ·  · 
irhe .major  x:e~ai.:lers ana  diiJtrib~ti:on ftl'l!ls  te~.t~:  o&tis~itute. inte£a:te~  •  ·· 
· oligopsotdstio s;y;stems  of.logal ol\g()pol;istig arenas,  .. enJoyi:tlg:· Mulative 
mul:tiptier dominance  whieh in .the ~ent  situation l,s .intensifying !o .t}le 
~tx:iment both of the u1  timate consumer  and of the tnanufa.t.};t:urer  or _prod,ucer. 
~eno~·.t; ;the  effects. of a:  merger  .. or  agreem~t bet~en  major>retai~ers,..>and 'b'~~en .... 
di,.~;tribution fi,rms  ~n g7'llera,1,. have t.o  1le·8J:la.l~ed in. :the  light .of,.this C:w\1!1ative.; 
mUltiplier. and its ~luence on. the dom1nance.·oonfe:rrec1  .. ·;tzy: .the111erger  or  .. a.greeme~ti. . 69.  The  mu:oha.sing  power  of distribution firms. and  oross--industr:r dominance 
Cross--industrydomin~ce 
terurl,nolog;y of Fran9ois Perroux}( 1) was  dl~ed  in my  work ~GonOlllTence 
oligopolistique et pla.nifioation oono1Jl'.l'entielle  international&". {2). 
Among  other things,  I  pu;f;  f()rward the fe>l:Lowing  principle: 
<- <,.  ''  ••  - •  ,_  '  >' 
.  ftTh,f!  dominance. of. on.e  industry A  over another industry B,  Which  supplies 
industry A,  together with the dominance  of industry A  over a  third industry c, 
a  customer of industry A,  tends to reint!)rce '$he  power . of .the firm [Or of the 
group of firms constituting and/().r:  dominati~ ind:watry,J] both over ,each  of 
the industries individua1l,y and ove:r  all t)lese industries as a  wh()le ... 
(op.  cit., P•  422)~  ·  · ·  ·..  . ·  ·  ·  ·  . ·  ·  · •· . .  .·. · 
Let us asli!U!De  that indui:stry A is the retail trade (  w:P,iQh'  is growing more  and 
more  concentrated and:  more  and more  powerful .in relation both t.o  :B  and to c) 
whereas B  · represents the supplier manui'il<Otm:ers. or p;ro4,ucers  sad.  C represents 
the aggreg&;te  o:f. Ultimate ,consumers •.  lndul!;tries B and  C are typically atomiStic 
industries, Which  is a  platitude in the ()a8e of  G and  d.emonattable in the case  o:f 
B;  industry A (  ~h:e f'irut  OX'  :gre~up  o~,  :f;i.r,Bls. COl:I,&Jti tuting and/or ,c()~i;rol,ling it) 
possesses substa:n:liial: de>min:~oe an<\ 'ne~ot;iS:tt~· ,fi!trettgth  "be~a.U:eef  .  · .  ·  ·  ··  · 
(a)  .~t· is J>ro~~ot~¥v;:j~oepti~~h:~~:~~ers•.~~:;.~~*}).ile~it.is.alJo .. 
.  ·  ~'Vid~1'lt  :~~•tt•.ttft!:ts R5ib)a,, -~~i.ers 'toi 'entry. are :~ st,t&t,~ct  ~~ctar  .. ot 
domi~o~  ·. ery:s Jitf.l,~zing,  th:e :lJI~t~()e ·~  .reinf'oroeJileXl:t.  c;;t. ~~etm:~· 
po•r .(9f. intlu~17;'. A  oyer ·:~.liclusti'ie,s  ~>an(L.d}(op. oit., p. ;424)f !Wet  · 
·~,,_, ,, . ' .  '_  ' :  ..  ·,·  ..  ·  . ' .  "- .·  -"/  '"  ~  . !  , .  .  . .  '  ' .  .  .  '  -.  , 
(b) i~d\J.St~~;Ahas e;li:f.ino~'  ...  arld  e?5J?tmAA¥- heed!?!l!'of ·choice/stnc• i~ c~  . 
·  ,' Chaos~ and ~  a11  the 'brands ana :Pz-od\lOts  '!fhioh  exist ~ere  in the  · 
~;ra: in the  ~crUB.rltities it Wan.1;s,  a.nd.oonseque11tly at the. })l'~ces .and. on 
.  \thee 'i&rm$ tth!oh. ate m(J$1;  favourable to it. .·  .  .  .  .  . 
~  ·.·-~~->~~\-:';·~-··,:,::-·,~·-.-··.:  ·.  __  :·:·  :.  ·  ..  ··  .>'.··.,::-.  .-:·~  -<··"•  _'  .  ,•- ; 
:fttQ·ilo~ ~h8.t the  ~;tructlire  9:r.  i~w3try B-. which shpp;Iies  ind~stry  A~  ..  ··· .... < 
<i~c>h!J~}.~~~~ Of'tne multitude'of domesUc and foreign prod\:!,eers·  and<m~acrt~ers·· 
Qf;:.~~e~a:t:'ticles ~brands Sold'by industry A muiJt  be atoinin.ic (op.  o;it.,  "  . 
·,  4t4 .and' 415)~ •.  In my  work  I  .stressed that:  ·  ·  • 
-.~  - '  . .  '  '"·  -.  .  ,  .  .  . 
\.,,  ~~tnanee·  fs the b,onu,s  ~ver!'t() the :fil'Dl  (pr ~oup of firms} in illduStr;t~  .<', 
·  Which  through teohnio&l  innovation (in distribution in this case) ~/o~·  .• , }  ·  ·. 
market expansion. he,s  been>better able than any other fi:l'.!llhtO .  ta.Jce ·  adV.:U~I!J. 
of' economies o:f  soa.le  (in this oase economies of scale fn dfst:!iibutionh  · 
;  ~ arJ;Y  expansion in illdu.stry ,ll:  (the suwliitr) is the result ~.:tiM'  :pOwer  WS.e1~ed.5 
·• · · · by •  firm  (or  grou~ of firms)  in indu,stry A (the buyer);  ·  ..  ·.•·  ··  ··  • ,  ;:· ·  .·.  ·  .···• 
- jhe benefit 'of this exJWUii~n is generally notenj,o;yed by t~piJt~y·~ b~t t;· 
industry A,  since< this i• the lnof3t  o1igopollsti,c  ~d  tb,e  rt(o~  o<>~;J(Jent:t'ated 
industry,, beoauseof its ,dolllin,anoe  and,negotiat;Lnt$  eti'E!n~~,·w~ioh•··.·  .•.... 
oan rea:p  tbe benefit C):f  expansion and'· o:f  in6re!l,i¥ed  J>rod,u~t~'nti:':tiq tll.e'  ! 
det:i;'iment  o:f  the less Qoncentrated. and mot-e  comP.ti  ~i  ve 'lnd:u¥trr  ... 
91 Extrapolating the series of chain reactions which  could follow from the logic of 
cross-industry !lominance, it may  be e:qlected: 
- either that industry B  (manufacturers and producers) will engage in a  process 
of concentration, reorganization and restructuring so as to boost its 
negotiating strength vi~vis  industry A ·(distribution); 
..:.  alternatively: that the same  firms in industry B  (manufacturers and producers) 
will attempt to penetrate industry A and  acquire  control of a  number  of 
sales points enabling them to escape the effects of the distribution industries• 
purchasing power. 
Ult~ately the cumulative effect of these chain reactions can only be  a  higher 
degree of concentration both in industry A and in industry B.  'J,'he  bill for 
all these successive concentration processes would ultimately have to be  paid 
by industry C  (the  consumer),  which b.y  nature is utterly atomistic and is 
therefore virtually incapable of negotiating from  a  position of strengtij. 
Although the growing number  of supermarkets can be  seen not as a  thr~at but as 
a  stimulus to competition,  we  must nevertheless be  on  our guard against the 
trend towards concentration among  the groups controlling the supermarkets, for 
excessive concentration would indeed be the end of competition. 
It follows that there must be very strict control of agreements and mergers 
between distribution firms if the  .· 6urrent state of oligopolistie .  commti  tion is to 
be preserved  (with large distribution firms enjoying considerable purchasing 
power  but competing With each other);  in allY  case this situation does offer 
considerable advantages for the .ultimate  consumer in certain co'lllltries arid  areas. 
Up  to a  certain point power  creates and stimulates competition;  beyond that 
point, it stifles it. 
Here it should be recalled that,  according to the theory of the oligopolistic 
dynamic equilibrium set out in my  above~entioned work,  power  does not in itself 
e;elUde the possibilit:z of competition  since oligaoolistic competition is based 
precisely on power  and,  more  specifically,  on the. <lynamic  balance of RQWer .. 
~evertheless there are certain fundamental  preconditions  which  must  be  met  if 
competition- is to work  satisfactorily. 
In.the case we  are considering ...  power  relationships between distribution 
(industry A),  production (industry B)  and consumption (industry C)  - it may be 
assumed that there are two  such preconditions if ;the  manifold competitive 
meChanisms  are to operate:  · 
(a) 
(b)  eaCh  of these large retailers must  display' and .market  a .certain minimum 
number  of different brands of each type of. Jll'oduct,  so that. the conSlUDer  can 
actually Choose  what he wa.rits.  · 
• 
92 The  foregoing outline gives, in general terms,  the main features of'  a 
dynamic  process which is taking place in different mazmers,  at different 
times and different stages in the various Community countries. 
70.  The  impact  of'  international tr§!ie on domestic  prices (1) 
The  existence of' inflation pressures. in a  given country should, in an open 
economy  such as that of' the European Community,  provide  a  stimulus to imports 
of products whose  prices have risen more  sharply on domestic markets than 
elsewhere.  For which products does this stimulus actually operate in reality 
and to what  extent?  How  is the mark..oup  on an imported product  shared out 
between the importer and the retailer?  Or is it a  frequent  occurrence for the 
retailer to import direct? Is the mark-up higher for imported goods than for 
domestic goods? 
And  there is a  mass of other fundamental questions for the competition 
economist  which are linked to those we  have  just aSked!  For instance,  do 
the  consumer prices of imported products rise more  quickly or less quickly 
than the prices of domestic products?  Does arise in the price of domestic 
products actually provoke greater imports of competing products - and,  if' 
so, to what  extent, in what  conditions .and  after what  time-lag?  Do  the 
retail prices of imported goods align on  .. those of similar domestic. goods 
or do  the prices of domestic goods ·tend to fall under the impact of imports? 
Are  the relationships and rea.Ctions between prices of imported products and' 
domestic products operating in an  uniform and  s·imultaneous  wa;y  or are  there 
differences  according to countries  and  areas  and/or to sales points in the sample? 
71·  The  main featwes of' the researoJf gn dj.stribution:  SWB!llar:Y 
The  answer to these. questions will .entail a  series of other analyses, 
already planned ii,l  ~the Commission's study programme,  entailing:  · 
- the gathering and sorting of basic data on international  tr~l!l, both 
within the Community itself and betWeen the Community  and other' countries; 
- de~.~led ana.lw-sis  of basic economic  and financial data (sales, ne:t 
profit, cash  flow,  own  capital) in respect of:  . 
(a} a  sample  of'  large firms in the manufacturing industry- in this case the 
food industry - manufacturing the products whose  prices· are analysed; 
(b) 'a sample  of large national distribution firms  (in this case. retailers of' 
food products)  working in the retail business and perhaps also in the 
wholesale business; 
(1) R.  Linda:  M&thodologie · de la recherche  sur la concentration appliauee  au 
- domaine  de  la distribution de  produits alimentaires.  page  29. 
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(o)  pflar~  national food  di~t:ribution :firms •ill: 
,.._.-.-~;;;;;;;.;;;;;...;;.  bUt  ziot  as  r~::ti3.ilers.  · 
c  ',' '"; 
This willgive a  P;:l.6tUz.eof: 
,.'  ·:,. 
·.  ~ the .Proti'ta.bility. or :fi:rms  ma.nufa9turing the 'wod.uots, who~e :Prices  ~=tr.e:. 
per:LOdioaHy. analysed and  compared;  - · ·  · 
- the  ~rofit,a.b:i.li::tfof  ;et~U.P:istribution groups  w;ho  own  a  la.pg~ number  ot 
'sale~ points in-the sam.ple. for,the  per:l.~ic. price. surveys;  ·  • 
··  -·- ~ pos:si.bly  ~~n of'  certain wholesale d.istri  butors who  sometimes  impQrt 
goods co'!l'ered  by the S'\Wveys • ·  ·  ·  · ·  -
'  '  '  ' 
·- <At  a su'Os;equent  stag!!!,  in View  oi the. interdependence or economic  ~ys:t;~ms 
and  circuit:~  .. we  shall have  to ocmsi~er t.h&.possibility:  '..  '> 
- of determi~ing, describing and  llleas~ing  .11  ~~ber of .-l,..o+cii;a.~l.-..~....,.  ...... =....,.-
a.rezla.s  in .the ;vario~ Mempe,r •:States;. :  \  i :  .  ·  · ·  ·. 
'  ;<c 
- of '~lysipgthe powerwiel~;a_ bytM .main~etaii'dtatri~iion groups 
- ,under  our·apP;l'O_ja.ch  of'  t~e ititegta.ted pligopsonistio system,:of local-
_- oliso:polistio a.renas,, a.hd  in, particula.r the_ manifold  impi~c~=ttions; of 
this power  f()r  competition _  -·-·  - ·.  - ·  - · · 
.-betweeri,produ.del:'s 
•  between retailers themselves oilaiite:vent localmarkets. 
The  f'oregoing  oonsid!!!~a:tions O.o~ot-.~iJn·at a.n·exhaustive  ei~inati~ of such 
a  compleX  ~upje,ot., .bW they do  ~fiQe  't~ ISMW. the  .. great .Pr~9tiCAl  Value  of 
an e:x;te.nsion · of .  the_  Commissipn  1s  .$t1,2die~ .  to dist~i  but  ion .  ~··  ..  Qt ana.lyais  c;>f.  , 
ooncentra:tioll in pr~u6t  markets~ particula.rly· the anatysis (if  the evolution .. 
of prices,  tnar~:uP,s,a.nd a;ll the.  othez:  s~~ica.nt<info~tion whicp; .. may•}ielp 
.to ola,rify  tb~ operation of competi;\i-ion ·qn::~he relevant ,product .tnark~ta and 
oircui  ts  ·  .( 1}.  >'  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
(1} App~ndiJt 2  to.  ;this  methodol~gi  (Stir~ys of retail prices _and  ma,r}(;.tlp!Sf 
·  .  ~ovisional ()ui'H.!le  methOO.ologr)  gives a:  prel~minary view.  ·· Vlii.  CLOSING  REMARKS  AND  GENERAL  CONCLUSIONS 
72. 
Th~ Commi~sion has alrea.d.;r  published sU:ty  o:~;- so volumes  in.the series :of  stuQ.ies  on 
concentration in individual  industries• and:  m.arkets.  .so far  th~se have .been provided 
free of chal-ge  (subject to availability} to lihoever aslced  for  them~  Amlex  2  to this 
paper lists the volumes published to date.  · 
The  results. of the studies thus .being available to all,  all can reach their own  assess.;; 
ment>on the wtilHy of the research. 
.  . 
For IllY  part I.'.feel it  .is in order to ba;se  IllY  general view on  a  recapitulation of the 
aims and means,  and by seeing to what extent the means  dep~d on the. aims  and are 
wa):'ranted. and _conditioned by them. 
.  . 
No"if  that the means  - the. methodology - have been set out in detail in the foregoing 
·  pages,  thi.s  beoomel!  a  p"os.Si.ble .a.nd  :j,nd~ed :f'rui.  t:ful .exeroi.se.  · 
The  objective of the E!.tudies 'can be  de~e'rmined and classified if. a  .distinction is made 
b:et'lieen: 
(a) the whole  set of specific or dil:'ect  objeotiv~s;  . 
(b) the  ultiiJHl.~e ()r ~eheral objeotive,  which lll±grit' also be  o~lle!i. t}).e  target. 
As  regards pbint (a),  it. has been  pci~sible  <in  pra,otioe to  obt~in these  obj.eoti~es1 
.by helping to apply .the  pr~vi~i~rt!3  of·t~et~~~ty e~ta~lis~ing .the  E~u-opea.n 
Economic. Coinmiln:ity,  througll: the .systematic anal;is:i,!!t  of a  mass  of (!.e.tailed 
information;  · 
by· enabling. th.e  colllnnuiity  to.make':i;pe  cd~isons  ~d  sUnuba.cy  studi~s wpi~h 
.·  are serh  ()Ut  in P8.1't  Ill; .9f  the1  aam#~  ·ae-~l't• on  Cdmpetiti~n ~ol:i,c;r sub'ltitted 
by the Commission  to<the'Eu_rcipe~ P.ar:liament;c  ·.  <\  c  · ·  ·  .·.•· 
- by info%-ming  p'u~1±~  PP~tli.~ ~d·  ~el~t~Y:e. cj}*'l:~  thi-o~b-th,e,  1>llbl~shi~  ~t' 
the various  ind1:vidua1 "s~udi~s'.  .  ··  .  •  ... 
But  I.  feel :tllor:e  at~en~i¢1l,'sh~l,4~.~~.~r.~~~~ t~ :the  ~~~4al  obj·e.Qt;i~  .{ihe"t~ge~}: 
whose  ~$o~$'(i~ , ·~,~·.•·s;~se~,-~li:Pt~~·· ~d  ;t:dllbse~~Ei th~ ~~i~s  .~Xf(l~y;dua,j. .. objeot~ves• 
~~;;,&~~~.~ere  ~is~' ·111  bra,~~~: ·:to  ·• eJCplore _:atiq,.  'ctet~rmine'.  th~  · ~U1nero1l:s  re;i:a,ti,on~hip~.~etwe~ 
··~·i>ll?ent~~:tion':·;.~Q. .O®t~l!lti-tiQ,n~ · ··4nd.·-t,hfa  l>r~t:s us  t·~ ·;:the  ~es'ti'On.  ,w;lJ.~the~_th~ '.l!-pproa~h 
"·~~:.:!lleth~s:whiQh•we•have seleO:ted•.·and applie4 were the most direct and  .. the riio$t.••EI:f':fec...,. 
· tfv$  lrl~ains :of t:ittiilg•this  tar~et.  ? :·:· · 
"  > ~··  <  •  •• •  •  ••  ·-~  ·~:  ~ 
. ;,>,.··  ·~ 
,.;  bf:  .. 's~puld  e:.,.~lier  a.J>proa,Ol).es  a.nd  other meth.ods  have been  pre~erred?. 
·  i;''f..~stf'}et it b~ oleaJ:>  that_ ther.EI  is defill,itely a .. need  ~or·a, method6lo~~.  The:  reasmt 
,  f9:r'·~hi.s.,il,i! that, in. view of the  g:~;-eat <di.vers~~Y. of st:l',)lotutes and  EiitlUI,t~ons which • 
;.',·havt!' •  ~t, b'e.  o~nsidered~  ·.·  .. a  l.94'ge ·number· of: .institute$ or  ·  j>es~arQh t eaJits  (1} have  ..  ha4 to be 
···  ~se~,~d.·~hey  ~DQ.st all  ..  work  in·the ~e  ().i.rection:·and.use'the  f!a.llte  methOds_if  .. their 
restil.ts are :to  be  complementary arid  compara.b:l~...  , ·:c.. 
·This oa.n  be  taken for granted•  But  the. next  qu.esti~ is.:  s~no~ o~~~t,ft.i~n .  ~iSt£1 l!tld 
since its effects a:J;.e  felt on the market  (fQr a  speoif'io' pr0d11,ct <~J'£>:,g;r9t1p of  o9lD.P~ting 
products),  why  is it not possible to confine the. ~a:lysis to  ~diV:idu:~:-rket~ ,ra1;her 
than working the industcy appr:Oa.ch? · 
(l) Amlex.l lists the institut.es and  exper:ts whioh have' done  rese~o.it.work f'or the 
Comission.  · 
95 73.  Relation between concentration and  competition:  general  context 
Matters here are more  complioateq.  Two  points have  to be  made: 
(1) All major firms  in fact do  business,  not  on  a.  single ma.:rket,  but  on  several markets. 
They  manufacture and sell a  large number  of products,  generally belonging to the  same 
industry but  somet.imes  also penetrating other industries. 
(2)  Concentration analysis  c~ot be  confined to determining and describing the shares 
held by  a.  given firm on  a  given market  but must  seek to grasp the causes and  effect 
of concentration.  These  are to be  found  in the  structure,  performance  and  com-
petitive strategy of the individual firm.  · 
The  industry approach thus  inevitably provides the link with analysis of ·all the 
structural  economic  relations which  develop around  individual market  shares and 
different market  situations. 
In other words,  the industry approach  is the point from  which  analysis of the relation 
between concentration and  competition proceeds,  since it permits analysis of: 
each marketj 
each  firm,  though if neces~ary a  sa.mple.n* of large firms may  beselected. 
It  i~a.ga.in,  the  industry.a.pproa.ch which  allows large firms to be  put under the econo-
metricmicroscope,  for the  study of concentration must: 
achieve  something; 
explain something. 
74.  Concentration and  performance 
As  a.  rule,  concentration should  serve the objective of boosting corporate performance. 
:But  are the results in practice to be  welcomed  or not? 
This question has to be a.nswereQ.  industry by industry,  marketby market and,  clearly 
enough,  firm by firm.  Hence  the need to verify: 
whether  a.  firm operating in the most  highly concentrated industries or markets 
has a  higher or lower level of performance  than firms operating on  more  atomistic 
or more  balanced markets; 
if  a  firm operating in the most  highly concentrated industries and markets-
and.perha.ps  even  enjQying quantitative dominance- turns in a  higher·level  of 
performance,  we  still have to find  out  whether and  to what  extent this higher 
level of performance is the result of: 
(a) better management; 
(b) greater size  .. 
The  effects of this greater s.ize then have to be determined and classified in terms: 
(b)(l) firstly,  of effects on  the production apparatus which,  by permitting greater 
capital intensity,  more  advanced  technology and  the achievement  of economies 
of scale,  make  for reduced costs  (which  is beneficial,  both ~o the manufacturer 
and  to the consumer); 
96 (b)(2)  secondly,  of effects on  the market,  since the  producer may  acquire the power 
to dominate  and control demand  curves  and  prices and this may,  in given 
circumstances,  make  for higher prices  (which  is harmful  to the  consumer). 
But  it is very frequently found  that the largest firms  do  not  in reality have  a 
higher level  of performance  than smaller firms,  and this has been  evidenced by a 
considerable amount  of empirical  research  (1). 
All  these analyses  can be made  only on  the basis of a  comparative method,  which  is 
to  say: 
by comparing the  structures and  performance  of the various firms  operating in 
a  given industry at a  given time; 
by comparing the  evolution of all the principal ratios concerning the  structures 
and  firms  in question. 
75·  Conclusions 
B,y  way  of conclusion,  let it be  emphasised that: 
research  into concentration in specific industries means  that  certain aspects, 
and particularly concentration on  product  markets,  have  to be  considered more 
fully and  in greater detail; 
analyses  of prices and  mark-ups - on  a  growing number  of products and  brands 
should enable new  light to be cast  on  the various  inter-relations between 
concentration and  competition,  closely linked to the structures and  oonduct 
of major manufacturing and distribution firms  and  to their manifold effects. 
The  industry studies and market  analyses relating to concentration and  competition 
are polyvalent  studies which  aim  not  only to describe the  evolution of the  specific 
industries considered but  also to create and utilise new  methods  and objects of 
analysis,  research and knowledge. 
(1)  R.  Linda,  Un  modele  de  developpement  avec relations asymetriques  (Italy)  in 
"Mondes  en developpement"  (Crise du  capl.talisme ou  ordre lnternational  n~uveau) 
Paris,  1975,  No.  11,  pages 428-443  and 451-459.  ' 
97 A P  P E N D I  C E S APPENDIX  1 
Concentration on certain markets  in certain 
Community countries  :  1973/74 
' MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  GERMANY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND  'l'BF!IJl  RA:NK  l'I1Tn11T 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
MANUFACTURE  OF  MACHINERY  OTHER  THAN  ELECTRIC  MACHINES 
Tractors and  agricultural 
machinery 
{  Landma.schinen  und  37.2  103  KIID*  IHC  Claas  J. Deere 
Ackerschlepper) 
Tractors 
{Ackersohlepper)  63·9  IHC  KHD  Fendt  MF 
Combine  Harvesters 
88  Claas  MF  J. Deere  Fahr/IHC 
{Miihdrescher) 
Office machinery 
Triumph/  64·4  138  Olympia  NCR  Kienzle 
{BUromaschinen)  Adler 
CUculatore 
~iumph/ 
(Rechenmasohinen) 
Olympia  Adler 
Typewriters 
Triumph/ 
{Schreibmaschinen) 
Olympia  Adler 
Textile machinery and 
Schlafhorst =mag- Meyer~·  accessories  25·3  3742  Morat  GmbH 
(Textilmaschinen und  mer  Cie 
Zubehor) 
Spinning machinery 
13armag- Schubert & 
{Spinnereimaschinen)  IBarmer  Salzer 
Weaving  machinery 
(Webereimaschinen) 
lschlafhorst 
* Including Fahr,  in which  KHD  has shares of more  than 51% 
103 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  GERMA.'NY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FlllMS  AID  TBJml  RA:NK  IA'I1T01\T 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(,&) 
Ci't'il engineering equipment 
Orenstein  Feiner  and brick making  and other  26.4  219  Liebherr  Dema.g  Maschinen- machinery for the prepa;ra.- & Koppel  werke  AG  tion of building materials 
Excavators 
Liebherr  Orenstein  Koehring 
(:Bagger)  & Koppel 
Earth moving  machinery  hisch  Wacker 
(Erdbaugerate)  GmbH 
Mechanical  lifting and 
handling equipment  25·1  261  Demag  Linde  Jl111&'-
Rheinstahl heinrich 
(Hebezeuge  und  Fordermitte~ 
Lifts 
Rheinstahl Schindler  Flohr- Haushahn 
(Aufzlige)  Otis 
Industrial tl'llOks 
Jlm&'- Linde  Eaton  heinrich  Steinbock 
(Flurfordermittel) 
ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING 
Electro-technical Industry  Siemens  AEG  Bosch  Alldephi 
AG  Telefunken  GmbH  GmbH 
Qnektroteohnisohe Industrie  AG 
~io, TV  and  record players  llosoh 
51·3  134  Grund!«  AEG  Alldephi  Siemens 
(RundflUllo-,  Fernseh- und  AG  Hausgerate 
Phonogerate)  (1973)  GmbH 
Colour televisions 
(Farbfernsehgerate) 
47  135  iAlldephi  AEG  Nordmende  Grundig 
104 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  GERMANY 
Concentration ratios {c4)  and coefficients of disparity {4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND  TBF!I'R  RANK  •mTON 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKIDI'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
{%) 
Black and White  televisions 
37·6  148  Alldephi  Grundig  Nordmende  AEG 
(Schwarz-Weiss-Tiscb-
empfanger) 
Portable televisions 
Grundig  AEG 
(Portables) 
Car  radios  Bosch 
Siemens  Becker  Alldephi 
(Kraftfahrzeug  Hausgerate 
-li'm~+"·  .~  ..  --~+  .. )  ( 1.07 ")  GmbH 
Electric domestic  ( 1973) 
appliances  73·2  260  Am  BSHG  Bauknecht  Miele 
(Elektrische Hausgerate) 
Dish washers 
(GeschirrspUler) 
87  308  Miele  AEG  BSHG  Bauknecht 
Refrigerators 
BSHG  AEG  Bauknecht 
{  KUhlschriinke) 
Deep  freezers 
( Gefriergerate) 
AEG  BSHG  Bauknecht 
Washing  machines 
60  157  BSHG  AEG  ·Miele  Bauknecht 
(Waschmaschinen)  {1973 
MOTOR  CYCLE  INDUSTRY 
Motorcycle  Industry 
BMW  Herkules  Ziindopp  98  151  Kreidler 
(Motorradindustrie)  ( 1974)  (29%)  (28.5%)  {25·5~)  ( 15%) 
CAR  TYRES 
Tyres 
61  153  Michelin  Continental Dunlop  Uniroyal 
{Neureifen)  (23%)  (18%)  (11%)  (9%) 
105 MARKET  CONCEN'rRATION  YEAR:  1974  COUNTRY:  GERMANY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl' 
Lighting equipment  for 
motor  vehicles 
Spark plugs 
Bulbs  and head  lamps 
for motor  vehicles 
Batteries for motor 
vehicles 
Generators,  regulators 
and  starters for motor 
vehicles 
Canned  meat 
Canned  fruit and 
vegetables 
Ice Cream 
(a)  c1  instead of c4 
. (b)  c2  instead of c  4 
(o)  c3  instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF  LEADmG  FIBMS  AND  TBlml  RANK 
liUl'll.  l'l'TnliT 
c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
CAR  ACCESSORIES 
!Westfalische 
87·5  340  ~etall- Bosch  SWF 
{c)  Industria 
(45%)  (3o%)  (12-5%) 
85  (b)  480  Bosch  Bern-
Werk 
(6o%)  (25%)  . 
85  (b)  480  Osram  Deutsche 
Philips 
(6o%)  (25%) 
70  (b)  266  Bosch  Varta 
(4o%)  (3o%) 
80  (a)  Bosch 
(So%) 
FOOD  AND  DRINK  INDUSTRY 
Coop  Herta  Artland- Schafft  13·1  193  Do:rffler 
(4.9%)  (3.9%)  (2o4%}  ( 1.9%) 
20  116  Carl  M"Ul.lers  Schwartauer Hengsten-
Kiihne  M""uhle  Werke  be~~  (5-5%)  (5  .. ~)  (4.9%)  (4·4 ) 
Langnese- Scholler  SUdmiloh  Oetker  84·5  396  Iglo (1)  Lebens- AG  Eiskrem 
(5o%)  (~~)1  (9%)  (7.5%) 
(1)  Controlled b,y:  Unilever 75%;  Nestle 25% 
106 MARKET  CONCEN'l'RATION  YEAR:  1974  COUN'l'RY:  GERMANY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKJl1l' 
Canned  fish 
Margarine,  Oil and 
Cooking Fats 
Soup 
Prepared  potato pur'e 
:Beer 
(::az.auerei  und  Malzerei) 
Spirits 
(Spirituosenindustrie) 
(Weinverarbeitende 
Industria) 
· Seft drinks inol'Wling 
natural spa waters 
(a) c1 instead of c4 
(b)  c2  instead of 04 
(c) c3 instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADil'iG  FIRMS  AND ~  RAm: 
liUl'll.  '"'Tn11T 
c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
35·3  640 
(b) 
60 (a) 
91  (b)  306 
90 (o)  428 
13  207 
25  142 
63  256 
15  278 
(1)  (2) 
Nordsee  Fisch-Union 
(26.9%)  (8.4%) 
Unilever 
Mag~i  Knorr  Unox 
(55  )  (36~) 
..::_ 
Pfa.nni- Maggi  Knorr  Werk 
(57~)  (2o%)  (13%) 
DUB-
Wickli.le~  Schult- Binl;ing-.  Kupper- Henninger-
he iss- Brauerei  ::az.au 
::SZ.auerei  Brauerei 
Eckes  Mast  Doornk.a.a.t  As bach 
Henkell  Sohnlein  RUttgers  Deinhard 
Coca-Cola  ttb  Blaue 
erkinger Quellen  Gerolsteine 
( 1)  Controlled by:  Unilever 68%;  Dresdner Bank  32% 
(2)  Controlled qy:  Nordsee,  Unilever, Fisob-Union 
107 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1972/14  COUN'l'RY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  .AXD  TBJi!Ill  RAmC  L'IITnlll" 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
TEXTILE  INDUSTRY 
Peignage  Peignage 
Combed  wool  37  (b)  1034  Amedh  de Mazamet 
(31%)  (6%) 
(1974) 
0  (Groupe  P.rouvost) 
Lainiere  Les  Fils de Files de 
Yarn  of combed  wool  45  (e)  224  de  Roubaix  L.  Mulliez  Fourmies 
(1974)  (2o%)  ( 15%)  (E)  (1o%) 
Lainiere  Les  Fils de 
Wool  knitting yarn  56  (b)  248  de  Roubaix  L.  Mulliez 
(1974)  (31%)  (25%)  (E) 
Louis  Roudiere  Tiberghien  D'WIIons 
Woven  woollen fabrics  48·5  193  Lepoutre  Fr~res  Freres 
( 1974)  (17.5%)  ( 14·5%)  ( 1o%)  (E)  (6.5%) 
Groupe 
Cotton velvet  35  (a)  AgachE!-
Willot 
( 1972) 
Groupe 
Flax yarn  50  (a)  Agache-
(1972)  Willot 
Groupe 
Woven  fabrics of jute  75  (a)  Agache-
(1972)  Willot 
Groupe 
Tufted carpets  40  (a)  Agache-
( 1972)  Willot 
Groupe 
Fishing nets  35  (a)  Agache-
( 1972)  Willot 
35  (a) 
Groupe 
Canadian tents  !Agache-
( 1972)  ~illot 
(a)  c1  instead of c4  (b)  c2  instead of c4 
(E)  Very  approximate  estimations 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
108 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972/73  COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn' 
&~broidery thread 
(Fils pour ouvrage  de  dame~ 
(1973) 
Industrial aewing thread 
(Fils a ooudre  industrials) 
(1973) 
Sewing thread 
(Fils a ooudre meroerie) 
(1973) 
Lining material 
(Doublure) 
(1973) 
Bedding 
(Tissus pour literie) 
(1973) 
General analgesics 
( non-l'lal'oot io) 
Anti-rheumatic drops 
(non-hormonic) 
Antibiotics (penicillin 
and derivatives) 
Psychotropic& 
( non-l'lal'oetic tranquil  ... 
lizers} 
(a) c1 instead of c4 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
(c) c3 instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND ~  RANK  <11'1Tnv 
c4  I  4L  I  )II  III 
(,&) 
Dollfus 
85  (a)  Mieg  et 
Cie 
Dollfus  40  (a)  Mieg  et 
Cie 
Dollfus 
80  (a)  Mieg  et 
Cie 
Dollfus 
55  (a)  Mieg  et 
Cie 
Dollfus 
35  (a)  Mieg  et 
Cie 
PHARMACEIJ'I'ICALS  InUSTRY  (E) 
( 1972) 
54  (c)  (46%)  (8%) 
37  (c)  393  (26%)  (7%)  (4%) 
47  (c)  309  (3o%)  (11%)  (6%) 
48  (b)  440  (33%)  (15%) 
(E)  Very approximate  estimations 
109 
IV MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  Aim  THEI'R  RAmC 
UU.l'll> !!iN'  l'AA TION 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn' 
Psychotropics 
(1971) 
Cardiovascular drugs 
(not containing reserpine) 
Peripheral vasodilators 
Drugs  for respiratory 
disorders  (cough remedies, 
anti-histamines) 
Anti-haemorrhage drugs 
(drugs  fo~ increas~ 
vascular resistance 
Hyper-cholesterolaemic 
drugs 
(Serum  clarifying agents) 
Meat  preparations and 
preserves 
Canned  vegetables 
Canned  mushrooms 
(a)  c1  instead of c4 
(b) c2  instead of c4 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
29  (b)  214  ( 15%)  ( 14%) 
62  (c)  588  (44%)  ( 11%)  (7%) 
50  (c)  444  (30%)  (14%)  (6%) 
33  (b)  272  (19%)  ( 14%) 
45  (c)  164  ( 17%)  ( 15%)  (13%) 
52  (b)  452  (36%)  ( 16%) 
FOOD  AND  DRINK  INDUSTRY  (E) 
Olida-Caby 
24  352  Fleury- a.v.s.  Herta  Morey 
Michon 
29  (o)  272  Saupiquet  c.a.c.  Bonduelle 
77.5  156  Euro- Champi- Blanchaud  conserves  France 
(c) 
(E)  Very  approximate  estimations 
IIO MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  M.ARICm' 
Canned  fruit in syrup 
Jams 
Canned  fish 
Condensed  milk 
Evaporated milk 
Milk powder 
Yoghourt 
Processed cheese 
Biscuits 
" 
"Bisootterie" 
(b) c2  instead of c4 
(c) c3 instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
UU!'I\;l!allt'HATION 
c4  I  4L 
(~) 
62  (c)  252 
29  (c)  144 
40  (b)  258 
8oe5  1332 
(b) 
95  (b)  752 
95  (c)  360 
63  192 
66.5  1278 
(b) 
51  147 
67 .,  494 
LEADING  FIRMS  .Alm ~  RAm<: 
I  II  III  IV 
Roussillon  Conserves  L 
Alimentaire Gard  enzbourg 
Andros  Lenzbourg  Mat erne 
Saupiquet  Pecheurs 
de France 
Lf!.it  Mont  France- Preval  Blanc  Lait 
.·. 
Gloria  France-
Lait 
~ance- Gloria  Mont 
~it  Blanc 
Gervais- Sodima  Chambourcy  Gama-Nova  Dan one  Yoplait 
Bel  Picon  Roustrn 
(Nestle 
Lu,  Brun  Belin  Marques  Biscuiterie 
et Associes  etrangeres Nantaise 
Aliment  Picard  Clement  Lu,  Brun et 
Essentiel  Assooies 
lll MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIBMS  AKD  'l'BEI'R  RA1QK 
liUl'll;Uf'  l'I'TON 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl' 
"Entremets" 
Dietetic prQducts  and 
infant foods 
Pasta 
Ready-prepared meals 
Cooking  oils 
Margarine 
Confectionery 
Chewing  Gwn 
Frozen foods 
Ice Cream 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
c4 
65·5 
(c) 
100 
73  (b) 
81  (b) 
75  (b) 
63  (b) 
39 
95  (b) 
80,.5 
89 
I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
Generale  *  276  Alimentaire  S.P.M.  Ancel 
Fali  *  Gervais- 349  BSN-G.D.)  Guigoz  S.P.M.  Dan one 
Panzani- Rivoire et 
286  Milliat  Carret- Buitoni 
Lustuoru 
322  Buitoni- Panzani- Barbier- llretagne-
Perugina  Milliat  Dauphin  Provence 
658  Groupe  G. I.E.  Astra-
Lesieur  Interhuiles Calve 
4000  Astra- Excel-
Calve  Soprodel 
163  aenerale  General  Lindt  Becco  Alimentaire Foods  (Storck) 
1700  General  Chiolets  Wrigley  Foods 
408  Find  us  Cofralim  Ortiz  Servifrais 
231  Ortiz  France- Motta  Ste ·  Cremiere . 
Glaces  Nantaise 
* Ste des  Produi  ts du Mais 
112 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET 
Mustard  and  condiments 
Fruit and  vegetable 
based condiments 
Pepper  and  spices 
Mayonnaise 
Sauces 
Beer 
"Alcools de  Bouche" 
(1973) 
Aperitifs and  Liqueurs 
(1973) 
Champagne  and sparkling 
wines 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
CONCli!M"''f?lll'f1TnTJ 
c4  I  41 
(~) 
70  (b)  734 
51  (b)  480 
50  (b)  372 
85·5  260 
(c) 
70  (b)  268 
69  480 
42.6  151 
63.1  205 
31·1  330 
LEA.DmG  FIRMS  AND  TH:Ii!:m  RANK 
I  II  III  IV 
Gale  Segma  Alimentaire 
Gale  Segma  Alimentaire 
Gale  Ducros  Alimentaire 
Mayolande  Lesieur  Gale 
Alimentaire 
Gale  Mayolande  Alimentaire 
B.S.N.  Union  des  Albra  Pel  forth  Brasseries 
(45%)  (12.5%)  (5-9%)  (5.6%) 
Martell  Courvoisier Hennessy  Remy-
Martin 
(12.8%)  (12.1%)  (11.1%)  (6.6%) 
Ricard  Pernod  Groupe  C.D.C.  Martini 
(20.1%)  ( 18.5%)  (18.5%)  (6%) 
Veuve  Piper  Moet- Mumm  et  Cliquot 
Hennessy  Cie  Ponsardin  Heidsieck 
(20%)  (8.8%)  (4.5%)  (3.8%) 
ll3 MARKET  cONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1972/73  COUNTRY:  ITALY 
Concentration ratios (c4) 'and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY.  OR  MARKET 
Cotton yarn 
Textile materials for 
houselaold  use 
(exolud~n)aw material 
Textile materials for 
household use 
{including 1~aw material 
n-rlll'luntinn 
Newspaper 
Printing and  writing 
paper 
. 
Wrapping  paper 
Kraft paper 
Paperboard 
(b) c2  instead. of c4 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
t;Ullll  P&IJITnliT 
c4  J 4L  I 
(%) 
TEXTILE  INDUSTRY 
(1973) 
38.8  310  A 
33·5  261  A 
39  174  A 
PAPER  INDUSTRY 
(1972) 
84  256  Timav"""' 
Arbatax 
(32%) 
45  131  Burgo 
(15%) 
40  179  San 
Cesario 
( 15%) 
74  (b)  1444  Import 
(65~) 
85  (c)  248  Verona 
(35%) 
114 
LEADING  FIHMS  .pm  'l'BJi!Ili  RA'.RK 
:ti  III  IV 
B  c  D 
B  c  D 
G  H  B 
Burgo  Marzabotto Ascoli  .... 
Valcerusa 
(29%)  (15%)  (8%)  ..  .  . 
C.I,R.  C.R.D.M.  Tolmezzo-
(1o%) 
Prealpine 
(1o%)  (1o%) 
Vita.- Burgo  Villa  Mayer 
(10%)  (9%)  (6%) 
Vita.-
Mayer 
(9%) 
Saffa  De  Medici 
(35%)  (15%) 
I MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973/74  COUN'l'RY:  ITALY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  .QD  TBEill  RA:NK 
{;Ul'lt 
,m,..,.._ 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
MANUFACTURE  OF  MACHINERY  OTHER  THAN  ELECTRIC  MACHINES 
(1974) 
Portable machines 
89 
(Portatili) 
Standard machines 
87 
(Standard)  ;" 
I 
Professional calculators 
(Calcolo Prof.) 
91 
' 
Pocket  calculators 
(Calcolo Taso.) 
30 
,. 
Accounting machines 
'. 
::  ·86 
(contB.'b.  e 1\is;temi 
......  +  .. 'hili·  .,  .  -~ . 
Scientificmicro-o 
•. c_alculators.··.  90 
'  (M~O:.t'Oc:i:•  scientifici) 
" 
·.  ;T~Ula.ls 
,.  93 
( 'rerxniriali)  ' 
Medium  scale and  large 
scale systems·. EDP  94 
(Sist. medio-ograndi  EDP) 
·.· .  -~-~ 
Spinning machinery 
Rep.  Fed. 
(Macchine  per filatura)  65·5  268 
Alle~e  France  A  c 
(1973)  (33%)  (15%)  (9%)  {8.5%) 
., 
115 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1972/73  COUNTRY:  ITALY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIBMS  Aim  TBli!I1i  RA1QK  1'11T011T 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(") 
Weaving  machinery  Rep.  Fed. 
(Maochine  per Tessitura)  56·5  311  Suisse 
Allemare 
F  France 
( 1973)  (32%)  (10•5%  (7'%>)  (7%) 
Knitting machinery  Rep.  Fed.  Royaume 
(Macchine  per ma.glieria  51  603  Alhma.gne  USA  Uni  0 
e  calzetteria)  (1973)  (38%)  (5%)  (4%)  (4%) 
ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING. 
(1973) 
Refrigerators  94  (c)  556  Zanussi  IRE  Indesit 
I 
(Frigoriferi) 
Washing  machines  76  (c)  344  Zanussi  Candy  Indesit 
(Lavatrici) 
Electric cookers  71  (c)  288  Zanussi  Merloni  IRE 
(Cucine elettriche} 
...:_ 
Radios  35  (c)  644  Hong  Kong  Coree  Singapore.  du Sud 
Black and  white television  Grundig or 
32  113  Philips  Zanussi  Autovox  Telefunken 
(Televisori monocromi) 
Colour  televisions  Allemagne  Emerson or  64  211  Grundig  Philips, 
(Televisori a  colori)  R.F.  \  Zanussi 
\ 
\ 
CYCLES  AND  MOTORCYCLES 
( 1972)  \ 
Cycles  and  motorcycles  47  186  Bianchi  Rizza  to  ea.rrtielli  Cioli 
Chiorda  Cinzia 
ll6 MARKET  CONCEN'l'RATION  YEA.R:1972/73/74cOtm'I'RY:  ITALY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  Aim ~  RAmC  I'I'TOliT 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl'  c4  1 4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
Mopeds  and Scooters  (50  c~  67  (b)  1288  Piaggio  Agrati 
Garelli 
Motorcycles,  motorscooters  71  192  Moto  Benelli  Piaggio  Aermaoohi  and  others  Guzzi  Gil  era 
CAR  TIRES  AND  CAR  ACCESSORIES 
(1973/74) 
Car  tyres  89  192  Michelin  Pirelli  CEAT  (original fit) 
(1974)  (34%)  (34%)  (21%) 
Car  tyres  84  134  Michelin  Pirelli  Importateurs  CEAT  (replacement)  (25%)  (23%)  (2o%)  ( 16%) 
1.· Spark plugs  Champion  94·4  792  Marelli  Lodge  Bosch  .  ( ~iginal fit)  ( o)  (74·6%)  (1o%)  (9.$%) 
Spark·plugs  88  307  Marelli  Champion  Bosch  Lodge  (replacement) 
(35%)  (35%)  ( 10%)  (8%) 
Batteries  Marelli  *  FlAMM  84  (c)  768  F.A.R.  Varta  (originEl.l  fit) 
(1972)  {63%)  (14%)  (7%) 
I  Batteries 
12·4  223  ~.A.R.  Marelli  Varta  FIAMM  (replacement) 
( 1972)  (30%)  (22%)  ( 10 •. 2%)  ( 10.2%) 
*  F.A.R.  •  Hensenberger,  Titano,  Tudor 
(c) c3 instead of c4 
117 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973  COUN'l'RY:ITALY 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (41) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND  TH.F:Ill  RANK  CONC w.I\1TJ1R 41'f1Tl'IN 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
FOOD  INDUSTRY 
( 1973) 
Canned  meat  92·5  454  Silllll\enthal  Aosal  Trinity  Star 
(6o%)  (15~)  (1o%)  (7 ·5%) 
Canned  vegetables  52·5  183  Star  De  Rica  Cirio  Arri~oni 
(17-5%)  (17·5%)  ( 10%)  (7 ·5  ) 
Jams  and  marmalade  40  164  Cirio  De  Rica  Arri~oni  Zue~g 
(15%)  (7-5%)  (7 •5 o)  ( 10 o) 
Fruit prepared with or  35  (c)  184  Calpa.k  Mon  Jardin  Cirio  without  sugar or alcohol  S.p.A.  It  alia 
(15%)  (1o%)  ( 1o%) 
Tuna  and  other canned  fish  57 ·5  215  Mazzola  Star  Trinity  Palmer  a 
(22.5%)  (17·5%)  (1o%)  (7 ·5%) 
88.5  964  *  Frozen foods  Sages  Surgela  Frigodaunia 
(c)  (72-5%)  (8.5%)  (7 ·5%) 
*  Ice Cream  40  (c)  368  Algel  Sanson  Tanara  Motta  Find  us 
(25%)  (7·5%)  (7 ·5%) 
Cheese  26  100  Gal bani  Invernizzi Locatelli  Polenghi-
Lombardo 
(6.5%)  (6.5%)  (6.5%)  (6.5%) 
Biscuits,  cakes  and  Pavesi  Saiwa  Maggi ora  Doria  ' crackers 
(c) c3  instead of c4  * Controlled by:  Unilever 7  5% 
118 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY: ITALY 
Concentration ratios  (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND  THEI~ RANK  l;U.l'lL'J!il'l'['RA'l'ION 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
264  Italiana  *  SU&ar  71  Eridania  Zuccheri  AIE 
(33%)  (25%)  ( 13%) 
IBP 
Cocoa  based confectionery  67 ·48  100  Ferrero  Buitoni- Motta  Nestle 
and chocolate  Perugina  Italia 
( 16.87%)  ( 16.87%)  ( 16.87%)  (16.87%) 
IBP 
Infant foods  and dietetic 
97 ·5  335  Plasmon  Gerber  Buitoni- Carlo 
products  Perugina  Er~5%J  (50%)  (22.5%)  ( 17 -3%J  {7. 
Pasta  27  110  Barilla  Buitoni  Amato  Agnesi 
(7~)  (7%)  (7%)  (6%) 
* AIE  •  Agricola IndU8t.  Emiliana 
ll9 MARKET  CONCEN'I'RA'l'ION  YEAR:  1974  COUNTRY:  NETHERLANDS 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADD'G  nRMS  AID  'l'HJiln  RAMC  •m,..I'\W 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
'") 
PAPER  INDUSTRY 
Total for the seeter  39  276 
Corrugated boardand oases  69.7  150 
Stationary and envelopes  52·6  160 
Sanitary and  household  82  185  paper 
Adhesive materials  83·7  414 
Wallpaper  100  (c)  175 
Folding cart.on  47·9  196 
120 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY: NETHERLANDS 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADil{G  FIRMS  .AND  THJi!ITi  RAm( 
liV.l'll.  LTION. 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
PHARMACEUTICALS  INDUSTRY 
Antibiotics  65  560  Beecham  Pfizer  Myoofarm  Hoffmann 
La  Roche 
Cardiovascular drugs  48  166  M.S.D.  Sandoz  r.c.r.  Astra 
Psyohotropics  64  467  Hoffmann  Wyeth  Ciba"'!~igy M.S.D.  La.  Roche 
.. 
Antirhewnatios  .  79  509  M.S.D.  Boots  Ciba-qeigy Midy 
Dermatologioali!t  42  243  Sobering  Ciba~Geigy Lederle  Glaxo 
0 
Gynaec.ologicals  80  336  Organon  Sobering  Wye.th  Noury. 
P~ma 
Diuretics  78  261  Hoeohst  R.I.T.  Ciba-Geigy Searle 
Antidiabetios  73  342  Hoeohst  Novo  Organon  Winthrop 
Hormones  38  245  ~rga.non  Philips- Sobering  Ayerf;lt  Duphar 
121 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973/7 4  COUNTRY:  NETHERLANDS 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients. of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  O:P' 
Ll!lAl>ING FIBMS  .Alm  TBEI1l  RAm<:  IJI'fiTnliT 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
Hoffmann  Union 
Sedatives and  hyponotics  65  752.  La  Roche  Chimique  Kaliohemie  Ciba-Geigy 
Belge 
Spasmolytios  57  163  :Brocades- Hoffmann  Philips  Boehringer  Gist  La  Roche  Duphar 
·. 
BREWING  INDUSTRY 
t.: 
(1974) 
:Brewing  industry as  Skol 
92  597  Heineken  (Allied  Grolsch  Bavaria  a  whole  :Breweries) 
.  Skol 
Draught  beer  86  493  Heineken  (Allied  Grolsoh  Bavaria 
:Breweries) 
Skol 
Bottled beer  93  473  Heineken  {Allied  Grolsoh  Bavaria 
:Breweries) 
122 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1968-74  COIJN'l'RY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADmG  FIBMS  AliD  TBJi!I1i  RAmC  l'I'ITnl\1' 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEl'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
TEXTILE ·  niDUSTRY 
Spinning and weaving  of  41  220  Ill-Morris  Coats-P.  Bulmer  Lister  wool  and man-made  fibres 
(1973) 
'  Spinning  and weaving  of  56  236  ..  ·.  Courtaulds  Ca.rr-Viy.  Tootal  Va.ntona  cotton and  man-made  fibres 
'  ( 1973)  .  .: 
.  ·. 
Cotton e.tc.  spinning  47  ,64  Courtaulds  Tootal  Viyella  Carrington 
. (19~M  .  ;  .. 
All wov:en .cloth  .33  188  Oourtaulds  Carrington Toota;t  Viyella 
I.•  .  (1968) 
; 
Woven· ftlament  60  344  Carrington  Courtaulds Viyella  Tootal 
(1968) 
I 
I 
Sewing  thread  75  (b)  200  Coats-P.  Tootal 
( 1972) 
... 
Hosiery and  lalitting  52  284  Oeurtaulds  Nottiilgham  Coats-P.  Car;z-Viy. 
(1973)  ••• 
; 
War~knitted fabrics  64  436  Courta.ulds  Viyella  Car~ington Tootal 
(1968) 
< 
Women's  hose  60  (b)  560  Colll'taulds  Tillings 
(1974) 
(b) c2  instead of c4 
.  ., 
NB:  Tootal is linked financially both to Courtaulds and to ICI and ICI  controls 
the Carrington-Viyella group.  · · 
123 MARKET  CONCEN'FRATION  YEAR:  1972/73  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LJilAD:ma  FIRMS  Aim  TBEill  RAJIK  l'I'TON 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKEn'  c4  J  4L  I  II  III  .. 
(~) 
PAPER  INDUSTRY 
(1972} 
Paper  manufacture  49  200  Wiggins  :Sowater  Reed  Teape.  Ltd. 
PrintilJ8 and  wri  till8  65  336  :Bowater  Reed  Wiggins 
papers  TeapeLtd. 
Paper board  71  (c)  248  Unile.yer  Wiggins.  Marton  Teape  Ltd. 
Paper  conversion  53  216  DRG  Reed  Mardon 
Manufactured  stationery  83  (b)  620  IDRG  Wiggins 
Teape  Ltd. 
Packaging  other than  57  {b)  376  IDRG  Reed  board 
:Soard  packaging  51  212  Reed  Mardon  :Bowater 
PHARMACEUTICALS  :tm>USTRY (E) 
:Bread-spectrum  80  antibiotics 
DRG  "'  Dickinson-Robinson  Group  Ltd. 
{b) c2  instead of c4 
(c) c3  instead of c4 
268 
( 1973) 
Beecham  :s.Wellcome  Glaxo 
(E)  Very approximate  estimation$ 
124 
IV 
. 
DRG* 
.Inveresk 
:Bowater 
Unilever 
Lederle MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF  LEADING  FIRMS  AND ~  RAm<:  c;u.l'lt;m·l·t!ATION 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKlL'l'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
Systemic anti- 88  244  M.S.D.  Boots  Geigy  Winthrop  inflammatories 
Bronchodilators  82  516  Fisons  A. & H.  ..  Boehringer 
*  Other hypertensives  91  782  M.s.D.  Ciba.  Berk  Boehringer  Pharma 
Diuretics  80  310  Hoechst  M.S.D.  Searle  Ciba. 
Non-narcotic  70  290  Winthrop  Dista  Wyeth  analgesics  .. 
Antidepressants  61  215  M.s.D.  Geigy  Squibb  Warner 
Tranquillizers  83  657  Roche  Wyeth  S.K.F.  M.  & B. 
Antiangina  93  562  I.C.I.  Ciba  ..  Hoechst 
Plain skin hormones  87  592  Glaxo  I.C.I.  Schering  Dista 
Cough  remedies  69  656  Parke  Boehringer M.  & B.  Davis  .. 
* Berk  Pharma..  - Berk  Pharmaceuticals 
125 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  AND  THF:I"R  RANK  liUl'll,;l!.il'l'  ~~~ 'IITnliT 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKE'l'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
Plain antacids  65  277  Boehringer wyeth  Reckitt  •• 
Contraceptives  82  290  Sobering  ..  Searle  .. 
Non-Barbiturate  95  856  Roche  Roussel  sedatives  ..  .. 
Peripheral vasodilaters  80  252  Abbott  Lilly  Up john  Squibb 
Systemic antibiotics  90  188  Up john  Abbott  Dista  Squibb 
Haematinics  81  232  S.K.F.  Abbott  Glaxo  Ciba 
Antinauseants  82  243  M.  &  B.  Beecham  ..  .. 
Penicillins  74  156  Beecham  Wyeth  Lilly  Glaxo 
Corticosteroids  59  202  Squibb  Glaxo  Pfizer  •• 
Anti-obesity preparations  94  479  ..  ••  Wyeth  •• 
126 MARKET  CONCEN'l'RATION  YEAR: 1973  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  .Alm  TBEI1i  RAJK  ............. 
IlmUSTRY  OR  MARKEl'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
La:x:ati ves  70  274  Reckitt  ••  Boehringer A.  &  H. 
AC~systemio hormones  60  469  Upjohn  Glaxo  Ciba  .. 
·.·. 
Oral diabetic  93  213  .  Pfizer  Hoechst  Winthrop  Roussel 
. 
Parkinson anticonvu.lsants  BQ  239  Geigy  ••  .Roche  Lederle 
L 
.· 
.' 
An~sj?asmod.ics  54  128  Searle  ••  M.  &  Bo  ·s•K•F• 
.. 
.··  Systemic antihistamines  66  217  A.  & H.  M.  &  B.  B.Wellcome  Wintnrop 
I· 
tc·. 
TB  preparations  95  182  ••  Ciba  Lederle  •• 
:c· 
. 
.  Oral cold preparations  90  377  B.Wellcome  ••  Warner  .  .. 
.  ·· 
Other vitamins  92  229  Ciba  Roche  .-...  •• 
127 MARKET  CONCJRATION 
! 
Concentration! ratios 
"- YEAR: 1972/73/7.f'OUN'TRY: tm!TED  KINCIDOM 
(c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
~f~URE  OF 
PA'I'Tnl\T  LEADING  FIRMS  .Alm ~  RAmC 
INDUSTRY  OR  M.ARKE'r  94  I  4L  I  II  III  ·IV 
I 
(%) 
I 
I 
1 
PHOTOGRAPHIC  INDUSTRY 
(1973) 
I 
1 
Still {sensitized  .  i  Agfa.-
95i  599  Kodak  Ilford  Boots  surfaces for cameras) 
i 
(71%)  Gevaert 
Cine  (8,Super 8, etc.)  90  828  Kodak  Ilford  Agfa.- Boots 
(72%)  Gevaert 
MANUFACTURE  ot MACHINERY  OTHER  THAN  ELECTRICAL  MACHnlES 
! 
(1972/1974)  ! 
! 
Massey  David  International  Tractors  71  150  Ford  Ferguson  Brown  Ha:rvester 
( 1974) 
I 
I 
Combine  harvesters  82  195  Claas  New  Massey  John 
Holland  Fer  peon  Deere 
(1974) 
I 
Cranes,  hoists, lifting 
i  Coles  Clarke  Herbert  NCK  68!  181  and  winding devices  I  Cranes  Chapman  Morris  Rapier 
( 1972) 
! 
i  Express 
Lifts and escalators  851  297  Otis  Marryot  Lift  Hammond  &; 
I  Elevator  Company  Chapman 
(1972) 
I 
I 
I  . 
Lancer 
Powered  industrial trucks  59!  234  Lansing  Boss  Coventry  Hyster 
•  I  Bagnall  Group  Climax 
( 1972) 
1 
i 
128 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1973/74  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (41) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET 
Beer  (E) 
( 197 4) 
Non  alcoholic drinks  (E) 
( 197 4) 
Canned  fish 
( 197 4) 
Frozen foods 
( 1973) 
Ice cream 
( 197 3) 
Condensed  milk 
(1973) 
Evaporated milk and 
sterilised cream 
(1973) 
Milk powder 
( 197 3) 
Butter 
( 1973) 
(a)  c1  instead of c4 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
(c) c3  instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  AND ~  RANK  l'I'TON 
c4  J  41  I  II  III  IV 
(%) 
FOOD  AliD  DRINK  INDUSTRY 
50  175  Allied  Bass  Guinness  Breweries  Charrington Whitbread 
50  (b)  Cad bury  Beechams  Sehweppes 
71·5  660  Unilever  Princes  Cucumber  GlerJI>yck  (John West) 
(43·5%)  (19%)  (5%)  (4%) 
87  (c)  600  Unilever  Nestle  Imperial 
* 
84  (b)  212  J. Lyons  T.  Wall 
&  Co.  &  Sons 
(43%)  (41%) 
Bo  (b)  200  Carnation  Nestle  Foods 
(4o%)  (4o%) 
91  285  Carnation  Nestle  Nestle  Libby,  Foods  (cr~me)  (lait) 
(49%)  (21%)  (17%)  (1o%) 
82  (b)  1166  Cad bury  Carnation  Schw%)pes 
(70  )  (12%) 
62  236  Nouvelle  Danemark  Australie  Irlande  Zelande 
(24%)  (22%)  (8%)  (8%) 
* Controlled by  Unilever 
(E)  Very  approximate estimations. 
The  market  share of the  conglomerate  group "Grand 
Metropolitan Ltd."  has  been  omitted from  the figures 
concerning  beer. 
129 MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1973/7 4  COUNTRY:  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients' of disparity (4L) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKET 
Yoghourt 
(1974) 
Margarine 
(1973) 
Breakfast cereals 
( 197 3) 
Crackers  and  cream 
biscuits 
( 1973) 
Chocolate biscuits 
( 197 3) 
Sugar 
(1973) 
Infant foods 
( 1973) 
Dehydrated  and  powdered 
potato 
i_12D} 
Canned  soup 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
(c)  c3 instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADma FIRMS  AND  TBEI'R  RAm<:  lTION 
04  1 4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
Express  Van  den  1  Marks  &  72  296  !Dairy Co.  Unigate  Bergh's  Spencer 
Van  den1 
*  77  (b)  1340  Bergh  &  Kraft  cws  Sainsbury 
Jur~ens 
(67 o)  (10%) 
89  512  Kellogg  Weetabix  National  Quaker 
Company  Biscuit Co.  Oats Ltd. 
80  ~~?  165  *  United  National  ABJI  Biscuits  Biscuit eo. 
(35%)  (3o%)  ( 15%) 
12·5 (b)  444  United  Cad bury 
Biscuits  Schweppes 
96  (c)  340  Tate &  British  Manbre  & 
Lyle  Sugar  Corp.  Garton 
(54%)  (26%)  (16%) 
70  196  H.J.Heinz  Gla.xo  Unigate  Gerber  Holdings 
80  367  Unilever  Corn  (Nestle) 
Products Co.  Chef  Maggi 
80  (c)  700  H J  H i  Campbell  Crosse &  Baxters  •  •  e  nz  Soup  Blackwell 
(6o%)  (12%)  (8%) 
* CWS  = Cooperative  Wholesale  Society 
(E)  Very  approximate  estimations 
ABM  = Associated Biscuits Manufacturers  Ltd. 
1  =  Controlled by Unilever 
130 MARKET  CONCEN'l'RA.TION  YEAR:  1972  COUNTRY:  DENMARK 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and coefficients of disparity (41) 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKE:I' 
Psychopharmacological 
drll€S 
Tra.nquilli  zers 
Antibiotics 
Analgesics 
Vitamins 
Contraceptive pills 
Insulin for oral diabetics 
Sulphonamides 
(b) c2  instead of c4 
(c)  c3  instead of c4 
MEASURE  OF 
l'I'TON 
c4  I  4L 
(~) 
62  303 
98  684 
65  (c)  104 
80  676 
89  254 
85  224 
63  (b) 
66  (c)  199 
LEADING FIRMS  AND  THJi!I'R  RA:NK 
I  II  III  IV 
Dum ex  Hoffmann  Lund beck  Ferrosa.n 
La  Roche  (Wyeth) 
Dum ex  Hoffmann  Ferrosa.n  Gea  La  Roche  (Wyeth) 
Lpvens 
Kemiske  Astra  Novo 
Fabrik 
The  Danish S  d  Alfred  Lpvens  Pharmacies  an oz  Benz on 
The  Danish  Da.nsk 
Pharmacies Ferrosan  Droge  Dum ex 
Schering  Wyeth  Novo  Searle 
Hoechst  Lund beck 
Hoffmann  Gea  Pharmacia  La  Roche 
l3l MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR: 1973  COUNTRYI  DENMARK 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  AND  TH'Ilrr'R  RANK 
Jlll' ;J!;N''tlATION 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKFI' 
Magnetic  tape recorders 
Record  players 
Colour televisions 
Radios 
Black and  white televisions 
Dry  cleaning machines 
Articles for the treatment 
of hair 
Electric cookers 
(a)  c1  instead of c4 
(b)  c2  instead of c4 
c4  I  4L  I 
(~) 
ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING 
77  Philips 
78  Bang& 
Olufsen 
80  Bang& 
Olufsen 
Bang&  70  Olufsen 
73  Bang& 
Olufsen 
89  417 
Fisker og 
Nielsen 
(47%) 
95  (a)  Carmen 
Clairol 
62  (b)  928  Ernst 
Voss 
(51%) 
132 
II  III  IV 
Eltra- Tandberg  Bang& 
Sony  Olufsen 
Philips  Garrard/  Len co  Arena 
Philips 
ITT/ 
Standard  Tandberg 
Electric 
ITT/  Rank  Philips  Standard  Arena  Electric 
ITT/  Rank  Philips  Standard  Arena  Electric 
Hoover  AEG  Electro  lux 
(28%)  (9%)  (5%) 
:a,s'tker  AEG  Braun 
Hansen  Electric 
Scan-
Atlas 
(  11%) MARn:T  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1974/75  COUNTRY:  DENMARK 
.Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
e 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING FIRMS  AJm  TJmilt  RA'NK  l'fiTOl\T 
INDUSTRY  OR ~ 
Coffee 
Margarine 
·. 
Infant foqds 
Frozen foods 
Ice Cream 
Canned  fruit and  vegetables 
Canned  meat 
Sqar 
Cheese 
(b) c2  instead of c  4 
(c)  c3 instead of c4 
c4  I  4L  I  II 
(~) 
FOOD  lNDUSTRY 
38  196  FDB  Merrild 
( 16%)  (~) 
76  252  Unilever  A.lfa 
(28%)  (22%) 
98  (c)  587  Nestl&  Plwnrose 
(6o%)  (3o%) 
80  235  F.lim  Plwnrose 
(28%)  (25%) 
Frisko  {  Premier 
91  (c)  281  Un"l  )  Beatrice 
l.  ever  Food) 
(46%)  (28%) 
56  210  FDB  OK 
(2o%)  (19%) 
78  296  JAKA  Plwnrose 
(32%)  (3o%) 
De  danske 
100  (b)  1228  sukker- Nykpbing 
fabrik:ker 
(86%)  (14%) 
42  241  A  B 
133 
III  IV 
Frellsen  Gevalia 
(7'ft)  (6'ft) 
FDB  Irma 
(20%)  (6%) 
IrJDa 
(8%) 
" 
Dybfrost  Irma 
(20%)  (7%) 
Eventyr 
Is 
( 17%) 
Beauvais  I%'1118.  Plwnrose 
( 10%)  .  (7%) 
DAK  F!borg 
(8%)  (8%) 
c  D MARKET  CONCENTRATION  YEAR:  1974/75  COUNTRYJ  DENMARK 
Concentration ratios (c4)  and  coefficients of disparity (4L) 
MEASURE  OF 
LEADING  FIRMS  AND  TBli!:t1i  RA:NK  i'I'TON 
INDUSTRY  OR  MARKE'l'  c4  I  4L  I  II  III  IV 
(~) 
Milk and milk products  39  185  A  B  c  D 
Butter  40  193  A  B  c  D 
134 APPENDIX  2 
Survey'S  of retail prices  and mark-ups 
(price - mark-up surveys) 
PROVISIONAL  OUTLINE  METHODOLOGY 
The  surveys  are based on  a  very 
confined sample  of sales points 
·and  industrial foodstuffs. I.  LIST  OF  INFORMATION  WHICH  INSTITUTES  AND  EXPERTS  CARRYING  OUT  THE  PRICE  AND  MARK 
UP  SURVEYS  ARE .  TO. PROVIDE 
1.  PRODUCT  :  (weight,  measure,  packaging) broken down  by brand  :  point  2. 
2.  BRAND  :  a  distinct code number for each packing,  according to weight  and 
d!iiie'iis ion. 
3.  BRAND  DETAILS 
- manufacturer's brand  ; 
- trade brand  ; 
- distributors own·label. 
4.  PRODUCT  ORIGIN  : 
- home-produced 
- imported  ; 
- mixed  ; 
- indefinable. 
5.  TYPE  OF  BUSINESS  :  Clas$ified .according to type,  location and  function  of the 
sales  point  (e.g.  suburban  bYpermarket).  The  number of sales points  analysed 
for each type  of business is given  (number of observatiol1s).  · 
6.  SALES  POINT  (Code  nuniber,  na:me). 
7.  OWNER  GROUP  :·Financial,  induetrial or commercial group which  owns  or controls 
the relevant sales  points  • 
.  &.  TIMING:  (Number  and date of survey) 
E:Jca:mple .·:  Survey No  1,  15 janU:ary i976  ;  survey No  2,  15 April  1976  ;  etc  • 
.  9.  TOTAL  SELLING  PRICE  OF  PRODUCT/BRAND  f  The  price  recorded for each brand  and  for 
.each type,  dimension  and weight  of the  relevant  product.  Thes.e  are the prices 
which will be  fed  into the  computer. 
10.  CURRENCY:  (DM,  FF,  FB,  LIT.,  etc.) 
11.  UNIT  OF  MEASUREMENT/WEIGHT  :  e.g.,  100 g, 1  kg,  1  litre, 1  m 2,  etc. 
12. !!!£l'JPLIER/DIVISOR  :  The  weight  and  dimension. for each product brand  (e.g.,  2.50  g, 
750  g,  half litre, etc.).  The  multiplier or divisor is thus  the figure by which 
the total price of the  relevant  packing  (point  9)  is multiplied or divided in 
order to obtain the unit  price. 
13.  TOTAL  BUYING  PRICE  i  Price paid by the  retailer who  buys  the specific brand  in 
the  relevant weight  or dimension,  to which the total selling price corresponds 
exactly (poin.t  9).  ·  ·  · 
14.  EXCHANGES  RATE  :  The  exchange  rate  applied to each national currency to give 
the selling and buying prices  in a  European currency. 
137 II.  SERIES  OF  PRICE  - MARK-UPS  TABLE 
The  detailed information briefly described above  enables  the  Commission's  Computer 
Centre to carry out  a  number of calculations. 
By  way  of example,  the  following .tables can be set up for each survey number  (or 
date),  for each country or area ahd  for each product  ~arket  : 
Table  1  Surveys  of prices  ~d mark-ups : 
Detailed results by sales  point. 
Table  2  Price surveys : 
Rankin~  baSed  on  price~ differences between sales  point. 
Table  3  Price surveys : 
Comparisons  of prices  and variations  as  between types  of business. 
Table  4  Price surveys : 
Structure  and evolution of the  sample basket  by type  of business. 
Table  5  Mark-up  surv~ys : 
Rankings  based on  differences  in mark-ups  as  between sales  points. 
As  we  have  seen,  these tables will  be  set up for each country  (or area)  on  the 
basis  of a  highly restricted sample  of sales  points  (averaging between  30  and 
50  for each country or area).  Interpretation of these tables  would  seem  easy 
enough. 
Table  1  simply reproduces  the  raw  data compiled by the  researcher,  with the sole 
addition of the  mark-up,  in other words  the  percentage  added by each seller to 
his buying price  in order to obtain the  retail price.  This  table also displays 
the  type  of business  (e.g.  suburban supermarket) to which each sales  point  in 
the sample  belongs,  together with all the  figures  (total prices,  unit  prices, 
mark-ups)  not  only for the latest survey but  also for the  previous  survey,  giving 
a  series  of meaningful  comparisons. 
Table  1  gives  detailed figures both for each sales  point  (on the left) and  for 
each product  (on  the  right). 
For each product  it should be  emphasized that table  1  higlights  two  main  facts, 
one  concerning the  type  of brand  (manufacturer's brand,  trade brand or distribu-
tor's  own  label)  and  the  other concerning the  origin of the  product  (home-produced, 
imported,  or partly home-produced). 
Although the basis for successive econometric  calculations is represented by the 
total price,  table  1  also brings  out  the unit  price so  as  to detect  certain 
pa~hological cases  where  the difference  in weight  and  paoking conceals substantial 
differences  in the  price  of the same  quantity of the same  product. 
Table  2  gives  the  result of a  series  of computer calculations from the basic 
figures,  giving the  gap between maximum  and  minimum  prices both for each product 
(on the left)  and for each sales  point  (on  the right).  The  products  are  ranked 
according to the  gap between the  maximum  price  and  the  m~n~mum price.  The  table 
also gives  the  percentage variation from  one  survey to  tp.e  next  ( t+i). 
138 Unlike  tabl49s  1  an~ 21  'Table J does  not  give  suQh detailed results but  ma.rks  the 
first stage, o:f  the gradual process of compa.ritive synthesis, bringing out  prices 
and variations (t!>get,her with ma.ximum  and minimum  figures)  for each type  of 
buSiness and not  for each sa,les  point.  However,  this table  remains  product  ana-
lytical since each: p~and arid  packing are consia..red separately. 
'l'a'Qle  3  also gives  prices, in European  currency, {i.e.  in units  of account  :  u. a.) 
obtained by'a.pplying the, exchange  rate  recorded at the dates  of the survey. 
'  '  ' 
Table  4  no  longer considers  individual products  (brands  and  packagings) but  the 
~gregate of the products  in the  sample,  known 'as  the basket.  However it must  be 
born in mind  that this basket  is not  to be regarded as  representative of household 
expenditure  in the technical sense generally employed by statisticians.  Addi-
tional information is given by table  4  which,  within the basket,  distinguishes 
prices  and variations ,for different types  of brand  (manufacturer's brand,  trade 
brand or distributor's ,own  label) and  relating to the differing origin of the 
products  (home-produced,  imported, ,mixed). 
It would,  for instance,  be  particularly interesting to ascertain  : 
- the  proportion of the  aggregate basket  represented by  own  labels 
- the proportion of the basket  accounted for by  imported goods  ; 
- which  prod~cts  ri~:~e  or fall most  on  average .,., own  labels or others'  imported 
or ~ome goods,  etc. 
Va~iations are obtained from the  average  of the  v~riations in the total prices 
of each of the  pro«;iucts  in the basket. 
Fi'n:ally,  Table  5'  g:~V'es  fu:U  ~  detailed figures  for mark-ups,' broken down  by product 
(bJ"a.nd  and  \l~Oking)  a.nq.  by sales point.  Howeve~, setting this table up is a 
papticula:rly onerous  t~k, since in several  coUn.tTies  it is virtually imposSible 
to ascertain mark.:.:.ups.  In many  cases,' then,  they, are no  more  than approximate 
estimates  and  econometric  calculations based on :them  are not  entirely foolproof. 
* 
*  * 
In the near future,  we  shall attempt to establish intra-Community comparisons 
of the  prices of the  relevant  products,  mark-ups  and variations  (both in prices 
and in M$-rk-ups ), using subsequent  tables  (numbered 6  etc. ) •  At  any rate,  we 
are still at the  experimental stage and the  prioe and mark-up surveys  are cur-
rently carried out  only in respect  of the distribution of a  number of industrial 
foodstuffs  and beverages constituting a  highly restricted sample  of "relevant" 
products. 
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SURVEY  OF  PRICES  AND  MARK  UPS 
DETAILED  ·RESULTS  BY  SALES  POINTS 
N°  of survey  : 
]2!1!  : 
(FigUres  in parentheses  are for 
survey no  of  ) 
Country 
Industry  : 
Cux-renoy  : 
SAMPLE  OF  SALES  POINTS  PRICES  NUMBER  AND  NAME  OF  PRODUCT 
No ·and  Selling  Brand  Origin  , •. 
·:  .  .  . 
Type  No  and  name  of  '  name  price 
of  of  Total  Quan- Unit 
buei- owner  Bu,ying  price  tity  price  ness  "SALES  POINT"  group  price 
(  )  (  )  (  ) 
Mark  lolp 
... 
~  l 
(  l 
(  l 
... 
l  l 
:_ 
~  l 
(  ) 
... 
(  ) 
(  l 
(  ) 
TOTAL  SAMPLE  AV 
(  AV  ) 
AV 
(  AV  ) 
AV 
(  AV  j 
... 
... 
... 
AV  = Average  Price  (selling,  buying)  and  Mark-up  for each Product  analysed by  Sales 
Points. 
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- ...  -
TABLE  2 
PRICE  SURVEYS 
SALES  POINTS  RANKED  ACCO!IDINO  '1'0  PRICE  DIFFERr;NCES 
No  of survey  1 
~: 
(Figures  in  parentheses  are  for 
survey no  of  ) 
PRODUCT  R4NKING 
Rilllking 
No  nnd  n~me of produ9t 
1  ... 
2  ... 
..  ... 
TOTAL  PRICE  OF  BABKET 
......  :~~ ..  ......................................  =  .. 
t+i  p.  *I SELLING  PRICP-
J  (  ) 
iiiAXIMUi>l 
(  ) 
MINIMUM 
(  )  .  1 
?ourcentagc  d_iff. 
(  ) 
(  ) 
(  L._ 
(  ) 
(  ) 
(  ) 
(  ) 
L_l 
(  ) 
(  ) 
MAXIMUM 
(  ) 
MINIMUM 
(  )  1 
Percentage diff. 
...  J ......  J ..••.•••. 
(l)  Percentage difference •  maximum  price  ....  minimum  price 
minimum  price 
COR.1ESPONDING 
SALES  POINT 
... 
... 
-
············=···· 
(2)  Variations between tho  preceding survey (in parentheses)  and 
this survey  (t + i) 
t+is *I VARIATIONS~ 
j  (2)  ! 
...  :  :  Type 
'  .  of 
'  '  ' 
business  n 
- :  . 
n 
'  '  II 
' 
•  II 
n 
'  '  '  ' 
n 
·'  '  n 
'  n 
n 
n 
'  '  •  n 
'  n 
'  ' 
RANKING  OF  SALES  POINTS 
COWl try 
Industry 
Currency 
in decreasing order of prices  (in nation currency) 
No  and  Total 
name  Owner  price 
of  group  (  ) 
sales point 
Quantity  Unit 
price 
(  )  (  ) 
:  .......... _  ........ ······--····-· -------- ····-··-=-= ........................ _  ....... 
'  '  '  •  '  •  . 
'  '  '  . 
·······--·---.....  ,! - ~ 
TABLE  3 
PRICE  SURVEYS 
COMPARISONS  OF  PRICES  AND  VARIATIONS  BY  TYPE  OF  BUSINESS 
No  of survey  : 
~I 
(Fi~s in parentheses  are for 
e.urv~y no  of  ) 
I  SAMPLE  OF  SALES  POINT 
NUMBER 
TYPE  OF  BUSINESS  OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
.  .  . 
'• 
'' 
... 
TOTAL·· SAMPLE 
VALUE 
MAXIMUM 
(  ) 
MINIMUM 
(  ) 
wEIGHTED 
AVERAGE 
(  ) 
(  ) 
- (  1 
(  .) 
L  ) 
(  ) 
(  ) 
MAXIMUM 
(  ) 
MINIMUM 
(  ) 
NEIGH.AVERAG 
(  ) 
Country  : 
InQ.ustry  : 
Currency  : 
Exchange  rate 
PRODUCT  SA)U>LE 
NU!®ER  AND  NAME  OF'  PRODUCT 
Brand •••  Origin ••• 
t+i  t+i  CORREs- CORRES- *  1  SE.LLING  PRICE  .l'ONDING  S .*  :  VARIA~  PONDING  P;  (  )  J  TIONS  SALES  SALES 
nat  .• ourr.  :~~  .. ,curr  •  POINT  in%.  POINT 
... 
··-· - t; 
No  of survey  : 
lb.!!.: 
(Figures in parentheses  are for 
suiYey no  of  ) 
SAMPLE  OF  SALES  POINTS 
Jltll(BER  OF 
TYPE  OF  BUSINESS 
OBSER-
VATIONS 
VALUE 
MAXIMUM 
(  ) 
lliNIMTJ)! 
(  ) 
HEIGirrED 
AVERAGE 
(  ) 
'l'~!Ji::4 
PRICE<lluR'mY& 
STRl.IC'roRE  AIID  l!;VOLU'riON  OF  THE  BASKET  BY  T 'i!'PE  OF  BUSINESS 
STRUCTUHE. OF  BAS !CST 
. TOTAL  PRICE  of whiCh  :  oi wbi,Jb.: 
' 
CO RilES- brand  ·:··  >  pr<>duots 
European  POND INC  National  Manufaot.  Trade  Distri:... 
SALES  buiO-rts  Home  Im-
Currency Currency  brand  brand  own  .  pro- p<>rtea  POINT  d~<oea 
(  )  (  )  (abe)  (  )  (  )  ( 
i  n  na.tiona:l  o  u  r  r  e  n c:y 
... 
(  ) 
L_j 
(  ) 
... 
-y  ) 
I  L  _L 
'·  J.  )  .· 
... 
.1__} 
(  ) 
(  ) 
TOTAL  SAMPLE  JolAXl:Mut: 
(  ) 
MININ!JM. 
·  ... 
(  )_.,·  ,  .. ·., .. 
WEIGSTED 
AVERAGE 
(  ) 
'  .  .  . 
Variations  are  obtained from  the 'average  of the· v~riatiOns in the total prices· of all the  pro-
ducts  in the basket.  ·  ·  ' 
... 
)Ux•d  ..  ... 
0  )  ... 
Country 
Industry  1 
Currency 
F.xchange  rate 
VARIATIO!IS  IN  THE  BASKET  l 
(%) 
of which  :  of which  : 
brand  :  p-roducts  : 
.;  .;  ...  I 
~"  e  "'  g~  ~ 
~.g  "  ......  "' ..,  t  ":!  ..  .lJ  ..  ...  m  1l 
0  r  ~"'  -~ $  "  ~.g  e  ..  Ao  H 
"'  "  -~ 
"' - ...  ... 
No  of survey 
~: 
(Figures in parentheses  are for 
f  ) 
PRODUCT  RANKING 
RAN-
KING"· 
T.4BLE  5 
SURVEY'S  ON  MARK  UPS 
Rankings  based on differences in marlc  ups  as  between sales points 
Country 
InduJi!try 
Currency 
CORRESPONDING  "  "  RANKING  OF  SALES  POINTS  II  MARK-UPS 
SALES  POINTS 
II 
(in decreasing order of marlc-ups)  II 
II 
MAXIMUM  II 
(  ) 
II 
Type  of  Number and  Owner  llla.rk-ups  II 
II 
name  of  t+i  MINIMUM  II  busi-
~* 
NUMBER  AND  NAME  OF  PRODUCT  II  (  )  sales point  II  ness  group  1  "  (  )  PERCENTAGE  DIFFER.  II 
II  (  )  II 
II 
II 
1  II  ... 
II 
(  ) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
(  )  u 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
(  )  II 
II  - II 
II  .  .  ... 
II 
(  ) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
(  ) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
K 
(  ) 
II 
H 
II 
MAXIMUM  II  1  Percentage difference = 
OVERALL  MARK  UPS  II 
(  )  II 
II  maximum  marlc  up - minimum mark  u  MINIMUM  II 
u  minimum mark up  (  )  II 
II  1  II  PERCENTAGE  DIFFER.  II 
~l'lt_~U.P  -~ml_l1:tm_UJII_rnal'k  up 
II  (  )  u 
II 
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I GERMANY 
FRANCE 
ANNEX  1 
List -of  ;institutes-- and  experts  who·  have carried out 
research for the Commission 
- IFO-Institut fUr Wirtschaf'tsf'orschung,  Munich. 
- Kienbaum  Unternehmensberatung,  Gummersbaoh. 
t  - DAFSA  Analyse  S.A.,  Paris. 
- Institut agronomique  medi terra.nl§en  (I.  A.M.)  et INRA,  Montpellier 
(J.L.  Rastoin,  G.  Ghersi,  M.  Castagnos,  D.  Boulet,  J~P.  Laporte). 
- GREFI,  UniversiU de  Rennee  (Pro£.  G.  ;BeJ."tin). 
- Fis-J,TOR  Consulenza Azienda.le,  Mil~o 
(A.  Amadui:zi,  R.  Ca~~~~i, a. -Martelli). 
- SORIS  S.p.A.  Studi e  ricero}le_ ~i Economia e  M8.t'keting,  Torino 
(P.  E•~liano, G.  Bertone,  F.  Gu'a.Sohino,  R.  Lanzetti). 
NETHERLANDS · 1  - Sticlllting voor Ec,onomisch  Onderzoek dar Univer&iteit van 41ftllterdam 
(Prof.  H.W.  de  Jong e:n  A. H.  Smolders). 
- Sticlitting Nijenrode,  Breukden  (Prof.  H.W.  de  Jong). 
- STUDIA  v.z.w.d., Bruxelles  (J.  Hallet). 
- - CRIDB,  .Louvain  (Prof.  Alex Ja.oquemin). 
1JNITED  KING-1  - Cranfield School of Management,  Cranfield, Bedfori 
(F.  Fishwick,  W.  Hull,  R.B.  Cornu).  Jill! 
- London  School of Business,  London  {Prof~ J.B.  Hea~h). 
-Development Analysts Ltd.,  Croydon 
(R.W.  Evely,  P.E.  Hart,  S.J.  Praia). 
IRELAND  1  ~ Faoulty of Commerce,  University College,  Dublin 
(Prot.  Louis P.F.  Smith,  Dr.  G.  Quinn}. 
DENMARK  1  - H&ndelshpjskolen in lrhus 
(Th.H.  Nielsen,  N.  Jprgenaen, J.  Veatergaard). 
* 
*  * 
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FRANCE 
FRANCE 
FRANCE 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
ITALY  -
I  - Laine  (NICE  232) 
- Coton  (NICE  233) 
- Bonneterie  (NICE  237) 
IV/109/7?1-F 
a  - Indutrtrie du papier- Fabrication (NICE  271)  IV/110/73-F 
- Tran~formation (NICE  272) 
1  - Produits pharmaceutiques  (NICE  313.1)  IV/111/73-F 
- Prodllits photogl'aphiques  (NICE  313. 2) 
I  - Machines et tracteurs agrico1es  (NICE  361)  IV/112/73-F 
- Machines  de  bureau  (NICE  362) 
- Machines textiles et leurs accessoires 
.  (NICE  364.1) 
- MaUriel de  gent&  civil  ~NICE 366.4) 
- MaUriel de  ;Levage  et de  manut.ention 
.  . .  .  .  (NiqE  366  •. 5) 
I.  - Cycles, ..  otO¢Ycles et oyolomoteurs 
.•  .  (NICE  385.1) 
.·  1  - .·  Lan~wittsqhaf'tlich  •. lfa8chinen und  A9ke~'-' 
...  chlepper >(N.ICE. 361,) 
0.::  .BUromaschineri  .(NICE  362) 
- Te~:llmaschinen u.  Zubeh1Sr (NICE  364.1) 
.;..  Bau- und.  Bauatoffma.schinen  (NicE  366. 4) 
- ijebezeuge  und  FU~ermittel (NICE  366.5) 
IV/343/73-D 
1  - Induat.ria di cicli  •  motocicli e  ciclomotori  IV/346/7-?I 
(NICE  385.1) 
a  - Wa (NICE  232)  lV/347/7ri 
- Co'!;one  (NICE  233) 
- Maglieria e  Calzetteria (NICE  237) 
1  - I:nduatria della ca:r'ta  e  della sua  tra.atol'o-
ma.zione 
..;.'  Carta  (NICE  271) 
- Ca:r'totecnioa  (NICE  2'7.2) 
1·- - Farmaceutico  (NICE  313.1) 
-.Fotografico  (NICE  313.2) 
- Prodotti di manutenzione  (NICE  313.5) 
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IV/349/7ri 1  - Farmaceutische  industria  (NICE  313.1) 
~ Fototechnische  industrie  (NICE  313.2) 
- Onderhoudsmiddelen  (NICE 313.5) 
NETHERLANDS  &  - Rijwiel- en Bromfietsenindustrie  (NICE  385.1)  IV/351/73-N 
GERMANY  1  - Rundfunk-1  Femseh- und  Phonogefite 
·  .  .  (NICE  375) 
- Elektrohausha.ltsger"4te  (NICE  376)  . 
ITALY/BELGIUM  a  TAbleaux  de  ooncentration. 
- Laine  (NICE  232) 
- Coton  (NICE  233) 
- Bonneterie  (NICE  237) 
ITALY/BELGIUM  I  - Pharmaceutique  (NICE  313.1) 
GERMANY  1  Papier- und Pappeindustrie 
- Heret.ellung  (NICE  271) 
- Verarbeitung  (NICE.  272) 
GERMANY  - Wolle  (NICE  232) 
- Baumwolle  (NICE  233) 
- Wirkerei  und Strickerei (NICE  237) 
GERMANY  - Fahrrader  (NICE  385.1) 
- Motorrader und  Mopeds  {NICE  385.1) 
FRANCE/BELGIUM  1  Tableaux  de  concentration 
:GERMANY /FRANCE 
!  . 
- Construction electrique  (NICE  37) 
- Construction d1appareila electroniques, 
radio,  tUI!vision,  electroacoustique  (NlCE  375) 
- Fabrication d 'appareils  electrodomesti~es 
(NICE  376) 
Tableaux de  concentrat.ion 
- Laine  (NICE  232) 
- Coton  (NICE  233) 
- Bonneterie  (NICE  237) 
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IV/446/13-D . 
IV/471/73-F 
IV/472/73-F 
IV  /514/73-D 
IV/515/73-D 
IV/516/73-D 
IV/540/73-F 
IV/543/73-F l.i'RANCE/GERMANYf  1  Tableaux de concentration 
ITALY/NETHERLANDS  ...  Cycles at motocycles  (NICE  385.1} 
BELGIUM 
BELGIUM 
GERMANY 
GERMANY 
I  ~ Laine  (NIC~ 232) 
'"  Coton  (NICE  233) 
•  Bonneterie  (NICE  237) 
1  ~ Construction 41appareil8 .Sleotriques, 
radios, Uleyision,  .sleotro-acouatique 
.  (NICE  375} 
•  Fabrication d'appareils .Slectrodomestiques 
(NICE  376} 
1  - Pha~azeutiscbe Industria  (NI~E 313.1) 
-.Photochemische  Industria  (NICE  313.2) 
1  - EmiQlungainduatJ."ie  (  ohne  Getri.nkdnduatrie} 
insgesamt  (NICE  20B) 
IV/517/73-F 
IV  /519/7  3-D 
- Herstepunr von  Fleischkonsel'V'8n  (NICE  201) 
- Hersteli~  von  Obst- und  Ge111Usekonsel'V'8n(~CB a<>3) 
BELGIUM 
.FRANCE 
NETHERLANDS 
- HeJ"Bte11UDg  von  Fisch konsel'V'8n. (NICE  204) 
I  - Induatrie ~euUque  {NICE  31).1) 
- I.ndustrie  Photographique  (N. ICE  313  •. 2}  .  - "  . 
- Produits d'entretien (NICE  313.5} 
1  - Construction d1appareile .Slectriques1 
radios,  t.Sl.Svision,  .Slectro-acoustique 
(NICE  375) 
- Fabrication d  1appareils .Slectro-
domestiques  (NICE  376) 
1  Papiel"-.en papierwarenindustrie 
- Vervaardiging·  (NICE  271) 
- Verwerking  (NICE  272) 
GE.RMANY/FRA!fCE/  1  Tableaux de  concentration 
RETHERLANDS  - Pharmaceutique  (NICE  313.1) 
GERMANY/FRANCE/  '  Tableaux de  concentration 
ITALY/NETHERLANDS  - Fabrication du  papier (NICE  271) 
- Transformation du  papier "cartotechnique" 
(NICE. 272)  . 
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IV/581/73-F 
IV/34/74-P 
IV/45/74-P GERMANY/ITALY  1  Tableaux de  cqnoentration 
-Construction  ~lectrique (NICE.37) 
..:.  Corist.ruction d'appareils electroniquea, 
radios, television,  &lf)ctroaooustique 
(NICE  375)  . 
- Fabrication d1appareils electrodomestiquea 
.  {NICE  376) 
i 
IV/ 9)/74-F 
a -Costru.zione d.i  appa.recchia.ture  elf!ttroniche  IV/189/14~1 
ed elettroactiatiche •.  ·  d.i  apparecchi radio 
e  televisivi  (NICE  375) 
- Coatruzione di appa.recchi elettrodomestici 
{NICE  376) 
·NETHERLANDS  1  ~  Food  Industr,y  IV/209/r4-E 
GERMANY/F~CE  1  Tableaux de  concentration  IV/259/74-F 
ITALY  .-
UALY/BELGIUM~ 
UNITED·. KINGDOM 
- tonstruction de  machines non &lectriques 
.  ···  .  {EX  NICE  3P) 
- Machines et traoteurs agricolea (NICE  361) 
- Machines  de  bureau  (NICE  362) 
- Machines textiles et acceasoires(NICE 364.1) 
- Machines pour  .. maUriaux de  construction 
.  {NICE  366.3) 
.- Materiel de  lavage et de  manu.tention 
· ·(NICE  366. 5) 
1  Tableaux de  concent~tion 
~ Construction de  machines  non  ~lectriquas 
(EX  NICE  36)  · 
1  Tableaux de  concenttation 
- Industria alimentaire dana  son ensemble 
(NICE  20B) 
- Industria des consel'ltes alilnentaires  .. 
. . (EX  NICE  201/203/204) 
seulement  pour l'Italie 
1  - Cost~zione di macchihe per ufficio 
(·NICE  362)  . 
- Costruzione d.i  materiale per soll&vamento 
e  trasporto  {NICE  366.5) 
- Costruzione di maochine  e  trattori agricoli 
/  .  .(NICE  361)  / 
IV  /337/74-F 
//--~·  -.  l:  . /  /'i/ 
- Costrllzione di maochi.ne  tessl,li ed aocessori  j 
.  (NICE  364.1) 
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- Electrical household appliances industr,y 
t  The  Food  Indu$tr,y 
a  The  Paper Industr.y 
1  Industria Farmaceutica 
&  Industrie alimentaire 
c  The  Food  Industr.y 
Industria di cicli, motocicli e  ciclc-
motori 
a  The  Textile Industr.y 
a  Industrie de  la brasserie 
1  Industrie alimentaire - Tableaux de 
concentration 
a  Industrie du textile 
1  A Study of the evolution or  concentration 
IV/400/74-I 
IV I  457/7  4-E 
IV/458/74-E 
IV/70/75-E 
IV/80/75-E 
IV/81/75-I 
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8716  FB  220 
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in the  Food  Industr.y -- Product  Market  Structure: 
- Vol'llme  I  87Z7  FB  350 
(t.  4· 25) 
- Volume  II  8709  FB  300 
(1.  3. 70) 
I  Industrie  Pha~ceutique  8741  FB  235 
(L  2. 70} 
I  The  Pharmaceutical  Industr.y  (II)  8742  FB  165 
(L  2.00) 
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UNITED  KINGDOM 
GERMANY 
Industria cotoniera 
Costruzione  elettric~ 
- Costruzione di  apparecch:i elettro-
domestici 
- Costruzione di  apparecchir.ture elettro-
niche ed elettroacustiche e  di J~pparecchi 
radio  e  televisi 
8743 
. 8746 
FB  200 
(t.  2.40) 
FB  275 
(t.3.35) 
Unt ersuchung zur Konzent rc;t ionsentwickl  ung 
in ,einem Untersektor des  Fahrzeugbaues  in 
Deutschland  (II) 
87 48  FB  100 
(t.  1.20) 
- Fahrrader  (NICE  385. 1) 
- Motorrader und  Mopeds  (NICE  385.1) 
Untersuchung zur Konzentra.tionsentwicklung  8749 
in verschiedenen Untersektoren der Pa.pier-
und  Pappeindustrie  in Deutschland 
M~thodologie de  l'analyse  de 'la concentra- 8756 
tion applirruee  a l'etude des'secteurs et 
des  marches 
A Study of the  e.vo1ution of concentration  8708 
in the  mechanical  engineering sector for 
the  United  Kingdom  · 
A Study of the evolution of concentration  8704 
in the United Kingdom  mechanical  engineering 
Industry - conce.ntration tables 
Untersuchung zur Konzentrationsentwick1ung  87 44 
in verschiedenen. Untersektoren der Iviaschinen-
bauindustrie  in Deutschland 
I  - Landwirtschaftliche  Maschinen  und 
A<;:kerschlepper  (NICE  361) 
II  ~ EUromaschinen  (NICE  362) 
III - 'rextilmaschinen und  Zubeh1:1r  (NICE  364.1) 
IV- Bau- und. Baustoffmaschinen  (NICE  366,4) 
V- Hebezeuge  unf Fordermittel  (NICE  366.5) 
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